

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE  
WASHINGTON, DC

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# FSIS DIRECTIVE

9030.1  
Revision 1

10/26/10

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## TARGETING FOR HIGH-RISK IMPORTED PRODUCT SHIPMENTS

### I. PURPOSE

This directive provides instructions to FSIS personnel in the Office of International Affairs (OIA), the Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement and Review (OPEER), and the Office of Data Integration and Food Protection (ODIFP), for monitoring risk from imported meat, poultry, and egg product shipments in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Automated Targeting System (ATS). This directive also provides instruction to Import Inspection Personnel regarding the process that FSIS will use to re-inspect imported products that may pose elevated food defense concerns.

#### *Key points*

- Describes general activities for FSIS personnel using the ATS
- Describes FSIS import inspection activities for high-risk imported product shipments

### II. CANCELLATION

FSIS Directive 9030.1, Targeting for High-Risk Imported Product Shipments, dated 9/10/08.

### III. REASON FOR REISSUANCE

FSIS is reissuing this directive to update the instructions related to targeted high-risk imported product shipments.

### IV. REFERENCES

FSIS Directive 5500.2, Significant Incident Response  
FSIS Directive 5500.3, Incident Investigation Team Reviews  
FSIS Directive 8410.1, Detentions and Seizures  
FSIS Directive 9600.1, Illegally Imported or Smuggled Products and Reporting in the Import Alert Tracking System

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**Distribution:** Electronic

**OPI:** OPPD

## **V. BACKGROUND**

A. The ATS is a CBP data tool that obtains and analyzes sources of information in order to track shipments that are offered for import into the United States and that may pose a risk to consumers or the food and agricultural infrastructure. It assigns a risk-based point score to shipments as they enter or prepare to enter the United States. Part of the basis for the risk-based point score is a yearly assessment of FSIS import data.

B. FSIS personnel working at the CBP National Targeting Center for Cargo (NTCC) access available data, review the assigned point score, and determine whether the scores are valid. FSIS has identified shipments assigned a validated score of less than 190 as low risk. Shipments assigned a validated score of 190 or more are considered high risk.

C. FSIS personnel working at the NTCC provide target-specific information to contacts within FSIS and CBP to ensure that shipments identified as targeted have been analyzed and controlled. A shipment deemed low risk by virtue of its score may still be targeted by FSIS or CBP for various reasons.

## **VI. GENERAL ACTIVITIES FOR FSIS PERSONNEL USING THE ATS**

A. The ODIFP Assistant Administrator or designee is to coordinate the assignment of FSIS personnel that will conduct targeting activities at the NTCC. An FSIS employee assigned to conduct targeting activities at the NTCC serves as the FSIS NTCC Liaison. Training on the use of the ATS is provided to FSIS personnel by CBP.

B. The FSIS NTCC Liaison is to:

1. Serve as a liaison between the NTCC management team and FSIS;
2. Alert FSIS managers to targeting issues;
3. Update data rule set information as needed (e.g., updated import data);
4. Deliver official FSIS responses to CBP inquiries made at the NTCC and consult with representatives of appropriate FSIS Offices, when necessary, to respond to inquiries;
5. Enter an Import Alert into the FSIS Import Alert Tracking System (IATS) when high targeting scores are validated; and

**NOTE:** The FSIS NTCC Liaison is to contact the OIA Import Inspection Division, Deputy Director for Operations (IID-DDO) or designee to enter an Import Alert.

6. Request sampling through appropriate FSIS channels based on risk evaluation.

## **VII. HANDLING SHIPMENTS IDENTIFIED AS LOW RISK (VALIDATED SCORES BELOW 190 (< 190))**

A. The FSIS NTCC Liaison is to review low risk shipment information and confirm a valid a low risk score. In some instances, Agency personnel may be asked to provide feedback on these shipments.

B. When a targeted, low risk shipment is presented to FSIS for reinspection, FSIS import inspection personnel are to reinspect these shipments and to report findings through supervisory channels, to the FSIS NTCC Liaison.

## **VIII. HANDLING SHIPMENTS IDENTIFIED AS HIGH RISK (VALIDATED SCORES EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN 190 (≥ 190))**

A. Shipments Located At the Port of Entry

1. When targeting criteria result in the classification of a shipment as high-risk because of a valid high risk score, CBP may hold the product before entry and determine appropriate action (e.g., X-raying the containers, radiation inspection). The product remains under the jurisdiction of CBP at the port of entry. If the shipment is confirmed hazardous, CBP will not allow it to enter.
2. The FSIS NTCC Liaison is to initiate an Import Alert, based on available information, through the IATS, for all high-risk shipments and forward information regarding these shipments to the appropriate Regional Import Field Office (RIFO) and to FSIS personnel at the CBP Commercial Targeting and Analysis Center.
3. The Import Surveillance Liaison Officer (ISLO) is to obtain copies of the shipping documents and to update the Import Alert with any pertinent shipment information not obtained by ATS.
4. To track movement of a high-risk shipment cleared by CBP, the FSIS NTCC Liaison is to coordinate with the appropriate IID RIFO or the appropriate OPEER Regional Director via Import Alert updates or phone with respect to any movement of the product.
5. If the product, the packaging, or the transport container in or for a high-risk shipment is determined by CBP not to be hazardous, the shipment of product may move to an official import inspection establishment, or to another location, for further examination in order to eliminate any product issues not identified in the CBP inspection (e.g., eligibility of product; tampering).

B. Shipments Moved to an Official Import Inspection Establishment: When a targeted high-risk shipment is examined and cleared by CBP (i.e., determined to be non-hazardous and no longer high risk to CBP), and is presented to FSIS for reinspection at an official import inspection establishment, the RIFO Supervisor is to dispatch an ISLO to oversee the reinspection.

1. The ISLO or other FSIS personnel is to inform the IID RIFO when the high-risk shipment arrives at the designated import establishment. The RIFO Supervisor or ISLO is then to update the IATS. The RIFO is to coordinate with the OPEER Regional Director in the event that the shipment does not arrive at the import establishment as scheduled.
2. The ISLO and other FSIS personnel are to:
  - a. Handle any shipments identified as high-risk, or in which the product or containers bear evidence of possible tampering or contamination, in a manner that will ensure their personal safety;
  - b. Contact the IID RIFO for any additional guidance before product staging and import reinspection of the shipment; and
  - c. Retain the shipment pending reinspection instructions.
3. The ISLO is to review shipment information (e.g., records, packaging, product, and possible evidence of tampering) and is to:
  - a. Inform the RIFO Supervisor or the IID DDO of his or her the findings;
  - b. Verify that the product is controlled;
  - c. Initiate or update an Import Alert through the IATS;
  - d. Conduct sampling, if requested, as directed by the Office of Public Health Science (OPHS) or the FSIS Emergency Management Committee (EMC) (see FSIS Directive 5500.3); and
  - e. Inform the RIFO and FSIS NTCC Liaison of all shipment findings.
4. Import inspection personnel are to reinspect the shipment, and the RIFO is to notify import inspection personnel to enter results for the unscheduled homeland security physical exam.
5. Where evidence suggests tampering, the IID-DDO is to elevate the Import Alert to an Incident Report (IR) as set out in FSIS Directive 9600.1 and FSIS Directive 5500.2 and inform the appropriate OPEER Regional Director. The OPEER Regional Director is to notify OIG as appropriate.
6. The FSIS NTCC Liaison is to notify CBP at the NTCC of all high-risk shipments identified as refused entry and of the reason for refusal.

C. ATS users may occasionally see a targeted high-risk shipment of non-amenable goods in the system that has been cleared by CBP but will not be presented to FSIS for reinspection. These types of instances may be of interest to FSIS because the meat, poultry, or processed egg product ingredients used in FSIS-exempted products must be from an [eligible source](#), (i.e., prepared under USDA/FSIS inspection or in a foreign

establishment certified by a foreign inspection system approved by FSIS). In such situations, the ATS user is to issue an Import Alert so that the appropriate follow-up inquiry can be conducted by either an ISLO or OPEER Investigator at a location other than an official import inspection establishment (see FSIS Directive 8410.1, Detentions and Seizures and follow guidance referred in FSIS Directive 9600.1, Illegally Imported or Smuggled Products and Reporting in the Import Alert Tracking System).

## **IX. DATA ANALYSIS**

On an annual basis, data collected through the ATS is to be analyzed by ODIFP working with OIA, OPPD, and OPEER, to inform the use of the risk-based point score, which provides target-specific information to FSIS and CBP staff. This analysis is to be used to identify trends in country of origin, volume of production, product types, and type of alert, along with other statistical trends. Additionally, OPEER, OPPD, and ODIFP are to collaborate with OIA when further analyses are needed.

Refer questions through supervisory channels.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David J. Seibert". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent loop at the end.

Assistant Administrator  
Office of Policy and Program Development