

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE/FOOD SAFETY AND

INSPECTION SERVICE

AGENDA

Pages: 1 through 271

Place: Arlington, VA

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION

Official Reporters

1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005-4018
(202) 628-4888
hrc@concentric.net

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Date: February 29, 2000

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION

Official Reporters

1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005-4018
(202) 628-4888
hrc@concentric.net

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE/FOOD SAFETY AND

INSPECTION SERVICE

AGENDA

Recent Developments Regarding Beef Products
Contaminated With Escherichia Coli O157:H7

Pages: 1 through #

Place: Arlington, VA

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION

Official Reporters

1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 600

Washington, D.C. 20005-4018

(202) 628-4888

hrc@concentric.net

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Date: February 29, 2000

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION

Official Reporters

1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005-4018
(202) 628-4888
hrc@concentric.net

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE/FOOD SAFETY AND
INSPECTION SERVICE

AGENDA

Recent Developments Regarding Beef Products
Contaminated With Escherichia Coli O157:H7

Holiday Inn
Rosslyn Westpark Hotel
1900 N. Fort Myer Drive
Rosslyn Ballroom
Arlington, VA 22209

Tuesday,
February 29, 2000

MEETING PARTICIPANTS:

DR. CATHERINE WOTEKI, Under Secretary For Food
Safety

MR. THOMAS BILLY, Administrator,
Food Safety and Inspection Service

DR. WILLIAM C. CRAY, JR., USDA

DR. DANIEL ENGELJOHN, USDA

DR. MARK POWELL, USDA

DR. SONJA J. OLSEN, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention

DR. CAIRD REXROAD, Agriculture Research Service

DR. DELL ALLEN, Excel Corporation

MR. JAMES HODGES, American Meat Institute

DR. KEITH BELK, Colorado State University

DR. ANN HOLLINGSWORTH, Keystone Foods

DR. WAYNE BIDLACK, California State Polytechnic
University

DR. NARAIN NAIDU, California State Polytechnic
University

DR. JAMES REAGAN, National Cattlemen's Beef
Association

DR. KEITH BELK, Colorado State University

DR. ANDREW BENSON, University of Nebraska at Lincoln

DR. COLIN GILL, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada

DR. RANDALL PHEBUS, Kansas State University

MS. NANCY DONLEY, Safe Tables Our Priority

MS. CAROLINE SMITH DEWAAL, Center for Science in the
Public Interest on behalf of the Safe Food
Coalition

P R O C E E D I N G S

(9:10 a.m.)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

MR. BILLY: At this time, it's my pleasure to introduce Dr. Catherine Woteki, who is the Undersecretary for Food Safety in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Cathy?

DR. WOTEKI: Thank you very much, Mr. Billy. I'd like to welcome everyone here today to what I view as being a very important public meeting on E. coli 0157:H7. For the past five years, the Food Safety and Inspection Service has pursued a strategy to make the food supply even safer. And I believe that the agency has made tremendous progress, along with the meat and poultry industry.

Just last month, we reached a major milestone with the third and final phase of implementation of the Pathogen Reduction and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points Rule. And evidence from many sources, including the salmonella performance standard data collected so far, show that this new system really is working to significantly reduce levels of contamination.

Now the organism, E. coli 0157:H7, has played a prominent role in the agency's strategy for change for a

1 number of different reasons. First of all, it's a
2 pathogen of great concern because of its virulence. And
3 as a result, FSIS has declared it to be an adulterant in
4 ground beef in 1994, one of the first steps taken by the
5 agency when it began an aggressive strategy to reduce
6 foodborne illnesses.

7 Second, because of the seriousness of this
8 pathogen, it served as a catalyst for change enabling
9 FSIS as to make major improvements in all aspects of its
10 food safety programs. Before E. coli 0157:H7 emerged as
11 a pathogen of concern, that progress occurred, but it
12 occurred very slowly.

13 Third, E. coli 0157:H7 has played a prominent
14 role in our strategy for change, because it's a prime
15 example of a food safety issue where FSIS had to take
16 action to protect the public health, even though the
17 scientific data were incomplete. The process we're going
18 through now to reevaluate our policies, as new
19 information becomes available, is a process that you will
20 see repeated again in the future for various hazards as
21 science moves forward.

22 And fourth, E. coli 0157:H7 is a good example
23 of how government, academia, industry, and consumers have

1 come together to address a single, very important food
2 safety issue. Today's agenda reflects the tremendous
3 efforts that have been put forth to make sure that our
4 decisions will be informed decisions.

5 Now our goal has been, and will continue to be,
6 to ensure that our policies for E. coli 0157:H7 protect
7 consumers to the fullest extent possible and that it's
8 based on the best scientific information available. This
9 meeting will help us to achieve that goal. And I look
10 forward to hearing the various presentations that are on
11 today's agenda.

12 Now, I very much appreciate all of your
13 interest in participating in this meeting today, and I'd
14 like to now turn over the meeting to Mr. Tom Billy,
15 Administrator of the Food Safety and Inspection Service,
16 who will be moderating the meeting today. Tom?

17 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. And I,
18 too, would like to welcome all of you to this public
19 meeting. As you know, E. coli 0157:H7 is a pathogen of
20 great concern to FSIS. In 1994, as Cathy indicated, the
21 agency declared the pathogen to be an adulterant in
22 ground beef. And the agency instituted an end-product
23 sampling program, first, to stimulate action by industry,

1 and second, to help keep adulterated products out of the
2 marketplace.

3 In January 1999, FSIS issued a notice to
4 clarify that E. coli 0157:H7 adulterate not only ground
5 beef, but any nonintact product or intact product that is
6 to be further processed into a nonintact product. Now,
7 as Dr. Woteki said, our goal has been, and will continue
8 to be, to ensure that our policy on E. coli 0157:H7
9 protects consumers to the extent possible and is based on
10 the best scientific data available.

11 Thus, FSIS is very interested in new
12 information that would enhance our understanding of the
13 pathogen and the appropriateness of our strategies. Such
14 new information is, in fact, available from a number of
15 sources. And that is why we're here today. We want to
16 hear this new information and share it with you to keep
17 all of you informed.

18 We also want to allow both the agency and the
19 public to ask questions and to receive any comments you
20 may have. We believe that the information presented here
21 today may well have a bearing on the agency's policy on
22 E. coli 0157:H7 or on the implementation of that policy.
23 In particular, FSIS wants to move forward on the January

1 1999 Federal Register notice regarding intact versus
2 nonintact products.

3 Verification of this policy by field employees
4 has been on hold, although industry must adhere to the
5 policy. In moving forward on the 1999 policy, FSIS has
6 posed a number of questions regarding implementation of
7 this policy on which it would like to receive input.
8 These questions were listed in the Federal Register
9 notice announcing this public meeting.

10 For example, we are asking whether it would,
11 whether we should, redesign our sampling program that is,
12 our testing program. And for example, should we
13 establish alternatives to that testing program, and
14 whether a plant's testing and verification programs
15 should influence the degree of FSIS testing.

16 Based on all of the new information presented
17 and comments we have received from a variety of sources,
18 we will present our current thinking on E. coli 0157:H7
19 to the National Advisory Committee on Meat and Poultry
20 Inspection which will meet in Washington, D.C., on May
21 16th and 17th. FSIS will, then, take whatever actions
22 are necessary to implement its policy and verify industry
23 compliance.

1 I'd like to take a moment to review the agenda
2 before we start. We have a number of presentations
3 scheduled today, and time will be allowed for questions
4 after each one. To facilitate this, we have established
5 a panel from the agency that is, from FSIS.

6 And the panel consists of Dr. William C. Cray,
7 Jr., who a microbiologist with the Microbiology Division
8 in FSIS; Dr. Daniel Engeljohn, who is the Director of the
9 Regulations Development and Analysis Division in the
10 agency; and Dr. Mark Paul, a risk analyst for the
11 Epidemiology and Risk Assessment Division in FSIS.

12 The panel members will have an opportunity to
13 ask questions first. Then, we will open it to the
14 audience to ask questions, as well. If you'll quickly
15 look at the agenda, I'd like to go over the agenda very
16 quickly. As you can see, we intend to lead off with some
17 agency presentations to share new information and data
18 that we have, to bring you up to date with regard to the
19 work within the agency.

20 Then, we will open it up to other federal
21 agencies and the work that they are doing, as well as
22 work, important new work that's being done in the private
23 sector, as well. We plan to break for lunch at 12:30.

1 We also plan to take a couple of breaks in the morning
2 and the afternoon.

3 There are a couple of changes in the agenda.
4 First, at the presentation just after lunch at 1:30, my
5 understanding is that Dr. Gary Weber will be making that
6 presentation. Is that right, Gary? And then, the
7 presentation at 3:15 this afternoon, regarding work done
8 at Kansas State University, that will be a joint
9 presentation involving both Dr. Randy Phebus and Dr. Jim
10 Marsden.

11 Finally, if you wish to speak during the
12 comment period between 4:45 and 5:45 this afternoon, we
13 request that you sign up at the desk out front here
14 outside the room. Several people have already done that
15 and we welcome that. We request that you sign up to
16 speak if you want to make a presentation.

17 Okay. With that, what I'd like to do, then, is
18 move on to the presentations. And the first presentation
19 will be done by Dr. William Cray, Jr. And he will focus
20 on the new methodology, the new testing procedure that
21 we're using for E. coli 0157:H7.

22 DR. CRAY: I want to begin by giving an
23 overview of the new method. The new method was developed

1 through a collaboration with Dr. Jerry Crawford of the
2 USDA Agricultural Research Service. His laboratory is at
3 the Eastern Regional Research Center in Winmore
4 (phonetic), Pennsylvania.

5 All agents and supplies used in the new method
6 are commercially available. The new method is posted on
7 the FSIS Website. The mention of specific brand and
8 trade names for a product, medium, chemical, or agent
9 does not constitute endorsement or selectivity by USDA
10 over similar products that might also be suitable.

11 Analysis for E. coli 0157:H7 can be divided
12 into four steps -- enrichment screening tests, isolation,
13 identification, and confirmation. The new and old method
14 use the same enrichment screening tests and
15 identification confirmation. The difference in the
16 method is in the isolation steps.

17 MR. BILLY: Dr. Cray?

18 DR. CRAY: Yes?

19 MR. BILLY: May I interrupt just a second? For
20 those that may not be able to see what's on the screen,
21 it's also in this handout that looks like this. And if
22 you'll look in there, you'll find the same slide is in
23 it. Sorry.

1 DR. CRAY: Enrichment step, the meat sample is
2 mixed with nutrients and chemicals in a broth to
3 encourage the growth of E. coli and discourages the
4 growth of other bacteria. In the screening test, the
5 sample enrichment broth is analyzed by performing an
6 immunochromatography based E. coli 0157 dipstick
7 screening test, if negative analysis stops. If positive,
8 the sample is considered a potential positive.

9 In the old method, samples of the enrichment
10 broth were diluted and spread onto MSABCIG aggre
11 (phonetic.) E. coli 0157:H7 appeared colorless on
12 MSABCIG aggre. Other bacteria could also appear
13 colorless, making E. coli 0157:H7 difficult to detect.
14 On the new method, E. coli 0157:H7 cells are concentrated
15 by using immunomagnetic separation and spread onto
16 rainbow agar.

17 E. coli 0157:H7 typically appears as dark
18 colonies on rainbow agar. For identification and
19 confirmation, biochemical tests identify the isolate as
20 an E. coli and serological tests confirm the presence of
21 the 0157:MH7 antigen. This is a slide showing a
22 representation of immunomagnetic beads in E. coli 0157.

1 These green structures represent E. coli 0157,
2 and these represent the immunomagnetic beads. The
3 immunomagnetic beads have an iron core, and they are
4 coded with antibody. Now, the antibody acts like a
5 molecular Velcro. And when the immunomagnetic beads make
6 physical contact with an E. coli 0157 cell, they will
7 adhere. The cells and beads are very small, 300 cells
8 placed end to end, which would equal about 1 millimeter.

9 This is a photograph of immunomagnetic beads,
10 which have been mixed with a pure culture of E. coli
11 0157. These rodlike figures are the E. coli 0157 cells.
12 And these are the immunomagnetic beads. The beads in the
13 attached E. coli 0157 cells are concentrated using a
14 column and a magnet. The enrichment broth containing the
15 beads is poured through the column.

16 The beads have an iron core and are held in the
17 column by the magnet. The colored dots represent
18 bacteria that are not E. coli 0157. The black dots
19 represent E. coli 0157. Buffer is poured through the
20 column to wash away most of the bacteria that are not E.
21 coli 0157. However, there are always some bacteria that
22 stick and cannot be washed away.

1 This shows the column after it has been removed
2 from the magnet and buffer is added, and the beads can be
3 flushed out of the column along with the E. coli 0157.
4 These beads are then plated onto an agar plate. And the
5 plates are placed in a warm incubator to allow the
6 bacteria to multiply. After 24 hours incubation, a
7 single cell that initially we could not see will multiply
8 and form a colony that we can see, which will contain
9 hundreds of millions of cells.

10 This line illustrates the differences between
11 the old and the new agar. On the old agar, the E. coli
12 0157:H7 cells and some other bacteria will appear
13 colorless. On the new agar, E. coli 0157:H7 appears as
14 dark colonies. Now, as you can see, there are a lot of
15 other bacteria on here. And these were the bacteria that
16 were sticking to the beads. We weren't able to wash
17 those off. And we refer to those bacteria as background.

18 And you can see when there is a low number of
19 E. coli 0157 on a plate that it's much easier to pick
20 these dark colonies, out on the new agar than to pick
21 which of these colonies -- of these colorless colonies
22 are E. coli 0157. Now, on these plates, we put an equal
23 amount of beads in E. coli 0157 cells, so there are
24 approximately 20 E. coli 0157 cells on the new agar and
25 20 on the old agar. And it would be very difficult to
26 pick the 0157 out of these background colonies that are
27 also colorless.

1 Now, I'd like to show you how the method is
2 performed in our laboratory. We have the magnet on a
3 stand and a pan to collect anything that is washed out of
4 the column. And we also have a small centrifuge. From a
5 dipstick positive enrichment broth, we will pipe that
6 about 5 mls and place that in a tube. Then we add a
7 screen with a mesh onto a second tube.

8 And we then pour the enrichment broth through
9 the mesh. And this withholds large particles of meat
10 which could clog the column. We take 1 ml of the
11 enrichment broth, and we add it to a small tube that has
12 the immunomagnetic beads. We place the tube on the
13 mixer, and this agitates the tube so that the beads will
14 thoroughly mix throughout the enrichment broth.

15 While the beads are mixing, we place our
16 columns on the magnet. When the mixing step is finished
17 we then add the enrichment broth with the beads to the
18 column. And we allow it to go through. The magnet will
19 hold the beads in this area. There is a matrix in this
20 area, which allows the liquid to flow through, but will
21 impede the beads from flowing through.

22 We then add a buffer to rinse away as many of
23 the background bacteria that we can. When the rinsing
24 steps are finished, we remove the column and the beads
25 are still in this area. And surface tension holds the
26 beads in the matrix. We then place the column on the
27 tube, and a buffer is added to the column.

1 And a plunger is used to force the beads down
2 through to the bottom of the tube. Now we have about 1
3 ml of our solution of beads. And we add a 10th of an ml
4 to an agar plate. And we then spread that on the agar
5 plate. We return to our tube, and we take a 10th of an
6 ml from this and make a 1-10 delusion. And we'll plate
7 that.

8 Then, we still have about .8 ml of the bead
9 solution. And we take that and put it into a small tube.
10 And then, we put that into our centrifuge. And this will
11 spin around and force all of the beads to the bottom of
12 the tube. We then collect these beads and plate those.

13 So for every sample, we'll have a plate with
14 undiluted beads, a 1-10 solution, and then our
15 concentrated beads for a total of three plates. And we
16 are doing this, because if the E. coli are present in
17 very high numbers, then it will be too hard to get
18 isolated colonies if we use undiluted beads.

19 And on the other hand, if they are sparsely
20 populated, then we need to use the concentrated beads to
21 ensure that we will be able to isolate the E. coli 0157.
22 We, then, place the plates in an incubator, and we
23 incubate them for 24 hours.

24 And at the end of the incubation period, we
25 examine the plates for dark colonies which are typical of
26 E. coli 0157. At this point, we perform a serological
27 latex bead test for the 0157 antigen. Colonies that are

1 positive for the 0157 antigen are then stripped onto
2 blood agar.

3 After incubation, colonies on those plates are
4 analyzed serologically, and biochemical tests are
5 performed to identify them as E. coli 0157. The agar
6 that we're using is not perfect, in that not every dark
7 colony is an E. coli 0157. But it is an improvement over
8 the old agar.

9 The new method is, at least, four times more
10 sensitive than the old method and reduces our analysis
11 time by one day. And now, I'd like to show you the
12 results of raw beef products analyzed for E. coli
13 0157:H7. The number of samples analyzed are on the y-
14 axis, and this shows fiscal years '95, when the projects
15 first began, '96, '97, '98, '99, and 2000 up to February
16 13th.

17 And this shows the number of positive isolates
18 in '95, '96, '97. And I don't know if you can read this
19 for three in '95, four in '96, two in '97. In 1998,
20 there is an increase. There are 14 positives. In 1995,
21 '96, and '97, the sample size analyzed was 25 grams. And
22 in 1998, the sample size was increased to 325 grams, so
23 this increase in positives in fiscal year '98 is
24 attributed to the increase in sample size.

25 The increase in 1999, where we had 29
26 positives, is attributed to the introduction of the new
27 method late in the fiscal year. And the data for 2000 is

1 incomplete, but we would anticipate that the numbers for
2 the fiscal year will be higher than 1999. Questions
3 please?

4 MR. BILLY: Okay. Are there any questions from
5 the panel? No. I have one question just to be clear. I
6 think I heard you say that this new method is four times
7 more sensitive than the old method that we were using, is
8 that correct?

9 DR. CRAY: Yes.

10 MR. BILLY: And I know that some of the studies
11 will be reported on later today were also using the
12 similar kind of new method, so it would be important when
13 presenters talk about their study to be clear what
14 methodology was used, so that we understand the
15 sensitivity of the method that's associated with that
16 data. Are there any other questions anybody has? Yes,
17 Kim?

18 MS. RICE: Kim Rice, AMI. Dr. Cray, can you
19 clarify on the 325-gram sample that you now pull, you
20 actually run 565-gram tests, correct?

21 DR. CRAY: Correct.

22 MS. RICE: So does that number indicate the
23 samples taken or the tests run?

24 DR. CRAY: This number indicates the samples,
25 and so the subsamples would be five times that number.

1 MS. RICE: So the number of tests run since the
2 change to 325 is actually five times that number,
3 correct?

4 DR. CRAY: Yes, yes.

5 MS. RICE: Okay.

6 MR. BILLY: State your name and your
7 affiliation.

8 MR. WOOD: Richard Wood with Fact Food Elements
9 Concerned Trust. You mentioned that this test takes one
10 day less than the earlier test. What is the total test
11 time, then?

12 DR. CRAY: Samples that are analyzed on a
13 Monday, we would have their result on a Friday. So about
14 four days. And that would be if there were no
15 extenuating circumstances. For example, if the E. coli
16 0157 colony was in a crowded area on a plate, it would
17 have to be restreaked. And that would add an additional
18 day.

19 MR. WOOD: And the sample is a meat sample that
20 is taken. Can this test -- and perhaps I'll learn this
21 as we hear the presenters -- but can this test be used
22 for fecal samples or any other kind of sampling?

23 DR. CRAY: We haven't evaluated that. But the
24 principles of using the beads, CDC uses those now for
25 that.

26 MR. WOOD: Thank you.

27 MR. BILLY: Yes?

1 MS. HOLLINGSWORTH: Ann Hollingsworth with
2 Keystone Foods. You stated that this test is four times
3 more accurate than the other test. On what basis are you
4 making the assumption? And has that data been
5 peer-reviewed and acknowledged?

6 DR. CRAY: The data was obtained by running
7 samples in parallel with the old method and the new
8 method. The data is in a manuscript which will be
9 submitted next month for publication. It has not been
10 peer-reviewed.

11 MR. BILLY: Yes, Caroline?

12 MS. DeWAAL: Can the new agar --

13 MR. BILLY: Caroline, state your name.

14 MS. DeWAAL: Caroline Smith DeWaal, Center for
15 Science in the Public Interest. Can the new agar be used
16 without the magnetic beads?

17 DR. CRAY: We find that the -- that it's a
18 combination of using the magnetic without the -- the
19 advantage of the new agar is that it's easier to see the
20 colony's typical E. coli 0157. However, the
21 immunomagnetic beads are necessary to concentrate the
22 cells, which might be present in low numbers.

23 MS. DeWAAL: But is there any reason for
24 people, whether or not they are using the new magnetic
25 beads, is there any reason for people to be using the old
26 agar? The new agar seems so much more superior.

27 DR. CRAY: We no longer use it.

1 MR. BILLY: Sonja?

2 MS. OLSEN: This is Sonja Olsen from CDC. I'd
3 just like to -- I think what you've already said is that
4 CDC currently uses immunomagnetic beads. And there are
5 published accounts of its use in humans. I don't know
6 about, in terms of beef samples, but it's used very
7 frequently in human samples. And it's found to be much
8 more sensitive.

9 MR. BILLY: Yes. Mark?

10 Mr. POWELL: Mark Powell, FSIS. Our analysis
11 of the scientific literature on the IMS method also
12 suggests that it's approximately four times more
13 sensitive. The sensitivity is also a function of the
14 concentration of the samples. At very low levels of
15 spiked samples, it appears to be about four times more
16 sensitive as the concentration in the samples elevates.

17 There's not such a stark contrast. But at the
18 very low levels that you would expect to find, it's
19 approximately four times more sensitive.

20 MR. BILLY: Okay. Randy, did you have
21 anything?

22 MR. PHEBUS: In terms of being able to use --

23 MR. BILLY: Your name?

24 MR. PHEBUS: Oh, excuse me. Randy Phebus,
25 Kansas State University. In terms of being about to use
26 this as a technique that you would use in in-house
27 laboratories, do you think that there's potential worker-

1 safety risk with all the pipe heading and transferring
2 and aspirating and centrifuging that is being done? Or
3 should that be a consideration?

4 DR. CRAY: Well, E. coli 0157 is serious, so we
5 adhere to all the safety regulations in our facility USDA
6 regulations. And as I showed on the slides, all of these
7 operations can be done in a safety cabinet.

8 MR. BILLY: Thank you.

9 MR. DANIELSON: Dean Danielson with IDP. I
10 would like to point out that there are several industry
11 companies that have adopted or adapted this new procedure
12 in the last two or three years. In fact in 1997-1998,
13 these systems, more sensitive systems, became known. And
14 some of us have been using those for a period of time.

15 One question to you or the agency is, I am
16 aware of some labs still using the old methods today.
17 I'm also aware through a secondhand source that when
18 queried, the agency will say either method can be used.

19 Now, in terms of defining policy, it seems to
20 me if there's two methods out there, one being less
21 sensitive and more sensitive, we need to get a little
22 more consistent in that, I would -- would be my opinion.
23 Is there a plan with the agency to specify this new
24 method?

25 DR. CRAY: I can respond in the sense that this
26 is precisely the kind of input and thoughts that we'd
27 like people to share with us as part of this meeting. We

1 recognize that it was a relatively new method, and we're
2 hoping that there would be people switching over to the
3 new method and gaining experience with it.

4 And as that process occurred, then we would
5 reconsider our policy. I mean, there are tradeoffs. If
6 the question is, you know, are they -- do we either do
7 the old method or no testing, we'll take the old method.
8 If they are going to do testing and make a choice between
9 the old and new methods, then we would prefer the new
10 method. But we can make that clear in terms of what we
11 -- what comes out of this meeting.

12 MR. BILLY: Kim, you have a --

13 MS. RICE: Kim Rice, American Meat Institute.
14 One point of clarification, my understanding is that the
15 new method, it's the beads that make it more sensitive
16 and that the use of the rainbow agar just simplifies
17 during the isolation. It's the use of the beads and then
18 the agar simply makes it easier for the technicians in
19 the lab to pick off colonies.

20 DR. CRAY: The beads make it more sensitive.
21 If there are a lot of background colonies that mimic E.
22 coli 0157, then in our understanding, the rainbow agar
23 helps us select the E. coli 0157. If there are not a lot
24 of background colonies with it of similar coloration, in
25 that situation, there isn't an advantage.

26 For example, on one sample, 128 silver-tone
27 negative colonies were picked from a plate. And only one

1 of those was E. coli 0157. On a plate inoculated with
2 the same material, rainwater plate, we were able to pick
3 five out of five. And so the E. coli, if they are there
4 in low numbers, the rainbow benefits, and also if they
5 are in -- if there are a lot of confining organisms,
6 background organisms.

7 MR. BILLY: Okay. Dr. Naidu and then --

8 DR. NAIDU: I'm Dr. Naidu. I'm from Center for
9 Antimicrobial Research. On the same question, the
10 sensitivity and specificity of your method depends on the
11 antibody that is sitting out that has been kept on your
12 magnetic plate. How much polyclonal is your antibody and
13 whether it will recognize all types of E. coli 0157 and
14 how the life of the antibody during your testing would
15 influence the result?

16 DR. CRAY: We use commercially prepared Dynel
17 immunomagnetic beads. These are used in many
18 laboratories in the U.S. and Canada and Norway. And my
19 understanding is it's proprietary information exactly
20 what their antibodies are. But my understanding is that
21 it's a polyclonal antibody to E. coli 0157.

22 That's why we use a serological test. When
23 we're picking colonies typical of E. coli 0157 off of our
24 media, we have to confirm chemically if they are E. coli
25 0157, that they are E. coli and we serologically confirm
26 that they are 0157 in itself H7. We also perform toxin
27 tests on all of the isolates.

1 So if an isolate is E. coli 0157-positive
2 serologically, and if the H7 test is inconclusive, then
3 we will -- and if it is toxin-positive, we will report
4 that out as E. coli 0157:H7.

5 MR. BILLY: Okay. Last question.

6 MR. WOOD: Rich Wood with FACT. Are the costs
7 of the new tests different than the costs of the former
8 tests? Is there an incentive one way or another?

9 DR. CRAY: The materials are more expensive for
10 the new tests. But the labor costs are markedly reduced.

11 MR. WOOD: So it's an even trade?

12 DR. CRAY: We think it's -- there's more
13 benefit to the new test. It costs less.

14 MR. BILLY: Okay. I'd like to move on. Thank
15 you very much, Dr. Cray. The next presentation will
16 focus on the area of irradiation of meat products. It
17 will be made by Dr. Dan Engeljohn.

18 DR. ENGELJOHN: Good morning. I, too, have a
19 handout in the back of the room that follows through each
20 of these slides. I'd like to point out the FSIS website
21 that's on this first page, as well, where we have most of
22 the information I'm presenting today is already available
23 on our website. And we will be having, or adding, more
24 information to that website shortly.

25 I'll talk briefly about the final regulation
26 that just issued. It issued in the Federal Register,
27 Volume 64 on December 23, 1999. It became effective on

1 February the 22nd of this year. It involves, for
2 specific the topic today, it involves the refrigerated or
3 frozen beef in the uncooked state. It could be packaged
4 or unpackaged, seasoned or unseasoned.

5 And the sources of irradiation can be from
6 gamma, which would include the Cobalt 60 or CZM 137
7 sources or the machine sources which would include x-rays
8 and high-energy electron beams. One other piece of
9 information issued this last week was our FSIS Directive
10 No. 7700.1, which includes the instructions to our
11 employees of how they would do verification activities
12 within the irradiation facilities. That too is available
13 on our website.

14 This week, I would hope this week we would be
15 issuing a question and answer that contains many of the
16 questions that we've received since the regulation
17 published. And it addresses issues related to labeling,
18 process control, and so forth. And we'll update that as
19 we get in more questions and post that to the website.

20 With regard to the controls that we have in
21 place, it's our expectation that radiation facilities
22 will identify critical points within their HACCP system.
23 And this would be for radiation on-site or radiation at a
24 contracted facility that may be off-site. Within that
25 control program, we would expect that there would be both
26 symmetry addressed, as well as documentation.

1 And most of that documentation relates to
2 licensing or registration, training of the employees that
3 operate the irradiation program, as well as operating the
4 food perishability aspects of their program. In
5 addition, there would be issues related to worker safety.

6 And we've added a criteria for citations that
7 might be received from other federal agencies or other
8 regulatory authorities related to the operation of an
9 irradiation facility. And then, we have issues related
10 to packaging. On the packaging issue, I'll talk about
11 next, those packaging criteria are listed in 21 C.F.R.
12 179.45.

13 I do want to point out that yesterday we did
14 receive a letter from the Food and Drug Administration
15 that will allow, upon the request of FSIS, recently, it
16 will allow for a one-year trial, the use of all radiation
17 materials that are approved for gamma sources to also be
18 used for electron sources or x-ray sources. And so we
19 will be getting instructions out on that that we've
20 received a number of questions on that. I was glad to
21 get that letter from FDA yesterday.

22 With regard to labeling, this is the area where
23 we get most of the comments. But I'd like to point out
24 that product that's irradiated in its entirety -- and
25 that could be either in the package form or in an
26 unpackaged form -- the requirements would be that
27 labeling would include the logo which is pictured here on

1 this slide in any color and a statement. And that
2 statement could be treated with radiation or treated by
3 irradiation.

4 Or if irradiated is in the product name that,
5 too, would suffice. But in any case if it's irradiated,
6 if the product is irradiated in its entirety, it would
7 have both the logo and some identification of the
8 radiation treatment.

9 If irradiated beef is used as an ingredient in
10 a multiingredient product, such as beef used to make
11 fermented sausage, then the irradiated beef would be
12 listed in the ingredients statement in the order of
13 predominance as it's used in the formulation.

14 This last slide talks about the radiation
15 sensitivity of E. coli 0157:H7. 0157:H7 is particularly
16 radiation-sensitive when compared to salmonella or to
17 listeria. The d values for E. coli 0157 in the
18 refrigerated state is .25 kilocurie (phonetic.) In the
19 frozen state, it's .45 kilocurie. To point out for
20 salmonella, in the refrigerated state, the d value is .4.

21 And for listeria, it's .48, so it is quite a
22 bit more sensitive to radiation than the two other
23 pathogens of primary concern in beef. To give you an
24 idea of what it would take to irradiate beef to eliminate
25 it to the levels that would be representative of cooked
26 beef, we have in place regulation 9 C.F.R. §318.23, which

1 is our cooked beef patty regulation for fully cooked beef
2 patties.

3 That is associated with a 5-log reduction for
4 salmonella and E. coli 0157:H7. It would require 1.25
5 kilocurie to irradiate beef in the refrigerated state to
6 achieve a log reduction for 0157:H7. In the frozen
7 state, it would take a higher dose. It would take 2.25
8 kilocurie minimum to achieve a 5-log reduction. That
9 would make it equivalent to a cooked meat patty.

10 In terms of the recently issued performance
11 standard rule for cooked roast beef, where the log
12 reduction for salmonella was 6.5 kilocurie -- I mean, I'm
13 sorry -- 6.5 logs, the equivalent in terms of what that
14 would take with the irradiation would be 1.63 kilocurie
15 in the refrigerated state and a minimum of 2.93 kilocurie
16 in the frozen.

17 And the reason the difference between the
18 refrigerated and frozen state is that the water particles
19 are tied up in the frozen state, and it takes a higher
20 dose to accomplish the same effect. With regard to the
21 organoleptic (phonetic) properties of irradiated meat,
22 our expectation is that there would not be any noticeable
23 or discernible differences in the taste, the color, the
24 odor, or other attributes associated with raw ground
25 beef.

26 And for those reasons, we believe that
27 irradiation is extremely effective in reducing or

1 eliminating 0157 from raw ground beef. And it is our
2 expectation that we will have irradiated beef available
3 fairly soon. We do have a training program for our
4 inspectors in the field.

5 We have roughly four plants that we know are up
6 and getting ready to irradiate beef, mostly in the
7 midwest in the Chicago area and the Sioux City, Iowa,
8 area, and then in the Florida area. Other than that,
9 we're waiting to see what kind of response we do get from
10 the irradiation and meat industry for this technology.
11 Any questions?

12 MR. BILLY: Any questions from the panel?
13 Okay. Other questions? Perhaps, I can kick one off,
14 Dan. There's a follow-on petition, I believe, from
15 industry to FDA regarding irradiation of meat products.
16 Could you speak briefly about that and what it's about?

17 DR. ENGELJOHN: Certainly. There are a number
18 of petitions that have been submitted to the Food and
19 Drug Administration for irradiation. Actually, there are
20 seven that have been submitted. And they are being
21 handled by FDA in an expedited manner, in the sense that
22 they have antimicrobial properties. And they will be
23 reviewed on a first-in, first-out-type of basis.

24 And so I would point out that two petitions
25 submitted by FSIS for hot bone meat and for poultry to
26 change poultry requirements to be the same or consistent
27 with red meat were number 5 and 6 on that list of

1 petitions. And then, the industry petition for
2 ready-to-eat product was number 7. So it's the last one
3 that's received.

4 And so our expectation would be that FDA would
5 resolve the petitions that have come in prior in the
6 order they were received. The regulation that we just
7 issued deals with raw meat only and can have non-food
8 seasonings added to it. But that's the extent of
9 additions that could be to the raw meat.

10 The industry's petition related to ready-to-eat
11 meat products. And it was very broad in the sense that
12 it covers all ready-to-eat meat and poultry products.
13 And that would include all the additives and binders and
14 treatments that occur with ready-to-eat meat.

15 FDA did begin the process of redoing some of
16 the additives and binders that would be in meat products
17 when they originally began the review for the raw meat
18 petition that was submitted back in 1994. So they've
19 begun the process. But there's an enormous amount of
20 work that also has to be reviewed, particularly from a
21 nutritional and from a toxicological safety standpoint.

22 It is our hope that we would be able to help
23 with the review of that petition by providing them some
24 expertise. But I think that it would probably be awhile
25 before they are able to address that particular petition
26 that would deal with ready-to-eat products and primarily
27 for the effect of *Listeria monocytogenes* control.

1 MR. BILLY: Thank you. Question?

2 MR. MARSDEN: Yes. Jim Marsden, Kansas State
3 University. Dr. Engeljohn, one approach that industry's
4 looking at is to utilize an integrated HACCP plan to
5 reduce the bioburden in the raw meat product prior to
6 irradiation as much as possible, and then to irradiate or
7 pasteurize that product using irradiation at low doses.

8 But what they documented bioburden control
9 using microbiological testing to document control. How
10 does the agency look at that? You were talking about a
11 5-log reduction and higher log reductions that would be
12 consistent with other regulations that are in place.

13 If bioburden were controlled and held at a very
14 low level, we could effectively pasteurize the product
15 without having negative sensory effects, and so on. Is
16 that something that you would look favorably on?

17 DR. ENGELJOHN: I would certainly agree with
18 the statements that you made about the effect of a total
19 process control where you're integrating a variety of
20 barriers to reduce the bioburden on the product. That is
21 exactly what we would hope industry would move towards in
22 terms of all their processing in meat and poultry
23 products that irradiation would be one of those hurdles
24 that could be added to it.

25 And you certainly could reduce the level of
26 irradiation that you might want to apply to that product.
27 The log reductions that I've provided in the slide, which

1 relate to the 5-log reduction and the 6.5 log reduction,
2 were meant as an indicator as to what industry may need
3 to consider if, in fact, 0157:H7 was contaminating raw
4 beef.

5 Right now, product that is contaminated would
6 need to either be fully cooked or treated so that the
7 pathogen would be eliminated or reduced to a safe level.
8 Those would be the requirements if you were to cook that
9 product.

10 And so I provided those 5-log reductions as a
11 relationship to ground beef and 6.5 as a relationship to
12 roast beef as examples of the type of reduction that we
13 would, at this point, would view as being clear evidence
14 that you've addressed that particular pathogen, that
15 pathogen only in the product. Radiation is selective for
16 the pathogens.

17 Again, their radiation sensitivity is
18 considerably different. And so the issue of taking care
19 of 0157 if it's contaminating the product is one thing.
20 If the issue is trying to go for a labeling claim, as an
21 example calling your product pasteurized, we have put
22 discussion in the preamble to the final rule that we
23 believe pasteurization is possible.

24 It may not be feasible today, but through the
25 controls that you've mentioned of controlling the
26 bioburden, certainly, a manufacturer may be able to
27 remove the vegetative cells of the pathogens that are

1 there that are of concern to a level equivalent to a
2 ready-to-eat product.

3 MR. BILLY: Okay. Caroline?

4 MS. DeWAAL: Thank you. Caroline Smith Dewaal,
5 Center for Science in the Public Interest. Dan, we asked
6 because of concerns that companies might use irradiation
7 as a substitute for good process control and good
8 sanitation in their plants, we actually asked the agency
9 to mandate microtesting prior to meat being irradiated so
10 that, in fact, you could evaluate the amount of bacteria
11 in the product. Why didn't the agency choose to do that
12 in the final regulation?

13 DR. ENGELJOHN: I'll hedge and say that we
14 addressed it to some extent in the preamble to the final
15 rule. But a general response would be that the agency
16 believes the system we set up with the sanitation
17 standard operating procedures and the written programs
18 associated with that, and then the associated HACCP
19 regulations that we have in place in combination don't
20 provide the opportunity for there to be lax sanitation in
21 combination with irradiation.

22 Again, our expectation is that irradiation
23 would, in fact, be identified as a critical control point
24 in any processing plant. And we don't see that there
25 would be the opportunity to make more lax the sanitation
26 procedures in place. We also have in place the pathogen
27 reduction requirements for salmonella at this time.

1 We did put in our directive that if a
2 manufacturer was operating an irradiation process in a
3 HACCP system and included irradiation as part of that,
4 that the checks for the pathogen reduction, the
5 salmonella testing, would occur after the radiation
6 process, as opposed to before.

7 MR. BILLY: Nancy?

8 MS. DONLEY: Nancy Donley from STOP, Safe
9 Tables Our Priority. Caroline actually asked my first
10 question. And I'm just going to add, kind of, a comment
11 to it is the necessity that to know the bioload prior to
12 going in that you can have -- if you have a 6-load coming
13 in and you're using a 5-log reduction of a 6-log load and
14 a 5-log reduction, it's not going to be effective.
15 That's a major concern of ours.

16 Second is maybe you can explain, Dan, why do
17 the agencies choose to, what I'm going to call, roll back
18 the poultry regulation, which had required that the
19 poultry be irradiated in the final packaging? And so
20 they actually rolled that back to remove that requirement
21 to make it consistent with the new rule for red meat.

22 DR. ENGELJOHN: I would say it's the agency's
23 opinion that, by allowing the flexibility with the
24 poultry, which we hoped we'd be able to do partly through
25 the regulation we issued, and then raising the maximum
26 doses that FDA had previously approved for poultry is
27 that we provide the opportunity for more raw product,

1 more poultry to be irradiated, and then used as a
2 secondary ingredient in other products.

3 Back in the early '90s when we issued the
4 poultry regulation FSIS did, in fact, submit a petition
5 to FDA for that particular approval. And we very
6 specifically identified that we believed it needed to be
7 for retail-ready-only product, because at the time there
8 wasn't a great deal of accommodated poultry available in
9 the marketplace or other processed poultry products.

10 And there certainly were not a great deal of
11 the low-fat poultry products and the sausage products
12 that are available today. So we believe that the
13 irradiation process for the raw materials used as
14 secondary ingredients in products which today cannot be
15 irradiated in their entirety would enhance the public
16 safety and the system that we would have in place for
17 protecting the public health. So I would view the
18 poultry regulations as not being a rollback, but one
19 which would further enhance public safety.

20 MR. BILLY: Dr. Naidu?

21 DR. NAIDU: Narain Naidu, Center for
22 Antimicrobial Research. I would like to expand on
23 Caroline's question. In medical devices, when you
24 radiate it, after irradiation you test for pathogens to
25 seem how much bacteria load was initially there.

26 Is the agency looking at anything on looking
27 for what is the microbial quality? Is bacteria live or

1 dead? It is still an implementary pathogen. Are you
2 planning to do any testing? After irradiation, what is a
3 dead mass of bacteria in like, for example, pathogen
4 content of the meats?

5 DR. ENGELJOHN: I would say that the agency has
6 in place a number of microbiological monitoring-type
7 programs. Again, we would view that the irradiation of
8 raw meat, in conjunction with the HACCP system, would be
9 one where we would follow through with our pathogen
10 reduction testing for salmonella.

11 If a plant were to make a health claim or a
12 labeling claim, such as a very specific reduction for a
13 pathogen or a specific statement about the effect of the
14 irradiation process, that would be something that we
15 would, in fact, verify as part of the HACCP plan
16 documentation that the plant would have as to how they
17 were able to achieve what they are claiming on that
18 label.

19 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. I
20 think we're going to move on now for the next
21 presentation, which focuses on the area of our risk
22 assessment. The presenter will be Dr. Mark Powell from
23 the Office of Public Health and Science in FSIS. Mark?

24 DR. POWELL: Thank you. I'm going to apologize
25 that hard copies were not available. However, if you'd
26 like to request a hard copy be sent to you, you can do so
27 at the registration desk. This presentation file will be

1 made available electronically at the OPHS Website. And
2 I'll put up the website address for that in the final
3 slide.

4 On behalf of the FSIS E. coli 0157:H7 Risk
5 Assessment team, I'm pleased to have this opportunity to
6 summarize the draft findings of the agency's assessment
7 of E. coli 0157:H7 in ground beef.

8 My presentation today will cover four areas:
9 first, a brief background on the process by which the
10 risk assessment was developed; second, our best estimate
11 of the magnitude of the public health problem; third, the
12 process risk model's predictions regarding the occurrence
13 of E. coli 0157:H7 in ground beef production; and
14 finally, the modeled results of some alternative
15 mitigation scenarios.

16 In the interest of time, during my
17 presentation, I'll refer to E. coli 0157:H7 simply as
18 0157. The 0157 risk assessment has been a large team
19 effort. And I'd like to take this opportunity to
20 recognize the many contributions of team members,
21 consultants, and scientific peers.

22 The 0157 Risk Assessment Project began taking
23 form in March 1998 when I formed a resource group during
24 the formulation stage of the assessment. In October
25 1998, a meeting was held to solicit public input at an
26 early stage of the process and to release a preliminary

1 document describing the modeling approach and summarizing
2 the data acquired by the team to date.

3 We have emphasized peer input during the
4 development phase of the assessment through presentations
5 at SRA and IAMFES and by convening a week-long,
6 interagency workshop on microbial pathogens in food and
7 water that involved microbial risk assessment
8 practitioners from USDA, FDA, EPA, United Kingdom, and
9 New Zealand.

10 The peer-review process began in December 1999
11 with presentations to SRA and the National Advisory
12 Committee on microbiological criteria for food. The
13 draft results that I will present today reflect changes
14 that have been made to the process risk model in light of
15 comments received through the peer-review process.

16 The 0157 process risk model covers all aspects
17 of ground beef production and consumption from farm to
18 table. The exposure assessment consists of three
19 sequential model segments. The production segment
20 outputs the prevalence of 0157 in live cattle. The
21 slaughter segment outputs the prevalence and levels of
22 0157 in beef trimmings destined for grinding.

23 The preparation segment outputs the prevalence
24 and levels of 0157 in consumed ground beef servings. And
25 this final output of the exposure assessment feeds
26 directly into the dose response assessment. The final

1 output of the model is the annual number of 0157 cases
2 due to ground beef in the U.S.

3 The scope of the assessment is limited to
4 ground beef as a vehicle of infection, and therefore,
5 does not include cross contamination to, or from, ground
6 beef or person-to-person secondary transmission. The
7 scope of the present assessment is also limited to 0157,
8 and therefore, does not include all enterohemorrhagic E.
9 coli.

10 However, the paucity a repositivity of reported
11 outbreaks due to non-0157, combined with the higher
12 isolation rates of serotype 0157:H7 in prospective
13 studies indicates that other EHEC's do not attain the
14 public health importance of 0157 in the United States.
15 The scope of the assessment is also annual and national,
16 although data are available at some points to model at
17 seasonal or regional scales.

18 Insufficient data are available to model
19 slaughter, processing, preparation, and other processes
20 at seasonal or regional sales. The scope of the draft
21 assessment includes cooked ground beef products. The
22 present draft assessment does not include products
23 containing ground beef that are prepared by means other
24 than cooking, for example, fermented sausages.

25 We also have not included raw ground beef
26 consumption which is a very uncommon practice in the U.S.
27 But the ingested doses would be analogous to very

1 undercooked ground beef. And this is considered. Intact
2 steaks and roasts are excluded, because potential surface
3 contamination would very likely be eliminated during
4 cooking.

5 The present draft assessment does not yet cover
6 other nonintact cuts of beef, such as steaks or roasts
7 that have been blade-tenderized, or injected with needles
8 that may introduce surface contamination into the
9 interior muscle tissue. However, FSIS does plan to
10 address the other nonintact products in the subsequent
11 iteration of the risk assessment.

12 This table presents our best estimate based on
13 epidemiologic data independent of the risk assessment
14 model of the magnitude of the 0157 problem attributable
15 to ground beef and places it in the context of the
16 magnitude of the problem from all sources. We estimate
17 that somewhere between 16 and 40 percent, with a most
18 likely value of 18 percent of all cases, are due to
19 ground beef.

20 The estimated distribution of the total number
21 of cases of 0157 due to ground beef has a median of
22 approximately 16,000 and a 95-percent interval of
23 approximately 9,500 to 29,000. Approximately 10 percent
24 of the cases are characterized as severe; that is, bloody
25 diarrhea for which the patient seeks medical care.

26 The estimated annual number of deaths due to
27 0157 in ground beef ranges from 5 to 20. This figure

1 compares the epidemiological estimate that the number of
2 cases of 0157 due to ground beef with the results
3 predicted by the risk assessment model under the
4 baseline, or as-is scenario.

5 The broader red curve, which peaks at about
6 15,000 cases per year, this characterizes the full range
7 of uncertainty about the epidemiologic data, while the
8 narrower blue curve with a peak around 20,000 0157 cases
9 per year only represents our uncertainty about the
10 central tendency or the most likely value, if you will,
11 of the draft risk assessment model.

12 The full range of uncertainty in the risk
13 assessment model would be much greater, but the degree of
14 overlap between these two curves suggests that we may
15 draw inferences from the model with some degree of
16 confidence. This figure presents the model's estimated
17 prevalence of 0157 at various points in the ground beef
18 production process, including the complete upper and
19 lower bounds of uncertainty in the risk assessment model.

20 Here, CB connotes cow bull, and SH means
21 steer/heifer. Our best estimate of the prevalence of
22 0157 in live cattle destined for ground beef production
23 is 11 percent. The bounds of uncertainty depend upon the
24 class of animal considered, fed or culled, but range from
25 less than 5 percent to greater than 15 percent.

26 The estimated prevalence of 0157 on carcasses
27 in the chiller ranges from a fraction of a percent to

1 approximately 3 percent. For the cow bull plants, the
2 estimated combo bin prevalence is 15 percent with a range
3 of uncertainty of 6 to 28 percent. For steers and
4 heifers, the estimated combo bin prevalence is 41 percent
5 with a range of 22 to 59 percent.

6 Our best estimate of the prevalence of 0157 in
7 grinder loads is 89 percent with a range of uncertainty
8 from 71 to 96 percent. Now, I'll proceed to the modeled
9 results under a series of alternative mitigation
10 scenarios. In each of the scenarios considered, we do
11 not specify how the mitigation would be achieved, but
12 simply pose what-if questions to the risk assessment
13 model.

14 In each case, we estimate the effect, leaving
15 everything else in the model the same of the mitigation
16 on the estimated annual number of 0157 exposures. This
17 figure, then, presents our current best estimate of the
18 annual number of 0157 exposures in ground beef servings
19 after cooking.

20 The range is large, about 240 to 340,000. But
21 as in the model comparison in slide 9, this figure does
22 not capture the full extent of uncertainty in the draft
23 risk assessment model. This figure presents the
24 estimated reduction in 0157 exposures, leaves everything
25 else in the model unchanged due to a 25-percent reduction
26 in the prevalence of 0157 fecal-shedding, live cattle
27 prior to slaughter.

1 This scenario estimates the effect of a 25-
2 percent reduction in the prevalence of 0157 on carcasses
3 at the chiller after decontamination measures. This
4 figure shows the estimated effect of reducing by 25
5 percent the frequency of internal ground product
6 temperatures during storage that are in excess of 41
7 degrees Fahrenheit.

8 This figure, then, compares the three
9 mitigation scenarios just considered. Each appears to
10 have a significant effect in reducing the number of
11 exposures. We have not yet modeled the cumulative
12 effects of multiple mitigations.

13 And while each of the hypothetical mitigations
14 presented appears to have a significant effect in
15 reducing exposures, these results need to be interpreted
16 cautiously, and further analysis of the process risk
17 model is needed before we can quantify the public health
18 effects of these mitigations. For example, we should not
19 expect to find a direct proportional correspondence
20 between the frequency of exposures and the number of
21 cases.

22 In other words, the 25-percent reduction in
23 exposures may translate into a reduction in the 0157
24 illnesses of greater than or less than 25 percent.
25 Nevertheless, these what-if examples demonstrate the real
26 utility of the risk assessment model as a tool to support
27 risk management decision-making.

1 This final figure shows the estimated effect of
2 testing 25 to 100 percent of grinder loads produced at
3 plants using the current FSIS method and rendering
4 pathogen-free any loads that are detected positive.
5 Again, the effect in this range of testing appears
6 significant.

7 A 100-percent testing scenario could be
8 considered as an upward-bound estimate of the direct
9 impact of such a program at this point, although a
10 testing program would also have indirect impacts that may
11 be difficult to predict or to quantify. The next step
12 for the 0157 Risk Assessment team is to draft a report
13 documenting the baseline risk assessment model.

14 We anticipate releasing a draft for public
15 comment and peer-review in the spring. Before
16 concluding, I'll draw your attention to the project's
17 website where the draft report and other project-related
18 information, including this presentation file, will be
19 made electronically accessible.

20 MR. BILLY: Any questions? Questions from the
21 panel? Dan?

22 MR. ENGELJOHN: This is Dan Engeljohn with
23 USDA. Mark, could you clarify one of the statements you
24 made about the ground beef that was used for your
25 modeling the information that you put in here? Was it
26 for ground beef that's used specifically for ground beef,

1 for raw ground beef? Or was it used for ground beef that
2 may be used for other ground beef products?

3 DR. POWELL: We considered ground beef meals
4 being 100-percent ground beef and another category of
5 servings in which ground beef was an ingredient in the
6 serving. So the full range of servings that include
7 ground beef.

8 DR. ENGELJOHN: This is Dan Engeljohn again.
9 Could that include product that would be used for cooked
10 meatballs?

11 DR. POWELL: Yes.

12 DR. ENGELJOHN: Okay.

13 MR. BILLY: Yes, Caroline?

14 MS. DeWAAL: Thanks. Caroline Smith DeWaal,
15 Center for Science in the Public Interest. I have two
16 questions. First is where did you get your prevalence
17 number for the incidence of E. coli 0157:H7 in the live
18 animal?

19 DR. POWELL: This was based on a number of
20 studies that have looked at the gastrointestinal
21 prevalence of 0157. We did not consider the hide
22 prevalence, the GI-positive prevalence of live animals
23 that we're estimating.

24 MS. DeWAAL: So this does not include some of
25 the most recent data on the prevalence of the GI tract?
26 Is that what you're saying?

1 DR. POWELL: It does include the most recent
2 evidence on the gut prevalence. It does -- we do not
3 meddle the hide prevalence. There has been some reports
4 recently on hide prevalence.

5 MS. DeWAAL: And what's the high-end prevalence
6 estimate?

7 DR. POWELL: For GI-positive?

8 MS. DeWAAL: Yes?

9 DR. POWELL: Our best estimate is 11 percent,
10 and the bounds is 5 percent -- less than 5 percent to
11 greater than 15 percent for GI-positive live animals
12 destined for ground beef production.

13 MS. DeWAAL: And secondly, of all the scenarios
14 you did test, you found that testing 100 percent of the
15 grinder loads really rendered the greatest public health
16 benefit?

17 DR. POWELL: That was intended to be an
18 upper-bound estimate on the effect that, not only
19 testing, but also rendering pathogen-free any grinder
20 loads that were detected positive could have.

21 MS. DeWAAL: Did you model any testing at the
22 carcass level?

23 DR. POWELL: We have not done that yet.

24 MS. DeWAAL: And just to clarify for myself,
25 the prevalence fact that you have identified, the
26 prevalence in the combo bins was 41 percent, and the
27 prevalence in the grinders was 89 percent.

1 DR. POWELL: Let me go back to that.

2 MS. DeWAAL: So 89 percent of grinders, you're
3 estimating, are contaminated or may render contaminated
4 product?

5 DR. POWELL: For cow bull plants, the estimated
6 combo bin prevalence is 15 percent with a range of
7 uncertainty of 6 to 28 percent. For steers and heifers,
8 the estimated combo bin prevalence is 41 percent with a
9 range of 22 to 59 percent. And then, our best estimate
10 of prevalence of 0157 grinder loads is 89 percent with a
11 range of uncertainty from 71 to 96 percent.

12 I should note that most of the levels predicted
13 by the model are at very low levels that would be very
14 unlikely to be detected by available testing methods.

15 MR. BILLY: Dr. Gill?

16 DR. GILL: Colin Gill, Agriculture Canada. The
17 models, I believe, are constructed on the basis that all
18 contamination with E. coli 0157:H7 occurs as a result of
19 contamination of carcasses with feces from shedding
20 animals.

21 Seeing as how the mouth of the animal,
22 persisting populations of bacteria, and improperly
23 cleaned equipment, and bacteria which grows in equipment
24 which warms during processing, are potentially major
25 sources of E. coli, and therefore of E. coli 0157:H7,
26 what effect do you think taking these sources of

1 contamination into account would have on the predicted
2 value of your models?

3 DR. ENGELJOHN: The model currently does
4 include the potential for contamination during
5 fabrication. We model, the correlation between the
6 GI-positive animal and the likelihood that a carcass is
7 contaminated. It may be contaminated by itself. It may
8 be contaminated by the environment. It may be
9 contaminated by an adjacent carcass.

10 We don't specify the mechanism by which a
11 carcass is contaminated. We rely simply on the empirical
12 evidence that establishes our best estimate of the
13 fraction of carcasses that become contaminated, given an
14 incoming prevalence of GI-positive animals. So we cannot
15 specify the mechanism by which the carcasses become
16 contaminated.

17 However, the model as it is currently drafted
18 and composed does seem to comport reasonably well with
19 our estimate from an independent source of data, the
20 epidemiologic data. Therefore, we feel that looking at
21 these alternative scenarios and the effects that they
22 might have, it's reasonable to draw inferences from the
23 current drafted model.

24 MR. BILLY: Kim?

25 MS. RICE: Kim Rice, American Meat Institute.
26 The rest of the data on combos and product, where did you

1 get that? Where's that data coming from? You said you
2 got the carcass data from studies done on GI levels.

3 DR. ENGELJOHN: Right.

4 MS. RICE: The other data, I missed that.

5 DR. ENGELJOHN: The model has been constructed
6 to predict at various points. And we have "ground-
7 truthed" the data at the point of ground beef production
8 with the FSIS testing data that's been done.

9 We've also "ground-truthed" the data on the
10 carcass prevalence from the FSIS testing that's been
11 done, taking into account the sample size, the
12 sensitivity of the tests. We presented this information
13 at the National Advisory Committee meeting in December.
14 And so you can get a more complete description of the
15 underpinnings of the model from that presentation.

16 MS. RICE: So the numbers that you have on, not
17 this chart, but the one where it says -- yes, that --
18 those for the combo bin and grinder levels, those are
19 estimates? They are not actual data that you have on
20 incidence rates?

21 DR. ENGELJOHN: Well, they are modeled
22 estimates that, at the grinder load, are -- there's an
23 overlap with the prevalence that would be estimated
24 directly from the FSIS testing data, taking into
25 consideration the sample size and the sensitivity of the
26 test.

27 MR. BILLY: Nancy?

1 MS. DONLEY: Nancy Donley from STOP. I
2 actually have two questions. Number one is how much of
3 this research was new research that you commissioned to
4 have? And were there other parts of this research that
5 were studies that were given to you?

6 DR. ENGELJOHN: We have relied on the
7 available, publicly available, information for the most
8 part. There has not been a lot of data that's been
9 submitted to the docket in response to our request in
10 October of '98 for data submissions. So we have used,
11 for the most part, the publicly available data, the data
12 that's produced by FSIS.

13 We have had a couple of submissions from a
14 couple of plants regarding their testing data in addition
15 to that. And as I said, we were able to incorporate some
16 of the new information on the live animal prevalence that
17 has been coming out. But a lot of the reported findings
18 have not yet made their way into the published
19 literature.

20 MS. DONLEY: And then, my second question is I
21 find it interesting that you kind of did a what-if
22 scenario on this end of the chart, if you will, at the
23 grinder of your testing 25 percent at the grinder and 100
24 percent at the grinder level. Did you take it the other
25 direction and look at it in the live animal and say what
26 if we reduced it 25 percent or 100 percent in the live
27 animal and what would the results be?

1 DR. ENGELJOHN: The scenario, the live animal
2 scenario that we considered, again without specifying how
3 it might be done was what if the live animal prevalence
4 were reduced by 25-percent? And that was estimated to
5 have a significant effect. Again, we aren't at the point
6 yet where we can quantify the effect, but we're
7 confident, based on this estimate, that there is a
8 significant effect.

9 MR. BILLY: Could you, just for everyone here,
10 explain what the red dot means in the context of this
11 graph?

12 DR. ENGELJOHN: Right. The blue curve shows
13 the -- our estimate, our most likely estimate, of the
14 number of exposures after cooking under the baseline
15 scenario. We have some estimate of our uncertainty
16 regarding that most likely estimate.

17 We have done one run under this 25-percent
18 reduction of live animal prevalence scenario and achieved
19 about a 210, 205,000 annual exposures. Because it lies
20 well outside the lower tale of this distribution, we feel
21 confident in saying there's a significant effect, a
22 significant reduction achieved by reducing live animal
23 prevalence by 25 percent.

24 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you. You can speak.

25 MR. BOLTON: Lance Bolton, Dupont Quality Con.
26 My question is whether you have taken into account the
27 methods used to determine baselines like the number of

1 organisms in live animals and GI tracts and the relative
2 sensitivity of those methods and whether or not the model
3 has been adjusted for those?

4 DR. ENGELJOHN: We have modeled sensitivity as
5 a function, both of the sample size and the concentration
6 in the sample.

7 MR. BOLTON: But the actual methods used were
8 the same methods used in the tests that you put together?

9 DR. ENGELJOHN: We have adjusted all prevalence
10 estimates to actual prevalence that would be inferred,
11 given the test sensitivity.

12 MR. BILLY: Okay. The next person I have is
13 Rosemary.

14 MS. MUCKLOW: I'm playing catch-up. I'm sorry
15 I was a little late this morning.

16 MR. BILLY: Would you say your name and
17 affiliation?

18 MS. MUCKLOW: Excuse me. Rosemary Mucklow with
19 the National Meat Association. The data that you base
20 this on, could you tell me again, I think you mentioned
21 it, the time frame that it was collected on, the data
22 that this is based on? Is this new data, recent data,
23 old data? What sort of time frame was it collected over?

24 DR. ENGELJOHN: There's a wide variety,
25 voluminous data. We have used the most recent data
26 available. In some cases, obviously, the surveillance

1 data, it will be more time-sensitive. The more recent
2 data will be more reflective.

3 However, other data that may be on, say, the
4 efficacy of a process, there's no need to think that that
5 would become outdated as long as the report is
6 well-documented. I'd refer you to the preliminary
7 pathways and data book that lays out a lot of the
8 information that's been used.

9 MS. MUCKLOW: And if I go to your website, as
10 listed up there, will I find the backup for what you have
11 explained to us this morning and the various charts, and
12 so on?

13 DR. ENGELJOHN: The draft report will be made
14 available on this website.

15 MS. MUCKLOW: When?

16 DR. ENGELJOHN: We anticipate releasing the
17 draft report for public comment and peer-review this
18 spring.

19 MS. MUCKLOW: I just recently became aware of a
20 paper that was published and peer-reviewed called Topics
21 in Microbial Risk Assessment Dynamic Flow-tree Process
22 which was, I understand, funded by FSIS. And Harry Marks
23 was the lead investigator. This is above my grade level
24 in statistics. Were the findings of this paper included
25 in what you discussed this morning?

26 DR. ENGELJOHN: We have utilized the data that
27 is the base, the clinical trial data that is the basis

1 for that paper that you're referring to. We have modeled
2 those responses for 0157:H7 somewhat differently. The
3 Shigella species that Marks and colleagues reported are
4 considered to be an upper-bound on the infectious dose
5 for E. coli 0157:H7 with the enteropathogenic E. coli.

6 The EPEC's are considered to be a lower-bound,
7 and so we have modeled the dose response as bounded by an
8 envelope, essentially, between those two dose response
9 curves with the most likely value for 0157 that is
10 derived from outbreak data.

11 MS. MUCKLOW: Are there any other published
12 papers that were funded by FSIS? This is the first I've
13 heard of this one that's a year and a-half old. Are
14 there any others that were included as resource material?
15 Or will we wait until you issue the White Paper before we
16 know that?

17 DR. ENGELJOHN: Again, I would refer you to the
18 Preliminary Pathways and Data Book that's been available
19 since October 1998. That documents the available data to
20 that point. We have since acquired and been made aware
21 of other data. And that will be fully documented in the
22 draft report that is to be released soon.

23 MS. MUCKLOW: And the Preliminary Pathways Data
24 Book is up at that website?

25 DR. ENGELJOHN: That's correct.

26 MS. MUCKLOW: Thank you.

27 MR. BILLY: Okay. Next, Ann?

1 MS. HOLLINGSWORTH: Ann Hollingsworth, Keystone
2 Foods. I have two questions, the first probably is just
3 from ignorance. You used a term called "ground-truth".
4 Could you explain that in a little more detail so I can
5 understand what you meant?

6 DR. ENGELJOHN: That is our term for evaluating
7 the consistency between the model's prediction and the
8 empirical data that's available. Another term would be
9 validate, but that's perhaps a little bit too strong.
10 There's a lot of discussion within the statistical
11 circles about just what validation of a model is.

12 Just because it agrees with the observed data
13 doesn't necessarily mean that, you know, a stopwatch is
14 right twice a day. It doesn't mean the model is
15 necessarily working. But that is our comparison of the
16 available empirical data with the model's predictions.

17 MS. HOLLINGSWORTH: Okay. The second question
18 when you were discussing the grinders portion where you
19 said that 89 percent was your best estimate of
20 contaminated product. You said that you compared that to
21 the USDA data for E. coli 0157:H7 and testing procedures
22 that were outlined in 101 (phonetic).

23 That only includes those portions of the
24 grinders that choose not to test within the limits of
25 that directive and does not include a vast number of
26 grinders to test that product. Does this include the

1 data from a representative portion of the grinders, I
2 don't believe?

3 DR. ENGELJOHN: That is the best empirical data
4 that we have. We would welcome more representative data
5 if it were to become available.

6 MR. BILLY: Okay. I'm going to take two more,
7 then we're going to have a brief break. So the next
8 person I have on the list is Dean.

9 MR. DANIELSON: Thanks Tom. Dean Danielson,
10 IDP. Mark, I didn't -- don't believe that you took into
11 account or at least spoke to potential seasonal and
12 regional differences or activities of 0157:H7 that we
13 know occur out there. I've really got three points to
14 make. That's one.

15 Number two, that 89 percent level, that gets to
16 be a pretty significant number. I'm curious as to how
17 you got that. I would be interested in reviewing that in
18 more detail, but in particular with a 15 percent cow bull
19 rate of 41 percent fed beef, and then all of a sudden we
20 leaped 89 percent on grinder loads. It's a pretty
21 interesting leap that kind of has baffled me for the
22 moment.

23 DR. ENGELJOHN: Okay.

24 MR. DANIELSON: Then I'll finish that, what is
25 a grinder load to start with? I don't understand what
26 that term means. That would be a point. And the second
27 question and the third question is you define a current

1 FSIS method for testing grinder loads. I'm not aware of
2 a defined FSIS method for testing grinder loads, so some
3 clarification.

4 DR. ENGELJOHN: I'll try and remember your
5 questions in turn. We're modeling the average over a
6 year throughout the model, because although we're aware
7 that at certain points there's data available to, that
8 suggests seasonal variation, at other points in the model
9 there, we don't have that sort of seasonal data.

10 And therefore, we're not looking at
11 geographical or seasonal variation throughout the model.
12 We have to go to the lowest common denominator of the
13 available data and model at the annual national level.
14 One of the reasons, again, that the prevalence is higher
15 than previously reported is that the vast majority of the
16 positive grinder loads, positive carcass bins, combo bins
17 that the model predicts are on the order of one log per
18 combo bin, okay, or one -- zero logs per grinder load.

19 So these are large quantities of product
20 contaminated at very low levels. Nevertheless, the model
21 predicts that they contain, you know, if a grinder load
22 that is composed of, you know, three or four combo bins,
23 2,000-pound combo bins is predicted to contain one
24 organism, it is a positive combo bin, I'm sorry, grinder
25 load.

26 We model grinder loads containing anywhere from
27 one to several 2,000-pound combo bins that would be

1 ground together. That's what we refer to as grinder
2 loads. So it's a variable quantity.

3 MR. DANIELSON: Okay.

4 DR. ENGELJOHN: Did that address all of your
5 questions?

6 MR. DANIELSON: Yes.

7 MR. BILLY: One last question, and then we're
8 going to take a break. Jim? Just speak up.

9 MR. HODGES: Jim Hodges, American Meat
10 Institute. I have two questions. When you presented
11 this data to the Micro Advisory Committee, they had
12 several questions, suggestions, even criticisms of the
13 way of projecting through the system about comparable
14 data to support some of the conclusions. Do you plan to
15 return to the micro committee for advice and guidance
16 after you've provided your model? And if not, why?

17 DR. ENGELJOHN: We plan on making the draft
18 risk assessment available for public comment and peer-
19 review. And the National Advisory Committee has been
20 part of that peer-review process.

21 MR. BILLY: So the answer is yes.

22 MR. HODGES: Will you go back at the committee
23 to have a discussion about that at the micro committee to
24 have questions?

25 DR. ENGELJOHN: Yes.

26 MR. BILLY: Yes.

1 MR. HODGES: The second question, in your
2 projections at the combo and grinder levels, I'm
3 predicating on incidence levels that are occurring in
4 carcasses, I believe that you are projecting that those
5 are standing to the system on a theoretical basis.
6 You're saying that 89 percent of a grinder load has a
7 potential to contain at least one organism.

8 How do you reconcile that with the data, the
9 ground beef data, that FSIS selects in their 0157
10 sampling program and shows somewhere in the neighborhood
11 of .4 percent? And secondly, what can you infer from
12 that about testing and its effects?

13 DR. ENGELJOHN: One of the analyses that we
14 presented at the micro committee showed the overlap
15 between the model's predictions and that which would be
16 inferred from the FSIS Ground Beef Testing Program.
17 Again, the levels that are predicted by the model are
18 such that it would be very unlikely, given a 325-gram
19 sample from a very large quantity of product contaminated
20 at low levels, to be detected.

21 The vast majority of servings, for example,
22 that would come out of a large grinder load that would
23 contain one log total of contamination would obviously be
24 negative. There would only be a small number of servings
25 from such a grinder load that would contain any 0157:H7.

26 MR. BILLY: Okay. We're a little bit behind
27 schedule, obviously, so what I'd like to do is try to

1 compress this break and ask that you return by 5 after
2 11.

3 (Whereupon a recess was taken.)

4 MR. BILLY: If people would take their seats,
5 please, I'd like to get started. Okay. I'd like to,
6 before I introduce the next speaker, just make a brief
7 comment which is that to reiterate what was said about
8 this preliminary risk assessment. Again, the results
9 that have been presented are preliminary results that
10 will be contained in a draft report.

11 That report will be subject to further peer-
12 review, as well as public input. We recognize that there
13 are new data that will be presented today from various
14 sources. It would be our intent to use that data to the
15 extent that we can, in terms of further refinements of
16 the model, and obviously, the results that it would
17 predict. So this is an iterative process.

18 We feel we've come a long way, in terms of the
19 development of the model. Obviously, it's critically
20 important that we have the best data that we can find to
21 use in the model to make these kinds of predictive
22 results most useful. So we look forward to the
23 additional presentations today, as well as further
24 comment and input that we'll receive when the draft
25 report comes out this spring.

26 Next, I'd like to introduce Dr. Sonja Olsen.
27 She is with the Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases Branch

1 in the Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases at the
2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. She'll make
3 a presentation on E. coli 0157:H7, a continuing threat to
4 our food supply. Dr. Olsen?

5 DR. OLSEN: Thank you. Good morning. Today,
6 I'm going to talk to you about E. coli 0157:H7, a deadly
7 pathogen which continues to threaten our food supply.
8 For simplicity and brevity during the rest of the talk I
9 will refer to this organism as 0157.

10 First, I'll give you a little background on the
11 organism. Then, I will tell you about CDC's estimates of
12 the burden of illness from 0157 in the United States.
13 After that, I will discuss recent trends over time, and
14 then end with a discussion of the sources of infection.

15 0157 was first identified as a cause of human
16 illness in 1982, following two outbreaks of bloody
17 diarrhea that were linked to hamburger patties served at
18 fast-food chain restaurants. Since these first
19 outbreaks, we have learned a great deal about 0157 and
20 the illness it causes. The organism has a very low
21 infectious dose. Less than 10 organisms can cause
22 infection.

23 It is shed in the feces of healthy cattle.
24 0157 is one of a number of sero-types of Shiga
25 toxin-producing E. coli that can cause disease. After
26 ingestion, illness begins with nonbloody diarrhea and

1 abdominal cramps. In many, but not all persons, the
2 illness then progresses to bloody diarrhea.

3 In most persons, the illness results within a
4 week, but in approximately 6 percent, it progresses to
5 hemolytic-uremic (phonetic) syndrome. Hemolytic-uremic
6 syndrome is a life-threatening condition characterized by
7 anemia, low platelet count, and kidney failure. It
8 affects persons of all ages, but the highest rate is in
9 children less than five years old.

10 In U.S. children it is the major cause of acute
11 kidney failure; 3 to 5 percent die, and 10 percent have
12 stroke or chronic kidney failure. There's no specific
13 treatment for O157 or HUS. Antibiotics do not cure the
14 illness. Therefore, prevention is critical.

15 So how big is the problem of O157 in the United
16 States? To estimate the burden of illness for specific
17 diseases, we rely on surveillance data. This slide shows
18 a surveillance pyramid which represents the burden of
19 illness for any given disease. As you can see, there are
20 limitations with surveillance data.

21 In order for a case of any disease to be
22 captured by routine surveillance, the following events
23 must occur: The ill patient must decide to visit a
24 health care provider. Provider must decide to obtain a
25 stool culture. The stool culture must be tested for the
26 organism. And the test must be positive. And finally,
27 the results must be reported to public health officials.

1 At each of these steps, some proportion of
2 cases are lost, or at least could be lost. Recognized
3 outbreaks account for only a very small proportion of
4 reported cases, essentially, the tip of the iceberg. To
5 quantify the degree of attrition at each step, CDC, FSIS,
6 FDA, and state health departments created the Foodborne
7 Diseases Active Surveillance Network, or FoodNet.

8 The network includes nine sites, the most
9 recent addition being Colorado, with a combined
10 population of 28 million residents under active
11 surveillance. FoodNet sites connect active surveillance
12 for seven bacterial pathogens, including O157.

13 In addition, FoodNet employs a series of
14 surveys that help us better understand the degree of
15 underreporting at each stage of the pyramid. First, the
16 population survey in which people are contacted at home
17 and asked whether they've had acute gastroenteritis
18 recently, and if so, did they seek medical care?

19 Second is a physician survey in which health
20 care providers are asked how often they obtain stool
21 cultures from patients presenting with acute
22 gastroenteritis. Third is a laboratory survey to
23 determine how often stool cultures are tested for
24 specific pathogens and how often the results are reported
25 to health officials.

26 Through the system of surveys, it is possible
27 to work backwards from the number of cases detected

1 through active surveillance to determine the number of
2 cases that likely occurred in the population. Using this
3 approach, it can be shown that for every
4 culture-confirmed case of 0157 reported to CDC, there are
5 a total of 20 cases that occurred in the community.

6 Thus, we use a multiplier of 20 to estimate the
7 true number of infections in the country. Using FoodNet
8 data, CDC recently derived national estimates for
9 foodborne illness. This slide shows the results for
10 0157. We estimate that 0157 causes over 73,000
11 illnesses, 2,100 deaths, no hospitalizations, and 61
12 deaths overall. Of these, foodborne transmission is
13 estimated to cause over 62,000 illnesses, over 1,800
14 hospitalizations, and 52 deaths.

15 Now, I want to discuss some of the recent
16 trends. Several sources of data have led some to believe
17 that the number of 0157 infections per year is
18 increasing. The next two slides are meant to explain why
19 this is not necessarily true and may be an artifact of
20 reporting. This slide shows the number of outbreaks of
21 0157 infection in the United States between 1982 and '98.

22 There were a total of 206 outbreaks reported to
23 CDC. As you can see, it appears that the number of
24 outbreaks is increasing dramatically. However, 0157 was
25 not discovered until 1982. And since this time, our
26 diagnostic and reporting capabilities have been improved
27 dramatically. Further, after the Western states outbreak

1 in 1992 and '93, 0157 became a nationally notifiable
2 disease.

3 In addition, PulseNet, a network designed for
4 states to compare molecular patterns of isolates from
5 foodborne pathogens such as 0157, was added in 1998. As
6 a result, we are now able to detect smaller sized
7 outbreaks that were probably occurring all along, but not
8 detected through routine surveillance.

9 Another way of showing that our reporting has
10 improved is to look at the number of states reporting by
11 year. Shown here are national surveillance data for 0157
12 infections for the period 1993 when 0157 became
13 reportable through '98. The yellow line indicates the
14 number of states reporting, and the red bars indicate the
15 number of cases reported.

16 As you can see, the number of reported cases
17 has increased in recent years. But most, if not all, of
18 this increase can be attributed to the growing number of
19 states reporting. Perhaps, the best data we have to
20 assess recent trends are FoodNet data, which is based on
21 diagnosed cases of 0157.

22 Because FoodNet has a defined area, it is
23 possible to calculate rates. Therefore, these data most
24 accurately reflect current trends in the United States.
25 This slide shows the most recent trends in 0157
26 infections using FoodNet data. Shown here are the number

1 of cases per 100,000 persons of 0157 infection and
2 pediatric HUS.

3 As you can see, the rate of 0157 infection was
4 2.7 in '96, 2.3 in 1997, and 2.8 in 1999. Although there
5 are only three years of data, the rate of infection seems
6 to be fairly stable. Similarly, the rate of pediatric
7 HUS was relatively stable at 0.58 in '97 and .7 in 1998.

8 Now, I'm going to discuss what we know about
9 the sources of the infection of 0157. Much of what we
10 know about the epidemiology has been learned from
11 outbreak investigations. This slide shows the various
12 modes of transmission in 206 outbreaks reported to CDC
13 since 1982. Foodborne transmission accounts for the
14 majority of recognized outbreaks.

15 Person-to-person transmission accounts for 20
16 percent. However, it's important to note that 0157 does
17 not naturally live in the human intestine. Therefore,
18 most outbreaks, due to person-to-person spread, often
19 begin with a person who ate a contaminated food.
20 Drinking water or swimming was a mode of transmission in
21 10 percent of recognized outbreaks.

22 Now, I'm going to focus just on those outbreaks
23 that were foodborne. This slide lists the major food
24 categories implicated in foodborne outbreaks with a known
25 source of transmission. As you can see, ground beef
26 accounts for the greatest proportion of outbreaks, 55
27 percent.

1 Other types of meat, such as beef or game meat,
2 account for about 10 percent of outbreaks. And produce
3 accounts for 20 percent. Although there's some
4 speculation that in recent years the number of outbreaks
5 due to ground beef is decreasing and the number due to
6 produce is increasing, our data do not support this
7 trend.

8 Now, we have discussed the sources of
9 transmission ascertain from outbreak data, which actually
10 represent a very small number of cases, so what do we
11 know about the source of infection from sporadic
12 infection? There have been several case control studies
13 to look at risk factors for sporadic illness.

14 Sporadic infections are single cases that don't
15 have any obvious connection with any other case. The
16 first sporadic case control study was conducted in 1990
17 to 1992 in 10 medical centers throughout the United
18 States. In uniformed and varied analysis, illness was
19 significant associated with eating hamburger, eating
20 uncooked hamburger, and eating in a fast-food restaurant.

21 These findings confirmed and expanded on our
22 knowledge of 0157 transmission from outbreaks. A second
23 case control study of sporadic infections was conducted
24 from 1996 to 1997, using cases in participating FoodNet
25 sites. The results were intriguing. Again, illness was
26 significantly associated with eating pink hamburger or
27 ground beef at home or at a restaurant.

1 However, in marked contrast to the previous
2 study, illness was associated with eating hamburger at a
3 restaurant that was not part of a fast-food chain. Why
4 should this be? What we'll call an important event that
5 occurred between these two studies, namely the massive
6 Western states outbreak of 0157 in fast-food chain
7 restaurants that occurred in 1992 and 1993, as a result
8 of this outbreak, we suspect that the fast-food industry
9 implemented several changes, including improved quality
10 control of meat and cooking methods with higher
11 temperature and longer times.

12 These process control measures mean that ground
13 beef served in fast-food restaurants is safer than it was
14 before. And as a consequence, people may now be less
15 likely to become infected with 0157 by eating ground beef
16 served at a fast-food restaurant.

17 In 1996, USDA introduced the pathogen reduction
18 and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points, or HACCP
19 Rule. The objective was to reduce pathogens in our food
20 supply with process control and microbiologic testing at
21 the slaughterhouse and grinding level. Just as
22 surveillance is critical to monitoring disease trends in
23 humans, it is equally important to monitor trends of
24 contamination in the food supply.

25 CDC feels that HACCP is a rational,
26 scientifically sound program that will ultimately help
27 reduce the incidence of illness due to foodborne

1 pathogens. As early as 2000, HACCP was still in the
2 process of implementation for ground beef. Therefore,
3 it's too early to expect to see significant declines in
4 the incidence of 0157.

5 However, we know that the incidence of other
6 diseases has decreased following targeted HACCP-like
7 programs. A good example is the decrease in salmonella
8 enteriditis (phonetic) following a flock-based quality
9 control program. I want to briefly mention that in
10 addition to 0157, there are other serotypes of Shiga
11 toxin-producing E. coli.

12 Other current surveillance for these organisms
13 in humans is limited. Efforts are underway to improve
14 them. Like 0157, these pathogens, including 0111 and
15 026, have been found in cattle and ground beef and are
16 known to cause severe illness and even death in humans.

17 As our diagnostic and surveillance tools
18 improve, non-0157 E. coli are likely to play a larger
19 role in human disease. For this reason, it's important
20 to be thinking of these organisms as potential food
21 contaminants. Fortunately, because of their similarity
22 to 0157, it is likely that current efforts, such as
23 HACCP, will effectively reduce contamination from these
24 pathogens, as well.

25 In summary, 0157 infection remains a serious
26 problem in the United States. Infection with the
27 organism can cause severe illness and even death. CDC

1 estimates that there are approximately 73,000 illnesses
2 and 61 deaths each year in the United States due to 0157.
3 Foodborne transmission accounts for the majority of
4 infections, both outbreak-related and sporadic.

5 And ground beef continues to be identified as a
6 major risk factor. Our case control studies have shown
7 how HACCP and other interventions by USDA and the meat
8 industry have helped to reduce specific problems, namely
9 in the fast-food industry.

10 Foodborne transmission of 0157 is preventable.
11 And changes in the meat industry are an important part of
12 this prevention. Comprehensive prevention strategies
13 from farm to table are needed. Thank you.

14 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. Any
15 questions from the panel? Dan?

16 DR. ENGELJOHN: Dan Engeljohn with USDA. On
17 the slide that you had about CDC supporting HACCP with
18 micromonitoring, could you explain or go into that in a
19 little more detail what you meant by that?

20 DR. OLSEN: Yes. I think we think it's an
21 important part of the HACCP and control part point,
22 control process that just as we are, you know, monitoring
23 for pathogens in humans, that it's important to monitor
24 for these pathogens in the food supply to know what the
25 level of contamination is and, as you know, a way of
26 monitoring the different control points.

1 DR. ENGELJOHN: If I could follow up, so you
2 would envision that as an FSIS-directed, monitoring-type
3 program?

4 DR. OLSEN: Correct.

5 DR. ENGELJOHN: Okay.

6 MR. BILLY: Bill?

7 DR. CRAY: Bill Cray, FSIS. Are you aware of
8 any differences in the actual isolates that are
9 associated with produce foodborne illness, and say, beef
10 isolates?

11 DR. OLSEN: You mean in terms of virulence or
12 --

13 DR. CRAY: Yes, any distinguishing features.

14 DR. OLSEN: No, I'm not aware of any further
15 characteristics of isolates at that level. As far as we
16 know, it's the same, you know, in terms of virulence and
17 in terms of --

18 MR. BILLY: Okay. Other questions? Yes.

19 DR. NAIDU: Narain Naidu, Center for
20 Antimicrobial Research. One thing is puzzling to me. If
21 E. coli 0157 is so exclusively associated with cows and
22 cattle, why there is such a low or no incidence of
23 disease in farm workers and their families? Why should
24 it only be with hamburgers?

25 DR. OLSEN: Well, that's a very good question.
26 There's some speculation that actually people who are
27 exposed over long periods of time, perhaps, on the farm

1 or through, say, chronic water contamination might
2 develop some immunity to the pathogen. In fact, I
3 investigated a fascinating outbreak where we saw just
4 that.

5 We were looking for serologic evidence of
6 immunity, and there were two groups of people. There
7 were the town residents, who had a much lower attack
8 rate, and there were a bunch of out-of-town visitors who
9 had come to this town for the weekend. And it was a
10 waterborne outbreak. But their attack rate was much
11 higher, suggesting that perhaps, you know, if you're
12 chronically exposed, you may develop some immunity. So
13 that may play a part in --

14 MR. BILLY: Okay. Dr. Gill?

15 DR. GILL: Colin Gill, Agriculture Canada.
16 There's been two international discussion groups on the
17 purposes of microbiological testing in relation to the
18 safety of meat in the last year. And both those groups
19 came to the conclusion that end-product testing is a
20 total waste -- for pathogens is a total waste of time.
21 Could you please elaborate on why CDC apparently thinks
22 it's a valuable tool for assuring the safety of the meat?

23 DR. OLSEN: Right. End-point testing, you mean
24 the packaged ground beef?

25 DR. GILL: Yes.

26 DR. OLSEN: I don't -- that's not what I meant
27 to imply. I apologize if I did. I think we're saying

1 microbiologic testing at different points are important,
2 you know. And the farther back you can push that testing
3 is, you know --

4 DR. GILL: Well, we're getting very little
5 prevalence of organism. And it's a very dubious value
6 for -- in relationship to implementing a HACCP, why do
7 you think the testing of the pathogens is a useful tool?

8 DR. OLSEN: Well, I think as we're developing
9 these new diagnostic tools, like the immunomagnetic
10 beans, we're not really sure what the prevalence of this
11 pathogen is in beans. And you know, similarly, we didn't
12 know what it was in humans. And you know, if you look
13 you might find it.

14 And I think it's just, you know, you can
15 implement the control process at different points, but,
16 you know to make changes that should have an effect on
17 the pathogen load in meat. But I think you're not going
18 to know until you test it.

19 DR. GILL: I would take it from that, your
20 suggestion from CDC focuses on continuing to do testing
21 to better inform all of us about the impact of various
22 preventive control measures in the farm-to-table
23 continuum that you're not necessarily saying that
24 end-product testing is a procedure for controlling
25 pathogens, such as 0157 in the food supply.

26 DR. OLSEN: Correct.

27 DR. GILL: Is that correct?

1 DR. OLSEN: Yes.

2 MR. BILLY: Other -- yes, Dr. Naidu?

3 DR. NAIDU: Your answer for the previous
4 question that probably certain populations could develop
5 antibodies against E. coli 0157, now does it mean because
6 this opens up a different Pandora's box, does it mean
7 that you have healthy carriage of E. coli 0157:H7 in
8 normal populations which can contribute very good
9 handling for the transmission of E. coli 0157:H7?

10 DR. OLSEN: I think it's a very good question
11 that we don't currently know the answer to.

12 DR. NAIDU: And number two is has CDC or
13 anybody has done any serological surveillance of what is
14 the antibody levels against E. coli 0157 in healthy
15 populations with age groups?

16 DR. OLSEN: Yes. I mean, there hasn't been
17 systematic, you know, sampling of the U.S. population,
18 but from various healthy populations, it seems to be
19 fairly low. And I think there's some evidence to suggest
20 that it may vary by urban or rural location.

21 And I think in the next few years, we're going
22 to see a lot more published on that. There currently
23 isn't a lot of data, but I think that's one thing, you
24 know, at least CDC is interested in looking at.

25 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. I'd
26 like to call to your attention a slight change in the
27 agenda. We'll next have the presentation from Dr.

1 Rexroad as scheduled. And then, the following
2 presentation on the results of the carcass survey
3 previously scheduled for 11:30 will be moved back to
4 right after lunch.

5 And the presentation on the antimicrobial
6 blocking agents will occur about noon as scheduled. So
7 the presentation of the carcass survey will be dropped
8 back to right after lunch. Okay.

9 Now, it's my pleasure to introduce Dr. Caird
10 Rexroad, who is the Associate Deputy Administrator of the
11 Agricultural Research Service. And he's going to be
12 making a presentation on research they've conducted on
13 preharvest food safety.

14 MR. REXROAD: I thank you for the opportunity
15 to be here today. And indeed, I do want to present to
16 you our research program. In preharvesting safety, I
17 want to describe its extent with the glossy behind it,
18 some of the approaches that we use. And to do that, a
19 number of the slides that I present will not refer to
20 0157.

21 However, towards the end of the presentation, I
22 will provide a summary of some of the data that we've
23 recently collected, particularly at the Meat Animal
24 Research Center that relates to 0157. Probably, as you
25 can see, it does say associate deputy administrator.
26 That means I won't be able to answer many of your

1 scientific questions. But I'll do my best and see that
2 we get that information for you. Okay.

3 Our total program in terms of funding is for
4 food safety research. It's about \$82 million; 228
5 scientists apply to that effort. We look at preharvest
6 pathogen control, \$27 million. Much of that has come
7 over the last few years as a result of the Presidential
8 Food Safety Initiative. So it's been a big increase, and
9 we're just now beginning to see some of the benefits of
10 that investment into this preharvest food safety
11 research. Okay.

12 I'll use some of the locations that we have as
13 a way of pointing out some of the kinds of things that
14 we're doing, whether they relate to 0157 or not and some
15 of the philosophy. In this particular location in
16 Beltsville, here in Maryland or across the river in
17 Maryland, we're looking at dairy management for pathogen
18 reduction. So we're looking throughout the production
19 system.

20 We're trying to build teams of people that know
21 about management research and the likely interventions
22 that we need to be doing, teaming those folks with
23 microbiologists together to look at the production system
24 and where the burden from pathogens can come in that
25 production system.

26 The Meat Animal Research Center certainly is
27 one of the places where we focus largely on production of

1 livestock from meat consumption. We do look at the meat
2 species -- cattle, swine, and sheep -- doing a number of
3 things related to epidemiology, ecology of the organisms,
4 and trying to develop interventions to reduce pathogen
5 burdens. We'll speak more about the data.

6 For instance, you've heard something about
7 feeding regimes. We'll talk a little bit about that.
8 Manure management is quite an important issue here,
9 because it's not only what's in the animal, but what's in
10 the environment that we think is important, particularly
11 as it relates to the safety of the water supply.

12 And of course, some of the organisms that we're
13 looking at at Clay Center are the salmonella and 0157.
14 In College Station, Texas, we have a little bit of a
15 different approach where we're looking, primarily, at
16 diagnostics and interventions. And they are looking for
17 new methods to reduce pathogenic bacteria, and
18 particularly looking at competitive exclusion.

19 You've probably heard a lot about replacing the
20 endogenous flora (phonetic) with flora that is likely to
21 be non-pathogenic and using that as a method of keeping
22 away the pathogens. We're now extending that from
23 poultry to other species and look forward to learning
24 more about the efficacy of that approach.

25 Well, I'll skip this one. It mostly relates to
26 poultry this morning. The National Animal Disease
27 Center, again, we think one of the largest parts or kinds

1 of investments that we need to be making over the next
2 few years are microbial genomics.

3 We see that investment taking place everywhere,
4 and we think in terms of understanding how these
5 pathogens, bacteria trade pieces of antibiotic
6 resistance, how they adapt to their environment, how they
7 become pathogens is very important. And we think a
8 fundamental understanding of the genome of pathogens is
9 extremely important.

10 We also work here on manure management, and as
11 I'll point out in a little bit, vaccine research and the
12 development of models for 0157. As you know, most
13 livestock species are not impacted with illness, as a
14 result the presence of the organism. So it's sometimes
15 difficult to have an optimal kind of a model on which to
16 study the organism.

17 Just a few slides to summarize some of our
18 research and some of this, the kinds of things we're
19 trying to do, again, are detect for specific types in the
20 live animal. And we'll say more about that in a minute.

21 Manure and meat and the environment even
22 becomes an important issue, occurrence in the production
23 environment; where does the pathogen burden come relative
24 to the kinds of production practices that we have, the
25 effects of things like feeding and transport,
26 particularly as we near the market, develop interventions

1 that are changes in the practices, changes in feeding,
2 feed additives that could reduce the pathogen burden.

3 We need to learn more about the organism. As
4 indicated, 1982 maybe is a long time ago in some ways,
5 but there's still many things that we simply don't
6 understand about this organism and other organisms that
7 are likely to emerge as problems.

8 So we need to invest, again, in understanding
9 them, and then some little additional work on specific
10 kinds of treatments, some of which you'll hear about here
11 today. I'll tell you a little bit about some of our
12 recent findings, some of which will be published in the
13 near future. And you can get better reference to that.

14 We do find a relatively high prevalence of
15 0157. A lot of this has to do with increasing
16 sensitivity of the assays that are used to detect the
17 presence of the organism, not necessarily in any sense an
18 increase in the organism. For instance, we found that in
19 13 or 15 herds, that at least one animal had feces that
20 were positive for the organism.

21 But many of the animals have been exposed based
22 on their serology; that is, the evidence of having
23 reacted to the presence of the organism. We did do a
24 study that suggested that hay-feeding could reduce the
25 incidence of the organism in feces when presented later.
26 However, we also found, at the same time, that transport

1 with water available and no food reduced the frequency
2 and the presence of the organism.

3 We think that we still don't know enough about
4 the ecology of the organism to really explain these
5 particular findings. And that's especially true for the
6 feeding, because there's a lot of disparity in the kinds
7 of scientific reports that we've had in the United States
8 about the report of feeding.

9 So they do these studies as we're now beginning
10 to be able to do them with, these more sensitive
11 diagnostics do indicate that there's some interesting
12 things about the ecology of the organism. But I don't
13 think we can say that we understand it on that basis.

14 We looked at the incidents in nine states. And
15 we found that using the sensitive assay that there's a
16 wide variation in the incidence of the organism, being
17 nearly absent in the wintertime in the December to
18 February time, having higher peak incidents in July to
19 October. And we've done some preliminary work on hygiene
20 related to the incidence of the organism and found that
21 it had no effect.

22 So one of the things to remember is that this
23 thing does have, at least in our studies, highly seasonal
24 incidence. A study which is to be published soon, which
25 we were asked to talk a little bit about, and that's just
26 what I'll do, is to look at the presence, again, using

1 our new sensitive assay methodology as animals are
2 presented for slaughter.

3 And we find that in this study where there were
4 30 lots of animals, a total of 357 carcasses to be
5 studied, of 29 lots studied, at least 72 percent of those
6 lots had a positive fecal sample, and 38 had positive
7 hide samples. As we looked at the kinds of interventions
8 that are being used in industry today, we saw a
9 tremendous decrease in the presence of the organism down
10 to less than 2 percent.

11 And I should remind you that this study was
12 completed during that time when we find a very high
13 prevalence of the organism; that is, the closer to 50
14 percent in the feedlot. So it was done during a
15 high-incidence time of the year.

16 With some suggestion, and I think this needs
17 additional study, but there's some correlation between --
18 it seems to make common sense, but you can't also be sure
19 -- some correlation between what's on the hide and the
20 feces and what may be there postintervention. If so,
21 then that suggests, again, that working in the preharvest
22 arena to reduce the pathogen burden would have some
23 benefits.

24 Again, I think that really needs to be
25 evaluated more closely. These data will be presented
26 soon for publication, are already in the review process.
27 And I think they've probably been mentioned here today.

1 We do other research. This particular research is at
2 Ames, Iowa, at the National Animal Disease Center where
3 we're developing some technology to distinguish among
4 0157 and others Shiga toxin-producing E. coli. I think
5 that is very important.

6 As I mentioned, it's very difficult to have a
7 model animal to repeatedly to be able to find the
8 presence of 0157 in an animal. So we need an animal
9 model to study how it colonizes in the animal and what
10 methods or interventions can be used to clear the animal.
11 And there, we're looking at pig models to do that,
12 particularly trying to answer questions about the surface
13 proteins that have a role in the adhesion and the
14 capacity, then, to colonize.

15 And one of the other things that we just happen
16 to be doing is testing an active agent as a method to
17 reduce the incidence of E. coli. Again, I want to
18 mention that we -- part of this research, not only in the
19 Food Safety Program, but in our environmental programs is
20 to address the incidence and the transport of manure, its
21 nutrients, and any associated pathogens in the
22 environment.

23 And certainly, that's part of what we will do
24 that will relate to our ability to answer questions about
25 0157. And again, our goal is in this preharvest program
26 is to develop management practices that will reduce

1 exposure to -- of the animal to these pathogens and to
2 reduce the pathogen burden.

3 Okay. That's everything I have to say. If I
4 can answer questions, I will. And I will be glad mostly,
5 probably, to talk about the program. But I probably can
6 answer a few questions about the data, which are not my
7 personal research data.

8 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thanks very much. First, to
9 the panel. Mark?

10 DR. POWELL: Thank you, Doctor. Mark Powell,
11 FSIS. Just to clarify, thank you for your presentation
12 on this study that will be coming out soon. The 72-
13 percent fecal positives, the 38-percent high positives,
14 that was a cluster prevalence, a herd prevalence or a
15 lot?

16 DR. REXROAD: That was a lot prevalence.

17 DR. POWELL: A lot prevalence.

18 DR. REXROAD: We studied 30 lots, and that
19 meant that just at least one animal in that lot could be
20 measured with one sample taken out of that lot.

21 DR. POWELL: So that would not, then, be
22 directly comparable to our animal estimates. Are you
23 aware of whether that study will be also reporting the
24 within-herd prevalence rates

25 DR. REXROAD: I don't know.

26 DR. POWELL: Okay. Thank you very much.

27 MR. BILLY: Okay. Bill?

1 DR. CRAY: Bill Cray, FSIS. Are you able to
2 comment on some preharvest innovation strategy which may
3 reduce the incidents of E. coli 0157?

4 DR. REXROAD: Well, a number of the
5 interventions have been developed. The rinsers, the
6 steam processing over the last years have, obviously, in
7 this study were very effective methods in reducing the
8 incidence on those carcasses. Is that what you're
9 referring to? I'm not sure I can go a whole lot further.
10 I can --

11 DR. CRAY: Yes, yes. On the farm --

12 DR. REXROAD: At this point --

13 DR. CRAY: -- feedlot.

14 DR. REXROAD: -- I think we're still in the
15 position of really working to develop the kinds of
16 interventions and management practices. We're still, as
17 a lot of these funds are very new funds to the agency,
18 still trying to sort out the ecology of the organisms and
19 the epidemiology, just looking to see where they are
20 entering into the production system. So we really
21 haven't developed a lot yet.

22 MR. BILLY: I have a question related to the
23 same study that Mark referred to. Did I hear you say
24 that 3 percent of the carcasses after slaughter were
25 positive?

26 DR. REXROAD: If I remember right, it was less
27 than 2 percent. I don't know the exact number.

1 MR. BILLY: Okay.

2 DR. REXROAD: Of course, that's based on our
3 research data.

4 MR. BILLY: Great. Thank you. Dr. Gill?

5 DR. GILL: Yes. That study interested me, as
6 well. Was this work carried out in a commercial plant?
7 Or was this under an experimental situation?

8 DR. REXROAD: This was carried out under
9 commercial conditions in several plants.

10 DR. GILL: Just a comment on that, there's
11 considerable amount of data in the literature relating to
12 the effects of high condition and microbiological
13 contamination of meat. And all of it says, basically,
14 there's no relationship whatsoever.

15 That it all depends on your dressing process.
16 So your results may be appropriate for one dressing
17 process and totally irrelevant to another dressing
18 process.

19 DR. REXROAD: Yes. I think your comment that
20 there needs to be additional data is appropriate.

21 MR. BILLY: Okay. Other questions? Caroline?

22 MS. DeWAAL: Caroline Smith DeWaal, Center for
23 Science in the Public Interest. First, just a comment on
24 the last comment; and that is, it brings me back to
25 hearing from a gentleman representing the government of
26 New Zealand who felt that actually the conditions of the
27 animals, as they come into slaughter, is actually very

1 indicative of the safety of the products coming out.
2 When you said that 72 percent of 29 lots were positive,
3 how large are those lots?

4 DR. REXROAD: I can't say exactly. I think
5 there are at least 30 animals on those lots. But I'd
6 have to look again. There were 300-and-some animals
7 total in that study, 30 lots. So there were 10 or more
8 animals in the lots.

9 MS. DeWAAL: And you do have data on the
10 peranimal positive?

11 DR. REXROAD: We have. In some of the feedlot
12 studies we have on per animal, the 50-percent incidence
13 was on a per animal in the feed lot. And that was in the
14 summertime and also the comparable data for the
15 wintertime where it was 1 percent or less. But because
16 of their cost contamination things, I presume, is why we
17 have the data in lots going into the slaughterhouse
18 studies.

19 MS. DeWAAL: And it was 50-percent positive on
20 animals in the summertime coming into the lots?

21 DR. REXROAD: In the feedlots for the fecal
22 samples.

23 MS. DeWAAL: In the feedlots. Thank you.

24 MR. BILLY: Rosemary?

25 MS. MUCKLOW: Rosemary Mucklow, National Meat
26 Association. You mentioned seasonal differences in the

1 findings. Did you find any kind of regional differences?
2 Or was it strictly only seasonal?

3 DR. REXROAD: We haven't really evaluated this
4 for regional differences. And they tend to be the
5 packing plants, if I remember correctly, tend to be in
6 the same region. I think that's an important question.

7 MS. MUCKLOW: So you may not have the data to
8 be able to evaluate regions.

9 MR. WOOD: Rich Wood back with Fast-Food
10 Elements Concerned Trust. With the seasonal differences
11 that you're looking at and the high figures that you
12 found, apparently, during the summer months, are your
13 intervention strategies being developed, in any way, to
14 account for those seasonal differences? Or are you
15 finding that the intervention strategies must be constant
16 throughout the production?

17 DR. REXROAD: I can't really answer that right
18 now. I haven't communicated recently with the scientists
19 that are doing intervention strategies. But, certainly,
20 we'll pay attention to our own data, I hope.

21 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much.

22 DR. REXROAD: Thank you.

23 MR. BILLY: Again, with the shift in the
24 agenda, the next presenter will be Dr. Narain Naidu. He
25 is the director for the Center For Antimicrobial Research
26 at California State Polytechnic University in Pomona.

1 And his presentation will be on antimicrobial blocking
2 agents in food safety. Dr. Naidu?

3 DR. NAIDU: First, I would like to thank Tom
4 Billy and USDA and FSIS for giving me an opportunity to
5 present our findings. My today's talk will be like
6 reinventing the wheel. There is in nature, for example,
7 a cow can protect itself. It doesn't need Ph.D.s. It
8 doesn't need M.D.s. It doesn't need anybody.

9 A cow in a pasture can happily protect itself,
10 and it can shed the E. coli 0157:H7 through its feces.
11 It goes away. But once when you slaughter the animal,
12 dehide the animal, eviscerate the animal, you make it
13 into food. The food for us is also a food for the
14 bacteria.

15 So now, I would like to walk you through a
16 technology that is present in the first place in the cow
17 itself which protected it. And we are depleting it
18 during the process and how we can replete it back so the
19 meat can protect itself. My talk for today is activated
20 lactoferrin a new way to protect meat from harmful
21 bacteria.

22 Today, it is E. coli 0157. Tomorrow, it may be
23 enterotropic specium (phonetic.) Day after tomorrow, it
24 could be another thing. On this planet, we share our
25 lives and bacteria, so there can be any bacteria that can
26 emerge as a pathogen. So the concept I would like to
27 present you today is how nature protects a life form like

1 cow and how we can give back to production, back to cow
2 after slaughter.

3 I will walk you through in this talk. What
4 this activated lactoferrin technology means, how this
5 technology works in the laboratory, in the pilot scale,
6 and exactly on the surface of the beef tissue, and what
7 are the research results we have so far in terms of
8 optimization of this technology, plus efficacy data and
9 our future directions of where we would like to take this
10 technology.

11 I come from California State Polytechnic
12 University, Pomona. And two and a-half years ago, we
13 have started a Center for Antimicrobial Research. It was
14 our intention that food safety is not a medical problem.
15 It is no more a food microbiologist's problem.

16 We would like to integrate medical technology
17 the way we know how we can handle pathogens in medicine;
18 how we can transfer the technology to the beef industry,
19 so that we can go for prophylactic measures to prevent
20 pathogens in tissues. We established the Center 1997.
21 We conduct both basic and applied research on various
22 antimicrobials. And we have been focusing mostly on
23 natural antimicrobials.

24 And we also explore the application of these
25 natural antimicrobials in clinical medicine, oral health,
26 animal sciences, for food safety, water quality, et
27 cetera. And let me take you to lactoferrin.

1 Lactoferrin, as the name sounds, it is an iron-binding
2 protein present in milk. And when we say that breast
3 milk is the best and it protects the infant, probably,
4 the first primary food any infant gets from its mammalian
5 mother, is milk.

6 There are so many protective factors that
7 protect an infant. And one of the important primary line
8 of defense is lactoferrin. And lactoferrin has been
9 discovered some 50 years ago, and for the past 30 years,
10 medical researchers have skinned this molecule in and
11 out.

12 If you go to Medline and put a key word on
13 lactoferrin, you would explore something like some 7,000
14 to 8,000 publications. And lactoferrin is currently
15 being investigated in AIDS research. It is investigated
16 in cancer research, in as an immunomodulator in vaccine
17 delivery mechanisms.

18 And some 12 years ago, when I got into this
19 research, we started investigating how this molecule acts
20 as an antimicrobial agent and what are the exact
21 mechanisms of this molecule on various microorganisms
22 that include bacteria, viruses, fungi, and parasites.
23 And one of the things that intrigued me was when mother
24 gives the first cholesterin, the cholesterin is full,
25 rich with lactoferrin.

26 And our entire gastrointestinal tract is like a
27 beautiful ion exchange column for a biochemist. This

1 thing goes and flushes everything. And this molecule --
2 and we wanted to study how bacteria colonizes in the
3 intestinal tract and how bacteria flushed away from the
4 intestinal tract.

5 That was of great medical interest for us to
6 understand infantile diarrhea, which is the worst number
7 one killer there is. About 20 million children get sick,
8 and about 3 to 4 million children die annually.

9 So we wanted to understand in these
10 immunocompromised populations how the milk and the milk
11 components, particularly lactoferrin, would establish
12 bacteria in the gut and how it would detach bacteria, how
13 it would detect lines (phonetic) to certain bacteria, and
14 how it would allow good bacteria to grow, and it would
15 allow pathogenic bacteria to get out.

16 And this molecule is also a multifunctional
17 molecule. It has plenty of -- you name it. It should
18 probably go into Medline and make a -- what this molecule
19 could do. And as I already told you, it is a broad
20 spectrum antimicrobial.

21 Now, when I work as a scientist, I always tell
22 my students nature is always perfect. As scientists, we
23 are imperfect. Our technology's imperfect. That's the
24 reason we improve upon Pentium 1, Pentium 2, Pentium 3.
25 We go on adding our inefficiencies and trying to improve
26 upon. And when we try to purify a natural molecule from
27 its natural niche like, say, milk, that molecule's no

1 more in that same confirmation to do the function what we
2 expect the molecule to do.

3 And it needs an activation process to bring
4 back that structure of that molecule to that confirmation
5 that it will do its biological job. So it took us almost
6 10 years. That small little molecule, it has been
7 x-rayed, photographed. It has been studied so
8 extensively. And we've had to spend more than 12 years
9 to understand how this molecule could be brought to a
10 confirmation that it would exactly behave the way it
11 would act in the intestinal tract.

12 So lactoferrin, when it's isolated from milk,
13 it is structurally compromised to deliver the right kind
14 of antimicrobialness. So it needs an activation process,
15 as you could see, that molecule binds to iron if these
16 two lobes on your left-hand side. And the jaws of
17 lactoferrin, as we call it -- some three years ago, there
18 was a beautiful article on the cover page of Nature,
19 "Jaws of Lactoferrin."

20 For the lactoferrin molecule to work as an
21 antimicrobial, the jaws have to be opened. So that is
22 where, actually, we require an activation process is.
23 And we have found a particular component that is very
24 similar to what you find in the mucus of the
25 gastrointestinal tract that would go to the internal and
26 stretch (phonetic) this one low and immobilizes the

1 lactoferrin molecule and opens the jaw. So it is now
2 ready for business.

3 And before I go a little further, I would like
4 to tell you that lactoferrin is not only present in milk
5 Lactoferrin is present in tears. It is present in
6 saliva. It is present in every mucous secretion that
7 bathes the mucal surface. Every form of secretion has
8 lactoferrin, including the neutrophils in a response.
9 They spew lactoferrin. So lactoferrin is present in
10 tissues.

11 It is present in the cylinder (phonetic) pool.
12 It is present on the mucous surface. So now, we wanted
13 to find a way to put this lactoferrin on a beef surface.
14 We know how it works in medicine. We wanted to transfer
15 this technology and try to see how this molecule -- we
16 could put it on a beef surface for the beef surface and
17 protect the beef surface from E. coli and other
18 pathogens.

19 Now, I would like to take you to how bacteria
20 become pathogens. Number one, if a bacteria does not
21 have an ability to colonize, it is no longer a pathogen
22 to be flushed off. Bacteria needs to have specific
23 mechanisms to stick to a surface and be there.

24 Like intestinal tract, it's like California is
25 like -- an earthquake flushing everything off. If a
26 bacteria has to cause a disease, it has to have specific
27 mechanisms to stick. This is an enterotoxigenic E. coli

1 you could see here. Those haylike projections you could
2 see are fimbria. In ETAC, we call them as colonization
3 factor antigens.

4 And in the presence of activated lactoferrin,
5 within minutes the bacteria turns off its fimbrial
6 expression. And it loses its ability to colonize the
7 intestinal tract. And activated lactoferrin, what all we
8 know in medicine, when we wanted to bring this technology
9 to beef research, the first thing is we would like to
10 optimize this activated lactoferrin to function in a beef
11 safety issue, in a beef safety situation.

12 So we wanted to optimize this lactoferrin
13 molecule against E. coli 0157:H7. That includes both
14 human strains, bovine strains. There are some
15 differences in how human strains and bovine strains and
16 species specificity about human-to-human, bovine to
17 bovine. That probably is a different talk altogether,
18 and also different kinds of other enteric bacteria.

19 To activate the lactoferrin to take and inhibit
20 this bacteria growth multiplication. At six logs --
21 concentration, we optimize the lactoferrin also with --
22 at 10 CFU per milliliter. And also, I want to remind you
23 there's a plethora of radiation-resistant bacteria. At
24 least we have tested some eight different
25 radiation-resistant bacteria. And we could also contain
26 them, control them with this activated lactoferrin
27 repression.

1 Once we have optimized this lactoferrin in the
2 laboratory, we took it further. Now, we wanted to use
3 this activated lactoferrin in beef processing. As you
4 could say down in the beef processing and that
5 multiple-hurdle mechanism, it is so much like the
6 gastrointestinal tract. Gastrointestinal tract is the
7 perfect multiple-hurdle mechanism. I want to remind you,
8 nature is always prolife, never intends to kill anything.

9 It always wants to put everything on
10 equilibrium. And when you look in here in an intestinal
11 tract, you have saliva that takes care of certain
12 bacteria. Then, it goes into the stomach. You have acid
13 wash there. You have hydrochloric acid much stronger
14 than your lactic or gastric acids, enzymes. If the
15 bacteria could pass, which E. coli 0157:H7 could, it
16 comes into the intestinal tract.

17 There, again, you have a microbial blocking it,
18 which would take care of this bacteria and flush it out.
19 That's the reason when you find so much of bacteria in
20 the feedlots, they are not happy campers. They wanted to
21 just get out. And you have those musocal barriers in the
22 intestinal tracts of healthy cows. And you don't see a
23 cow coming and complaining of hemolytic-uremic syndrome.
24 It's a turnoff.

25 So now, the activated lactoferrin we want to do
26 in this, as this thing says out of the hurdle (phonetic),
27 the last hurdle you see in the intestinal tract that

1 would dispose of all the bacteria. We wanted to see that
2 thing pass one more additional hurdle. The meat
3 processing research has done tremendous progress with all
4 those interventions.

5 And those interventions should be in place,
6 plus this would come as one more additional hurdle for
7 the pathogens to jump over. And the electrostatic
8 application we started working because it's not like
9 medicine. You have about 20,000 cattle that's been
10 processed in one day. It's not like a doctor to patient.

11 We don't have more than some two seconds to,
12 actually, to handle a carcass. So we doubled up and we
13 started working with an electrostatic spray system. In
14 less than a second, we can put, cover the entire and pet
15 carcass, like, it is coated and coated in a uniform on a
16 mucosal surface. We can daily work activated lactoferrin
17 in a biologically functional manner in less than a
18 second, onto the surface, uniformly.

19 And we would create a protective barrier like a
20 shield on the carcass until the carcass goes to the
21 consumption level, because in some of the processes, you
22 may have a postharvest contamination, not a
23 post-processing contamination, so that thing would go
24 through various different steps.

25 And finally, you would get a carcass that has
26 not only displaced the bacteria, but the lactoferrin
27 would stick to the surface and remain there and retain

1 its biological activity till it goes to the consumer.
2 And from there, we took this to the pilot scale system.
3 In the pilot scale system, we have built a digitally
4 simulated spray system which exactly mimics a beef
5 processing plant.

6 Since we started working with E. coli 0157:H7,
7 I was not interested in stomaching the things and getting
8 the bacteria in the liquid. The problem with E. coli are
9 pathogens, as I told you earlier, is the bacteria that
10 are loose and stick. You can easily detach them -- are
11 not the ones that cause the problem.

12 The ones that would stick strongly to the
13 surface and resist any detachment, these are the bacteria
14 that would cause the problem. So we have to study
15 directly the bacteria attachment on the tissues. So we
16 have used a labeling technique to get into the DNA and
17 label the DNA of the live E. coli 0157:H7.

18 We need a -- time of labeling, so we can track
19 down E. coli 0157:H7 wherever it is going. In this
20 digital system, the spray system, we can exactly program
21 how many seconds of wash we can keep, how much
22 temperature we can keep, and how fast the belt would
23 move. And we can inoculate the E. coli 0157:H7. We can
24 purposefully contaminate, in fact, a tissue.

25 And we could study and compare different
26 sanitizing systems, all without lactoferrin at the end.
27 And as you could see here, E. coli 0157:H7, 0157 has an

1 adhesive called integrin, plus it has other adhesion
2 mechanisms, as well. It has a specific affinity,
3 especially to collagen type 1 and collagen type 2.

4 As you could see here, those little
5 sausage-like creatures there, they are E. coli 0157 so
6 beautifully embedded in the collagens fimbrials in a
7 tissue matrix. And our pilot studies have shown that if
8 you have one million cells per gram of beef infested with
9 E. coli 0157, all the treatments combined -- it means I'm
10 talking about a sanitizing assembly where you have a
11 water wash, then you have an organic acid wash, then you
12 have a hot-water wash, then you will go water wash and
13 then again an acid rinse, and so on -- it could remove
14 only from 7 percent of E. coli 0157:H7 on the tissue.

15 So you still will have at the end approximately
16 some 25 percent of the bacteria still left. And those
17 are the bacteria that will cause all the problems. When
18 you stomach this tissue, these bacteria don't come out.
19 Whatever the sampling you have, it is representative of
20 those loose 7 percent that come into your liquid phase.
21 These bacteria are still there on the tissues.

22 So these are the bacteria that could be removed
23 if you add one more step of lactoferrin, activated
24 lactoferrin at the end. And we tested lactoferrin
25 against a variety of gram-negative and gram-positive
26 bacteria, including the currently most feared
27 microorganisms in meat industry, of course E. coli 0157,

1 and we looked into different kinds of salmonella, both
2 the pork, cattle and the poultry pathogens, including DT-
3 104.

4 We have gone with the campylobacters. We went
5 with shigella. Shigella is considered to be the mother
6 of fecal E. coli 0157. And we went with clostridium and
7 various other bacteria. And about the safety and
8 tolerance of lactoferrin, lactoferrin has been consumed
9 by mankind, or by mammals, since the evolution.
10 That's probably the first coating, actually, we got into
11 our mouths ever.

12 And the anticipated level of -- we want to
13 apply is one thousand times less than what is actually
14 found in a single serving of milk, a glass of milk. But
15 it is already a less amount of lactoferrin that we can
16 activate and effectively dispose of those -- that amount
17 on the entire beef carcass. And there are various
18 ingredients in this formulation that would keep this
19 molecule active.

20 And all those ingredients in this formulation
21 are GRAS. And lactoferrin is now going to a GRAS
22 petition, as well. And there is no reason to suspect any
23 adverse impact of lactoferrin on nutritional quality.
24 And probably when you took your cup of tea or coffee with
25 milk in it, or you have your yogurt or your cheese, you
26 have taken your dose of lactoferrin.

1 But it is not an active form, however. It
2 doesn't affect the nutritional quality, sensor
3 characteristics, or product safety. For example, the
4 taste you feel in your saliva in your mouth, lactoferrin
5 is there. And there is an abundant source of
6 lactoferrin. Currently lactoferrin has been produced or
7 isolated as one of the many bioactive ingredients from
8 cheese whey.

9 And these large quantities of whey are
10 available and lactoferrin is being commercially produced
11 by many, many major dairy companies around the world.
12 And there is enough of lactoferrin to protect the entire
13 meat supply. And, as I told you, lactoferrin is a
14 commercial commodity.

15 And the next step is right now we're looking
16 for some regulatory approvals of our in-plant testing on
17 beef carcass and ground beef applications. We want to
18 expand our research to pork, poultry, and other processed
19 meats. And we are still awaiting such regulatory
20 approvals from FDA and USDA. And applications are beyond
21 me.

22 I, basically, belong to the medical sciences,
23 and there is a tremendous amount of data over there that
24 we wanted to get into medical applications, which we are
25 currently looking at. And in summary, this is a natural
26 protective mechanism that primarily existed in a cow.

1 For the past 12 years when I started working
2 with cow milk lactoferrin in human diseases, I never even
3 had the faintest of idea that we're talking about a
4 homologous situation, a cow milk protein getting back to
5 cow. Nature has designed this molecule for cows. And it
6 is one of the natural food safety solutions that Mother
7 Nature has provided.

8 We just borrowed a page from Mother Nature to
9 bring it back to the beef industry. This is a normal
10 application of an extensively studied natural protein.
11 And it is consumer and producer friendly. And thanks for
12 your attention.

13 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you, Dr. Naidu.
14 Questions from the panel? Okay. Go ahead.

15 MR. GOYAL: Raghugir Goyal, FSIS today. I'd
16 just like to ask have you made any study or made an
17 attempt to study long-term bioassays or how it could
18 chronically affect the safety of the body?

19 DR. NAIDU: Of what, of lactoferrin?

20 MR. GOYAL: Yes.

21 DR. NAIDU: There are various studies.
22 Lactoferrin is currently being used as an ingredient of
23 infant food formulas all over Europe and in Southeast
24 Asia. So it is being consumed by the most sensitive
25 population on the planet, that is the infants.

1 MR. GOYAL: No. I'm just asking if any of the
2 experimental studies like chronic studies, like two-year
3 bioassays done in the annual studies --

4 DR. NAIDU: Yes.

5 MR. GOYAL: -- have you done to prove there's
6 any chronic effect on the -- any type of live animals or
7 -- the surrogate animals or sometimes for --

8 DR. NAIDU: Yes.

9 MR. GOYAL: -- those studies done in --

10 DR. NAIDU: Yes. Yes, sir. Those studies were
11 done. There are 29 different animal studies have been
12 done in the last 15 years. And there was a big review
13 article where recently we published -- probably, you
14 could get the article, and see it in the safety and
15 tolerance section, you can read that. There was 10 pages
16 of section there. We have listed all the trials, animal
17 trials.

18 MR. BILLY: Yes, Mark or Dan, and then Kim.

19 DR. ENGELJOHN: Dan Engeljohn with USDA. What
20 level of residue would you expect to be coated onto the
21 product?

22 DR. NAIDU: Could you please repeat your
23 question?

24 DR. ENGELJOHN: Would there be a residue left
25 of the lactoferrin on the processed meat products?

1 DR. NAIDU: We wanted lactoferrin to remain on
2 the surface of the meat, so that it would give a lasting
3 protection.

4 DR. ENGELJOHN: Okay. And so in the petition,
5 I'm assuming that you're putting together, or have put
6 together, on this visit, would it identify the level that
7 would need to be there?

8 DR. NAIDU: Yes. I think we have assays, and
9 we are keeping those in place.

10 DR. ENGELJOHN: And it's specific for meat and
11 poultry?

12 DR. NAIDU: Right now, we are focusing mostly
13 on beef and beef products, yes, sir.

14 DR. ENGELJOHN: And does it create a sufficient
15 amount of protection in the sense that it allows for
16 competition by other organisms, anaerobic organisms,
17 or other organisms that may survive all tied up?

18 DR. NAIDU: Lactoferrin is also a prebiotic.
19 The only organism that it would allow to grow is --
20 Lactobacilleae and other organisms don't grow. And we
21 have done these shelf-life studies for 45 days, seeing
22 that how lactoferrin could put down the bacteria to
23 multiply.

24 MR. BILLY: Okay. Kim?

25 MS. RICE: Kim Rice, the American Meat
26 Institute. Can you explain how you went about doing your
27 control study, the level you inoculated at and how long

1 you let it grow, and then how you came by measuring the
2 effect of the interventions, and then the lactoferrin?
3 Could you briefly explain that?

4 DR. NAIDU: What we do is we try to -- we take
5 E. coli 0157; we grow them in the presence of treated
6 thiamin. The thiamin gets incorporated with the DNA. We
7 did those bacteria, and we tried to make a standard curve
8 as to three different variations with variables with
9 total platlet counts and how much DPM it would come to.
10 And also, we do an OD (phonetic) determination and also
11 correlate how much in the disintegrations per minute.

12 And then, we take a measured volume of measured
13 DPM of bacteria, so we exactly know how many bacteria we
14 are putting there. And when our E. coli 0157 sticks to a
15 surface, it needs a minimum of 30 minutes interaction for
16 that lock-and-key mechanism to establish an equilibrium.

17 If you put 100 cells, only 7 cells will bind of
18 the equilibrium. If you put a million cells, only 7
19 percent, so for that 7-percent equilibrium, you have to
20 keep it for 30 minutes. And after that, we subject it to
21 different kinds of treatments. And at different steps,
22 we take those meat pieces, and we disintegrate the entire
23 meat piece in a tissue modernizer, put it into a meat
24 account and measure, and then correlate it with how many
25 bacteria are left. And we wanted to see zero with
26 lactoferrin.

1 MS. RICE: And can I ask a followup question?
2 The number of cells you were measuring, that was just the
3 ones that were marked in the DNA? It was not live or
4 viable? It was just --

5 DR. NAIDU: They are live. They are live
6 bacteria.

7 MS. RICE: They were all live?

8 DR. NAIDU: Yes. All of them are live. This
9 is a technology we use in cancer research to study live
10 cancer cells.

11 MS. RICE: And you allowed it to bind for 30
12 minutes only, or was it longer than 30 minutes?

13 DR. NAIDU: We put even sometimes for two
14 hours, a minimum of 30 minutes -- 30 minutes to 2 hours.
15 After two hours, no matter how much you keep it, it's
16 equilibrium.

17 MS. RICE: Okay. Thank you.

18 MR. BILLY: Nancy?

19 MS. DONLEY: Nancy Donley from STOP. I think I
20 heard you mention at the very end of your presentation
21 that you're looking at this for other uses. Perhaps,
22 have you looked into this at all with -- as a medical
23 treatment for people who are infected with E. coli 0157?

24 DR. NAIDU: Oh, yes. We have been working on
25 that. That is actually my main focus for the past 20
26 years. We have been working on that, but for the past
27 two years, our entire focus went onto beef. My plate is

1 full. I could not even go look into any other products.
2 Our total 100 percent focus is on beef safety.

3 MS. DONLEY: But you looked at it as a medical
4 treatment for humans for 20 years?

5 DR. NAIDU: For 12 years, yes.

6 MS. DONLEY: Twelve years?

7 DR. NAIDU: Yes, ma'am.

8 MS. DONLEY: Really, nothing ever came out of
9 it?

10 DR. NAIDU: There are; there are treatments
11 going on. And I think in oral hygiene, it is going on;
12 in -- intestinal, it is going down. But the point is,
13 activated lactoferrin is a pretty new discovery. This
14 would allow a different kind of ballgame. If you wanted
15 to take lactoferrin as a prophylactic or a therapeutic
16 that we're exploring now how to get there, but after we
17 finish the beef story.

18 MR. BILLY: Okay. Andrew?

19 DR. BENSON: Andrew Benson, University of
20 Nebraska. A couple of questions here. Any idea what the
21 incidence of allergy is to lactoferrin?

22 DR. NAIDU: To our knowledge, no. And if I had
23 to go, whenever you take a protein, if a protein is
24 denatured by any process, then any protein can become an
25 antigen. And lactoferrin, as a native protein, it is
26 nonallergenic.

1 DR. BENSON: The question was, in terms of
2 those persons that are allergic to milk products, are any
3 of those persons allergic to lactoferrin, in particular?
4 Or do you know?

5 DR. NAIDU: No. So far, there are no reports.
6 The only complaints you have is lacto-intolerance, which
7 is a carbohydrate-associated intolerance coming from the
8 milk products. In certain cases, it can be casing. And
9 actually, if I had to put a little spin on lactoferrin,
10 lactoferrin decreases the inflammatory responses and it
11 decreases any allergic responses. Lactoferrin is now
12 currently being tried to reduce rheumatoid as a
13 treatment.

14 DR. BENSON: The second question was a little
15 bit about the mode of antibacterial action that you have
16 here. You suggest in one of your experiments that it's
17 inhibiting growth and multiplications. So it's obviously
18 not killing the organisms. Would you clarify that for
19 me, in terms of what its mode of action was?

20 DR. NAIDU: Okay. In medicine in the past five
21 or six years, the way we build up, killing a bacteria
22 meant a bacteria was alive or dead, it still has the
23 ability to cause immunostimulation in immunomodulation.
24 It's still a proimplimentary breather that can lead to
25 other events, cellular events. So nature never kills
26 anything, unless it takes --

1 DR. BENSON: But you referred to a specific
2 experiment, though, where you were looking at growth
3 inhibition.

4 DR. NAIDU: This particular lactoferrin, the
5 way we activated it, it acts as a bacterial static agent.
6 It stunts the bacteria and does not allow bacteria to
7 multiply.

8 DR. BENSON: And what is the mechanism of that?

9 DR. NAIDU: Iron deprivation.

10 DR. BENSON: Iron deprivation?

11 DR. NAIDU: Yes, sir.

12 DR. BENSON: So iron deprivation also would
13 explain the loss of pilae in the experiment with the
14 endotoxins.

15 DR. NAIDU: No. That's a different mechanism.
16 For that, lactoferrin has to bind to FNOC, and then it
17 has to put a small little fragment inside and inhibit the
18 plasmid. That's an altogether different mechanism.

19 MR. BILLY: Marty?

20 MR. HOLMES: Marty Holmes, North American Meat
21 Processors. The graph you showed that showed the
22 reduction, pathogen reduction, using the lactoferrin, did
23 that include any other interventions? Or was that
24 strictly lactoferrin?

25 DR. NAIDU: No. As I wanted to recall that
26 slide back to you, it is plus-lactoferrin. You held all

1 interventions in place. And the last step is a
2 lactoferrin formulation for 10 seconds.

3 MR. HOLMES: Okay. And that's what I'm talking
4 about. Did you do any tests, lactoferrin only, to see
5 what result it was?

6 DR. NAIDU: Yes.

7 MR. HOLMES: And what was that?

8 DR. NAIDU: It comes around 95.

9 MR. HOLMES: Ninety-five percent reduction?

10 DR. NAIDU: Yes.

11 MR. HOLMES: Okay. Thank you.

12 MR. BILLY: Okay. Caroline?

13 MS. DeWAAL: Thank you. Caroline Smith DeWaal
14 with the Center for Science in the Public Interest. I
15 have a couple of questions. One is how large is this
16 study that you're reporting on in terms of how many
17 samples have you run? I mean, what level of confidence
18 do we have in the result here?

19 DR. NAIDU: We have been testing for the past
20 one and a-half years almost on a regular basis. And
21 three of my students are running this plant almost three
22 times a day and hundreds and hundreds of samples. We
23 have piles of data, and three students are going to
24 finish the pieces on this.

25 So we have quite a good amount of data. What
26 we did, Caroline, is we already know in medicine how it
27 works. We just wanted to translate this thing to a

1 different ballgame. Here, we're talking about a big
2 surface, and we have a very short period of time to move
3 things up. So we understand. I think we need to do a
4 lot of -- lot of work which we have done on a pilot
5 scale. But we still have to go for the in-plant testing
6 for approving us.

7 MS. DeWAAL: I note that, although it was hard
8 to read the list of pathogens on one particular slide,
9 you didn't have -- I was struck by the fact you didn't
10 have salmonella typhimurium, which is a type of
11 salmonella which is frequently associated with beef.

12 DR. NAIDU: There were listed -- a list of a
13 lot of -- we could not put them. DT 104 was there,
14 typhimurium three, four different serotypes we tested.

15 MS. DeWAAL: Okay. Fine. I just noticed that
16 in the salmonella list, it didn't include typhimurium.
17 And finally, and I think this is really a followup or,
18 maybe, the same questions Marty just asked. Why so late?

19 I remember with the TSP work, the trisodium
20 phosphate, they tried to put it way at the end of the
21 process and found that if they put it earlier in the
22 process, it was far more effective. Have you tested out
23 the lactoferrin earlier in the process before the other
24 hurdles that you have tested? Why are you putting it so
25 late in the process?

26 DR. NAIDU: It was two and a-half years ago, I
27 was approached by a few people. And my work back in

1 Europe and back in so many other countries -- this is my
2 20th country -- I have met a gentleman by the name of
3 John R. Miller. He is the CEO of Farmland National Beef.
4 And then we went on some discussions. And I started
5 talking about how medical technology can take care of E.
6 coli 0157 in a clinical situation.

7 From there, the whole thing has been spun. And
8 today, here we are. And medical people usually don't
9 want to step down to food microbiology, because all your
10 colleagues would say that, probably, your period is going
11 -- doldrums. So we never go downward. But this is a
12 children problem.

13 All my life I have worked with infantile
14 illnesses as a medical person. And you see a child
15 dying, I think without even explaining, you cannot
16 explain the symptoms. It is so pathetic. And all my
17 life, I worked with infantile infections, and this is a
18 disease with an immunocompromised host, especially
19 children who are immunocompromised. And we wanted to
20 transfer this technology. And that's how it is so late
21 to bring this technology to the beef industry.

22 MS. DeWAAL: And perhaps, I didn't state my
23 question very clearly. Have you tested it on warm
24 carcasses, as well as carcasses right before they go into
25 the chiller? Why are you using lactoferrin so late in
26 the slaughter process? And have you tested it earlier

1 before you utilized all the other -- you know, you had
2 washing? You had the antimicrobial --

3 DR. NAIDU: Oh, yes. I'm sorry. We have
4 tested lactoferrin before going through all those
5 processes and after those processes. As one of our
6 friends has asked, if we try to take lactoferrin alone,
7 it is effective. However, you need to have a mechanical
8 way of removing those bacteria. Lactoferrin could
9 inhibit radiation. You need to have a mechanical way of
10 flushing the bacteria out.

11 And all those different steps of washing and
12 the flowing through the carcass would help that
13 mechanical flushing out. I'm sorry I didn't understand
14 your earlier question.

15 MR. BILLY: Rosemary?

16 MS. MUCKLOW: Rosemary Mucklow, National Meat
17 Association. I think what you're really telling us,
18 Narain, is that lactoferrin is not a substitute for good
19 cleaning practices, that we need to do all of the other
20 things that we've always done. And this is just one
21 extra safeguard that has a very impressive result,
22 certainly, in the research and, hopefully, in the real
23 world. Is that a fair statement?

24 DR. NAIDU: Absolutely. I would actually give
25 a take-home message. Nature has never devised a silver
26 bullet. There's never one thing that could take care of
27 anything. And Rosemary is precisely correct. This is

1 one of those various multiple hurdles. And all those
2 hurdles that are out there right now, they have to be
3 there in place.

4 MR. BILLY: Absolutely. Marty?

5 MR. HOLMES: I had one further question. That
6 is --

7 COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. Your name, please?

8 MR. HOLMES: Marty Homes, North American Meat
9 Processors. I know we're not that far yet, but are we
10 talking about if this is a wash or a rinse similar to
11 organic or lactic acid rinses, is there some labeling
12 requirements that would be -- need to be looked at?

13 Are we talking, you know -- Dan, you brought up
14 questions about residues. You know, this is all fine and
15 good, but if we start talking about a lactic acid or
16 putting this on the label, that just raises some concern.
17 I just want to make that comment.

18 DR. NAIDU: Well, again, we have a team of
19 regulatory guys working with us. Maybe, I think they are
20 the right people to answer it. I'm a scientist in my
21 little lab, so thank you for your comment.

22 MS. WALLS: Isabelle Walls, International
23 Sciences Institute. Have you got any data showing after
24 you treat the meat with the lactoferrin, what percentage
25 do not attach to the meat? Do you have any data to show
26 that?

27 DR. NAIDU: It was actually 99.9 percent.

1 MS. WALLS: That you had --

2 DR. NAIDU: Yes, because it very effectively
3 attaches to most of the bacteria.

4 MS. WALLS: So after treatment, then, if you
5 challenge it -- have you tried it at different periods of
6 time after you challenge it?

7 DR. NAIDU: Oh, yes. Yes. It protects the
8 meat from the bacteria. The bacteria would not attach,
9 because the surface charges and the collagen matrices,
10 which are the receptors for E. coli, have been blocked.
11 This thing will competently go there, occupy those sides,
12 and does not allow an in-coming bacteria after the
13 lactoferrin treatment to get to the surface and colonize.

14 MS. WALLS: I'd be interested in that data.

15 MR. BILLY: Bill?

16 MR. BROWN: Bill Brown, ABC Research. Two
17 quick questions. One, have you tried it on listeria
18 monocytogenes? And two, is it heat-stable?

19 DR. NAIDU: Number one, Listeria monocytogenes
20 is a different kind of pathogen. Lactoferrin, when it
21 exists in different sites in our body, it is meant to
22 take care of different kinds of bacteria. The way we
23 have tuned this molecule and activated it is specifically
24 against the bacteria I was talking about.

25 Yes, we could tune and activate this
26 lactoferrin molecule against listeria. And we know how
27 to do that. And your second question about the heat in

1 this thing. At pasteurization temperatures, lactoferrin,
2 we have done a lot of differential econometric studies on
3 folding and unfolding of lactoferrin. To pasteurize
4 these temperatures, it can unfold and recoil back, but
5 when you go to extremely high temperatures, like any
6 other protein, it would be nature.

7 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much.

8 DR. NAIDU: Thank you. Now, we'll break for
9 lunch.

10 (Whereupon, a luncheon recess was taken.)

11 //

12 //

13 //

14 //

15 //

16 //

17 //

18 //

19 //

20 //

21 //

22 //

23 //

1 A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

2 MR. BILLY: Everyone take their seats, please.
3 I'd like to do a few housekeeping things to get started.
4 Again, we're running about a half hour behind, so I'm
5 going to press forward. Before I do, I'd like to remind
6 everyone that we do have a time schedule at the end.

7 We may eat into some of that time, depending on
8 our adhering to the agenda scheduled for this afternoon.
9 But nonetheless, we welcome comments. We encourage
10 people that wish to make a statement or comments to do so
11 by going out to the registration desk and letting us
12 know. And we'll make that time available, first, to
13 those that sign up and provide us that information to the
14 extent that time's available.

15 Getting back to the agenda, the next
16 presentation was one that was delayed or carried over
17 from this morning. And it is a group presentation. It
18 reflects a piece of work that was carried out by
19 coalition and industry, looking at the incidence of E.
20 coli 0157:H7 on carcasses, as well as other places in the
21 slaughter operation.

22 The presentations will be made by Dr. Dell
23 Allen, who is Vice President of Quality and Training for
24 Excel Corporation; Mr. Jim Hodges, who is the President
25 of the American Meat Institute Foundation; Dr. Keith
26 Belk, who is the Assistant Professor at Colorado State

1 University, the Department of Animal Sciences; and Dr.
2 Ann Hollingsworth, who's Vice President for Food Safety
3 for Keystone Foods. So, folks, whoever is first.

4 DR. ALLEN: On behalf of the Beef Industry
5 Coalition that worked on this project, I want to thank
6 USDA for the opportunity to present our results. I
7 think, first of all, you all are at risk as an audience.
8 I have been turned loose with a computer up here to do
9 this presentation. And I've never done that in my life.
10 So we'll learn together and enjoy it together.

11 A couple of points I'd like to make, first of
12 all, as I told somebody when I went to lunch today, the
13 first thing I've learned -- I've learned a couple of
14 things today -- number 1, E. coli 0157, evidently, is all
15 around us, but thank God for drinking milk. So that's
16 the good news out of the morning that I'd say.

17 I think another thing that I would like to
18 stress, we've talked a lot about 0157. We've talked a
19 lot about testing. And as I sat through, particularly
20 the early morning sessions, you know, it reminded me, as
21 I told Kim who was sitting next to me -- Kim Rice -- we
22 need Ann Murray here for a little more good news. You
23 know the song she had, "A Little Good News Today,"
24 because it was pretty gloomy for awhile.

25 But I would remind everybody, and I think it
26 needs to be publicly stated, that my company alone will
27 perform about 18,000 tests for E. coli 0157:H7 this year.

1 And I think my peer companies -- I think I can speak for
2 them -- although I don't know exactly what they do, I
3 would dare say that they would be somewhere in that same
4 type of vicinity anymore.

5 So despite what may be the perception, there is
6 a lot of work that has been done and is being done to try
7 to get at this organism and to try to take it and remove
8 it from the food supply on the part of an industry that
9 has taken this as a very, very serious challenge over the
10 years. With that in mind, we'll go ahead and get into
11 the formal presentation if I can remember to hit the down
12 arrow.

13 First of all, last year on January 19th, USDA
14 came out with a policy clarification on their
15 adulteration policy on 0157:H 7. And basically, what it
16 was doing is clarifying that it was adulterated in ground
17 beef, but potentially also should be considered such in
18 trim, as well as muscle meat, where they were stenciled
19 for an intact surface penetration.

20 As a result of that, this group will be
21 presenting the information to you as form. And out of
22 that early genesis of a group came the recommendations
23 that we made in March of last year to go ahead, and
24 before we got into this too much further, really try to
25 start looking at what was the incidence level of 0157 in
26 our plant.

1 We realized that we needed to work hard, even
2 harder than we were, maybe at getting information out
3 into the public. We felt like, definitely, all segments
4 needed to be involved. And by all segments, everybody in
5 the segments represented in that meeting represented
6 everybody from cattle producers through retailers in that
7 group.

8 It's still our feeling, and I think a lot of
9 people's feeling, that the end-product testing that is
10 being done and is done is equivalent to closing the barn
11 door after the horse is out. And the logical alternative
12 to that is to go back upstream somewhere and try to
13 identify it earlier in the production stream, such that
14 it can be prevented from being, even entering food
15 streams.

16 With that in mind, we looked internally at our
17 industry and said the logical choke point may be in the
18 carcass form, at least initially, and that if we can
19 identify it on a carcass, we could at least take that
20 carcass and isolate it and get it out of the food system,
21 and that the carcass so contaminated would either be sent
22 to condemnation or processed in a way of cooking which
23 would kill the organism.

24 Basically, strongly stated in that group,
25 presumptive positives had to either be treated as a
26 confirmed positive, or you take them out to confirmation
27 and find out where it is. We felt like that message

1 needed to go out loud and clear to everybody in the
2 industry. We also wanted to come up with some way, if we
3 could, and encourage USDA to come up with a system that
4 basically encourages testing and does not discourage
5 testing.

6 In many cases, the current policy actually
7 discourages or causes people not to test. Sometimes,
8 it's the attitude, "it's better not to know whether it's
9 there or not." And that's really the ostrich-head-in-
10 the-sand approach. And we need to get that ordered if we
11 can, and we want to work with the agency to try to get
12 that done.

13 Looking at that, we asked the USDA to consider
14 the revision of their directive 10010.10, which had come
15 out previous to that. I don't know; it's been a year,
16 two years ago. Well, actually, it was about two years
17 ago they came out.

18 And in that directive, which allows for a
19 reduced -- for a plant to enter into a reduced testing
20 period by USDA, one of the criteria in there is that you
21 have to have six months of negative data up front before
22 you qualify for that, where you test in your system for
23 six months and you get six months, negative information.
24 And then, you can qualify to operate under that
25 directive.

26 And that six-months testing period is actually
27 a deterrent to some people to even enter into. And so we

1 recommend taking a look at that and doing away with that
2 six-month requirement. Basically, we felt like option
3 three, which is in that directive, and allows plants that
4 have microbial intervention systems in their system to
5 qualify under that directive.

6 Basically, should be revised to formalize, if
7 you will, a process verification testing as a part of
8 that directive, and then basically to also to allow the
9 eligibility for FSIS's reduced testing, if I qualify for
10 it in my plant, for that to be passed onto my customers.
11 Out of that, then, came a recommendation from this group
12 that we do a pilot survey, a pilot test, if you call it.

13 Basically, we were coming up with a carcass-
14 testing process. We had a written program. Basically,
15 it stated in that program any positive, confirmed
16 positive, that we found to be removed from the system and
17 any presumptive positive that was only taken at that
18 stage would be treated as a confirmed positive,
19 identified the swabbing sites to be used as the same
20 flank, brisket and rump sites that the USDA uses in their
21 generic E. coli sampling.

22 And we recommended a minimum level of sampling
23 of one carcass per 300 slaughtered and/or, if a plant
24 killed less than that, then the slaughter, at minimum, to
25 sample a minimum of one per day. And with that, I'm
26 going to turn it over to our next speaker in line, Jim
27 Hodges.

1 DR. HODGES: In the Carcass Testing Pilot
2 Project, we started with the objective to evaluate the
3 feasibility of a carcass testing program to routinely
4 verify slaughter plant controls for E. coli 0157:H7.
5 This was not a designed research project, but simply on a
6 plant-by-plant basis to look at whether the carcass
7 testing program that had been proposed was feasible and
8 workable.

9 The survey design included 12 plants. Those 12
10 plants were geographically disbursed across the United
11 States. They included both steers and heifers and cows
12 and bull slaughters in various plants. And in each
13 plant, there was at least one microbial intervention.

14 But those intervention systems would vary
15 between the various plants. One in 300 carcasses were
16 tested and were tested at three points during the
17 slaughter process -- on the hide before hide removal,
18 prior to carcass wash, and after final microbial
19 intervention.

20 The carcasses, the hides and carcasses, the
21 same ones were tested throughout the system, and matched
22 sides and alternating matched sides were tested prior to
23 carcass wash and after final microbial intervention.
24 Trend data, if it was normally done by the plant or the
25 plant could obtain that trimmings information from their
26 customers, we did collect that during the course of their

1 normal business activities. But that was not a part of
2 the routine design of the program.

3 The test ran for a one-month period immediately
4 after Labor Day into October. For the carcass handling,
5 each carcass was identified as an individual lot and held
6 until confirmed negative for 0157. Carcasses confirmed
7 positive for E. coli 0157:H7 were rendered or cooked,
8 those carcasses that tested positive after the final
9 microbial intervention.

10 And positive tests required a reassessment of
11 the slaughter procedures and carcass intervention
12 systems. The hides were sampled with a 24-square-inch
13 area along the brisket midline in one area. They were
14 analyzed using a modified USDA ARS hide-sampling method
15 that was mentioned this morning.

16 The difference between the ARS method and what
17 we did is because this was a commercial survey. Those
18 hide sponge samples were transported and not immediately
19 gone into incubated enrichment as the ARS protocol called
20 for. And all presumptive positives were confirmed for
21 0157.

22 The hide samples were sent to a central
23 laboratory, the Penn State E. coli Reference Center. The
24 carcass sampling procedures was done by the individual
25 plants or a laboratory, private laboratory of the plant's
26 choosing. This was to simulate what would happen in
27 commercial practice.

1 We did not use a centralized laboratory for the
2 carcass sampling programs. We sponged 40 square inches
3 on the 3-side areas, brisket, flank and rump. We
4 analyzed using the, what I've classified as, the modified
5 FSIS Microbiologic Laboratory Guide Book Procedures.

6 The difference between the current procedures
7 that is used by FSIS and what we used is we used the MSA
8 VCIG agar, instead of the rainbow agar. We did, however,
9 consult with FSIS about that choice that we had started
10 with. And with their concurrence, we elected to stay
11 with our original plants.

12 And again, all presumptive positive samples
13 were confirmed. We transferred our -- the data was
14 brought to AMI. We coded that data and gave it to
15 Colorado State for analysis.

16 DR. BELK: Thank you, Jim. This slide reflects
17 data from the first six plants included in the study that
18 was received by Colorado State University. Very quickly,
19 I'd like to outline a couple of interesting notes here.
20 Firstly, this column is the number of observations
21 collected at each one of the plants involved in the study
22 at each of the three processing sites within the
23 harvesting system in those plants.

24 One of the unique aspects of the study was the
25 fact that the hide samples, with the exception of the
26 first plant out of the first six plants, resulted in
27 positive incidents of E. coli 0157:H7. The incidents

1 ranged from down here at 0 percent up to a high of almost
2 19 percent on the surface of the hides.

3 For these first six plants, prior to washing,
4 but after hide removal, only one of the six plants
5 actually exhibited positive incidence of E. coli 0157:H7.
6 And following application of the intervention systems
7 within the plant, none of the six plants exhibited
8 positive incidence of E. coli 0157:H7.

9 Similarly, for the second set of six plants,
10 once again, only one plant out of the second set of six
11 did not have any positives detected on the surface of
12 hides. And one again, the range and the incidence was
13 0.00 up to a little over 18 percent incidence on surface
14 of the hides.

15 Three of the plants did have positive samples
16 obtained from the surfaces of carcasses after removal of
17 the hide, while the other three plants all had zero
18 frequency of E. coli 0157:H7. And once again, all six of
19 the plants reported no positive incidence of E. coli
20 0157:H7 after application of the intervention systems.

21 If you look at the total of all plants
22 combined, we collected approximately 2,248 samples at
23 each of the processing sites included in the study. Hide
24 on, the average mean incidence of E. coli 0157:H7 was
25 3.56 percent. After hide removal, but prior to
26 intervention application, the incidents dropped to .44

1 percent. And this was a statistically different number
2 from the hide-on incidents.

3 And in following intervention or application of
4 the intervention systems, the incidence dropped to 0
5 percent. And that also was a statistically significant
6 reduction in the frequency of E. coli 0157:H7. In
7 addition to this, as Jim Hodges mentioned, samples were
8 collected of trimmings, which were sent to laboratory for
9 evaluation of E. coli 0157:H7.

10 And in this study, none of the beef trimmings
11 samples were found to test positive for 0157:H7. To
12 summarize these numbers very quickly, at the hide-on
13 stage of processing, succumbing into the packing plant,
14 only 2 of 12 plants did not run into some incidence of E.
15 coli 0157:H7 on the exterior of the hide.

16 Prior to washing or prior to the application of
17 interventions, 8 of the 12 plants did not experience a
18 positive incidence of E. coli 0157:H7, and samples
19 collected from the carcasses following application of the
20 intervention systems resulted in 12 of the 12 plants not
21 experiencing a positive incidence of 0157:H7.

22 Some of the conclusions that we devised from
23 analysis of these data, firstly, the current protocols
24 that the monitoring system for E. coli 0157:H7 are
25 resulting in about an average of 6,373 samples collected
26 per year at the retail ground beef level.

1 If a carcass testing program were capable of
2 being applied in such a manner that we were testing one
3 of every 300 carcasses slaughtered, both fed beef and in
4 market bull plants, that would result in the cumulation
5 of over 120,000 samples per year, about a 19-fold
6 increase.

7 In addition to that, the surface sponging
8 protocol that was used in this study would result in
9 about a two-and-a-half-fold increase in the
10 amount of surface area currently been sponged via the
11 generic E. coli verification programs of the house
12 regulation.

13 Testing for pathogens to ensure food safety
14 cannot be successful. Pathogen contamination is an
15 infrequent, unpredictable event. And there's no such
16 thing as zero risk. And that was, once again, clearly
17 shown this morning with the presentation of the model
18 risk assessment systems.

19 This results in somewhat of a disparity in
20 current FSIS policy. If you look at the definition for a
21 critical control point in the HACCP regulations that
22 recognizes the fact that there's no such thing as zero
23 risk, while on the other end of the spectrum downstream
24 in the production process, you have adulteration policy
25 that, by definition, implies that there is such a thing
26 as zero risk.

1 We would encourage anybody that would like to
2 implement a testing program to consult the American Meat
3 Science Association's publication from last year dealing
4 with the scientific perspectives of sampling within
5 production.

6 Logically, pathogen testing upstream would at
7 least increase the probability of effectiveness,
8 particularly from the verification or a process control
9 perspective. The reasons we think this would be the case
10 is because positive carcasses can be removed from
11 commerce prior to fabrication and grinding if they are
12 detected within the packing plant.

13 And secondly, if a positive were to be detected
14 post`intervention, appropriate corrective actions would
15 be allowed to occur which would allow and enhance the
16 continuing improvement theory of the preventive food
17 safety programs currently implemented in the packing
18 industry. I'll stop and turn it over to Dr. Ann
19 Hollingsworth.

20 DR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Thank you, Keith. In
21 summary, we would like to recap what it is that we have,
22 as a beef industry coalition, put together in our attempt
23 to continue to aggressively pursue the death of E. coli
24 0157:H7, in other words, to eliminate it from a pathogen
25 of concern in the food industry.

26 We believe that taking a process-control
27 approach is the way to go about this. And we believe

1 that because it would encourage industry testing, it is
2 to our advantage as industry to eliminate this organism
3 from the food supply. And we're very serious about doing
4 so. However, some of the methodologies that we are --
5 some of the procedures that we're currently being
6 subjected to do discourage testing in some facilities.

7 The proposal that we've put together would lead
8 to an aggressive approach to the control and eventual
9 elimination of E. coli 0157:H7. And it also involves all
10 segments of the industry from the slaughter facilities
11 all the way through to the retail establishments.

12 Briefly to remind you what our proposal is, we
13 would like to revise our request, the revision of FSIS
14 Directive 10,010.1 to remove the six-month negative
15 requirement which states that you must have six months of
16 negative results before you are allowed to be a part of
17 this program.

18 Secondly, we would like that option three be
19 formalized, revised to formalize a process verification
20 testing procedure. And thirdly, we would like to ask
21 that the eligibility for reduced testing by FSIS be
22 passed through the chain for hides that have been tested
23 upstream. We believe that this all should be part of a
24 carcass testing program that includes a written program.

25 It would be a formal program that would include
26 a protocol that stated the sampling frequency in the
27 sites, the methodologies that would be utilized, and it

1 would provide for process reassessment activities which
2 would include that all presumptives, presumptive
3 positives for E. coli 0157:H7 be treated as positives,
4 unless they are confirmed to be negative at further
5 stages down the confirmation process.

6 In addition, a process evaluation should and
7 could include an investigation of the process operation,
8 a trace back to the supplier, a review of any other data
9 that might be, might shed some light on what's going on
10 in the plant, the generic E. coli that is required by
11 FSIS in the processing facilities today. And we believe
12 it should, probably, include an ability to do increased
13 sampling.

14 And finally, based on the results of the survey
15 that you've just viewed from my colleagues, we believe
16 the Beef Industry Coalition that FSIS should have gotten
17 the recommendations of our coalition. And we believe
18 that this is supported by those survey results. Thank
19 you. And I and my colleagues would be willing to answer
20 any questions.

21 MR. BILLY: Thank you very much. Are there any
22 questions from the panel? Yes, Dan?

23 DR. ENGELJOHN: Dan Engeljohn with USDA. Could
24 you identify the interventions that were noted in the 12
25 plants?

26 MR. HODGES: As I mentioned -- Jim Hodges,
27 American Meat Institute -- as I mentioned from the

1 various interventions that were applied in the past, it
2 was not selected to data from a specific plant, because
3 that was not the purpose of the survey. The survey
4 purpose was to look at the carcass testing to be applied
5 and used to verify the process control in the individual
6 plants, so you did not collect the data on a
7 plant-by-plant basis.

8 MR. BILLY: Could I ask a followup on that? Is
9 it possible to provide examples of the types of
10 interventions, not whether they were all in each plant,
11 but to --

12 DR. ENGELJOHN: Provide the types of
13 interventions that all plants were to have at least one
14 intervention, which is pretty much -- the case. The
15 interventions range from pasteurization to hot-water
16 thermal pasteurization, organic acid rinses, and all of
17 the other types of slaughter procedures to prevent
18 contamination up to the steam bath.

19 MR. BILLY: Thanks. Bill?

20 DR. CRAY: Bill Cray, FSIS. Do you think that
21 a more sensitive assay for E. coli 0157 would help you
22 assess the value of interventions?

23 MR. HODGES: Our attempt was to use the most
24 sensitive setting we had available to us at that time.
25 Clearly, on the hide samples, there was a great deal of
26 differences of scientific opinion about how that ought to

1 be done. The method we chose was sensitive. The same
2 thing occurred with carcass sampling.

3 When we initiated this study, that was before
4 the new methods were used, immunomagnetic separation and
5 the rainbow agar was announced. That was announced on
6 September the 10th, if I recall right. And we had
7 started to do the project immediately after Labor Day on
8 the 6th. But we did have some concerns about that.

9 But it was decided at that time that we should
10 move forward, because we had already -- it was to our
11 advantage to incorporate the new pathogen with the beads.
12 It was the only difference in the agar that we chose to
13 stay with, because it was technician-specific in a
14 variety of other supplies in place, and we would have to
15 restart the project all over again.

16 DR. CRAY: That's okay. I have a followup. I
17 didn't ask that as a criticism of your study. I was
18 thinking more about the future. As the testing becomes
19 more sensitive, will that be of value for you?

20 MR. HODGES: Absolutely.

21 MR. BILLY: Okay. Dr. Gill?

22 DR. GILL: Thank you. Colin Gill, Agriculture
23 Canada. Can you offer any explanation for the failure of
24 some plants to find any E. coli 0157:H7 at the height of
25 the shedding season, while other plants were finding some
26 20 percent of their animals were --?

1 DR. ALLEN: Dell Allen. Colin, I was relying
2 on you to do that. You're the microbiologist. In
3 seriousness, first of all, I don't know that this was the
4 height of the shedding season. We didn't get started
5 until September.

6 And basically, based on what I've talked to the
7 RS people, I think it happens a little earlier than that
8 in the year. And the other one, again, I don't know
9 where these plants were, but I would suspect there's some
10 regional differences potentially in there, as well. I
11 don't know. I can't answer that.

12 MR. BILLY: Okay. Caroline?

13 MS. DeWAAL: Thank you. Caroline Smith DeWaal,
14 Center for Science in the Public Interest. Were the
15 carcasses tested at the three different points, the same
16 carcasses? And maybe you said that and I missed it.

17 MR. HODGES: Yes.

18 MS. DeWAAL: Okay. So you were testing the
19 same exact carcass at each point?

20 MR. HODGES: We tested the hide of the animal.
21 The animal had been slaughtered, eviscerated, and then we
22 would take one side and test the prior carcass portion
23 and the matching side would be tested after farm
24 interventions.

25 MS. DeWAAL: Okay. My second question is,
26 really, has to do with your conclusion on pathogen
27 testing. And maybe, I'm misunderstanding it, but the

1 slide that says testing for pathogens to ensure food
2 safety cannot be successful. Perhaps, you mean as -- I
3 guess, my takeaway message of viewing your slides is that
4 pathogen testing is quite important as a verification
5 that your process is working.

6 I mean, you're showing us that, you know, up to
7 20 percent of the carcasses can be contaminated coming in
8 the door, and yet, at three different points you're
9 finding that the final number on the carcass
10 postintervention is zero. So, in fact, the pathogen
11 testing is documenting, is process-control verification.
12 So I guess I'm just a little unclear what this one slide
13 said when it seems like the actual takeaway message is to
14 the contrary.

15 DR. BELK: Keith Belk. You're exactly right.
16 Testing can be used effectively for verification of
17 process control. And what the slide has written is, it
18 says that if you're going to test to ensure safety
19 procedures somewhere down the stream at that point, then
20 it won't be successful. It's a scientific factor, as
21 long as scientists have been around. Another big
22 difference between ensuring the safety of a product using
23 food safety or using testing versus --

24 MS. DeWAAL: So could it be said a different
25 way that testing isn't a substitute for interventions or
26 for process control? I mean, I just -- I mean, clearly,
27 it's used here very effectively to document process

1 control and as a verification technique. It's not
2 necessarily a substitute.

3 DR. BELK: I think there'll be some speakers
4 dealing with that. I think there'll be some speakers
5 later in the program who will discuss the NSA guidelines
6 and recommendations for using the testing procedures.

7 And I think it was basically the feeling that
8 experts had put together that document that pathogen
9 testing probably wouldn't be the best selection of the
10 methodology for ensuring process control. However, since
11 it is apparent that we will probably be testing for
12 pathogens, then we went on to make the following
13 recommendations.

14 MS. DeWAAL: Okay. Thank you.

15 MR. BILLY: Mark?

16 DR. POWELL: Thank you for your presentation.
17 I have just a couple of questions for clarification. You
18 said that there was a statistically significant
19 difference between the prevalence following the
20 intervention that was with respect to the high prevalence
21 or to the -- prior to treatment prevalence? Which one
22 was that difference?

23 The zero prevalence following intervention was
24 -- you reported it to be statistically significant. It
25 was statistically significant from what, from the high
26 prevalence, from the part of the wash?

1 MR. HODGES: From all three processing steps,
2 there was a significant reduction statistically in the
3 incidence of the organism. When you're superstrict
4 across that road, you get a, b, c.

5 DR. POWELL: And so, again, the difference is
6 some -- is due to some mixture of treatments which varies
7 across plants?

8 MR. HODGES: I think it would relate to
9 prerequisite programs through manufacturing practices, to
10 hygiene and standard operating procedures employed by the
11 plants, in conjunction with the use of intervention
12 systems as part of the HACCP.

13 DR. POWELL: I guess I'm getting to the point
14 of it being hard to distinguish what the definition of
15 the treatment is. You have, you know, a pretreatment,
16 posttreatment when that treatment is variously defined
17 across plants. And so it's hard to interpret that
18 numerical difference in terms of a statistically
19 different, statistically significant difference based on
20 a treatment when the treatment is loosely defined.

21 MR. HODGES: I guess I'm unclear as to where
22 you're finding the word treatment.

23 DR. POWELL: You talk about --

24 MR. HODGES: The application of intervention
25 systems and before application of intervention systems.

1 DR. POWELL: Substitute intervention systems
2 for treatment, it's -- you've got a pre and post
3 intervention. And the interventions are --

4 MR. HODGES: Essentially --

5 DR. POWELL: -- they are not the same across
6 all plants.

7 MR. HODGES: Correct.

8 DR. POWELL: And so it's difficult to
9 interpret, then, you know what the effect of that
10 intervention is, because it varies across plants.

11 MR. HODGES: The intention was to look at --
12 define the system and the effects of that, including
13 intervention throughout the program. And I think we've
14 provided it with a handout that has a table in the back
15 that's more specific relative to the statistical tests
16 that were conducted. But all three of those sampling
17 sites, the frequencies, when compared to the sample --
18 statistics and those are all statistically different than
19 the .025 level.

20 DR. POWELL: Right. But the statistical -- the
21 application of that statistic implies that you have a
22 consistent treatment that's being applied.

23 MR. HODGES: Why?

24 DR. POWELL: You're comparing one prevalence at
25 one point to another prevalence at another point. You
26 would need to have a consistent set of interventions to
27 --

1 MS. DeWAAL: The purpose of the study was not
2 to compare interventions. It was to see if -- go ahead,
3 Ann.

4 DR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Very simply put, what the
5 survey shows is that you do take the systems and that
6 each plant was effective in reducing, or in this case,
7 eliminating E. coli 0157:H7 from the carcasses that went
8 out. It's this whole system that we're concerned about,
9 and not individual treatments.

10 DR. POWELL: If you were to -- well this is,
11 perhaps, getting a little technical, but a more
12 appropriate statistical treatment would be to group all
13 the plants that had similar treatments and evaluate their
14 effect, rather than pooling all the data across all the
15 various treatments.

16 MR. HODGES: I disagree, because if that were a
17 possibility, then you wouldn't have to have HACCP plants
18 developed for each individual plant and another plant,
19 even within the same company. I mean, the whole basis
20 for this is the fact that there was a whole different set
21 of environmental conditions and other conditions that are
22 going to influence the safety of product in any given
23 plant. And to try and standardize those conditions over
24 all plants is just unrealistically impossible.

25 DR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Additionally, if you're
26 combining a set of treatments into one treatment, as we
27 did here, the ability to show a difference is to find

1 differences, significant differences. It says our
2 systems are very effective.

3 The other way around, if we had to combine six
4 or seven different ones and one had had a program and one
5 had not, the one that had not would have remained much
6 more unlikely that we would have shown any differences.

7 MR. BILLY: Okay. Other questions? Go ahead.

8 DR. PHEBUS: Randy Phebus, Kansas State
9 University. Would you explain one more time quickly how
10 the hide samples were taken? Was that also a sponge?

11 MR. HODGES: The hide samples was a sponge
12 along the midline on basically a 2 x 12 inch area and it
13 was designed to show if there was testing control or not.

14 DR. PHEBUS: Is there a particular reason you
15 chose the midline as the sampling site for the hide?

16 DR. ALLEN: Because in the plant, Randy, if you
17 go try to do it somewhere else, you're in dire danger.
18 That was the simplest, easiest, and most effective way to
19 get out a hide sample in the commercial setting of
20 multiple plants, multiple locations.

21 MR. BILLY: Yes, go ahead.

22 MS. SOSA: Meryl Sosa for Food Animal Concerns
23 Trust. I have a -- I'm sorry -- Meryl Sosa for Food
24 Animal Concerns Trust. I have a question about the
25 coalition. At the beginning in the background, you
26 mentioned that the logical preventive point is
27 carcass/live animals.

1 And you mentioned that producers are part of
2 your coalition and what I wanted to find out was whether
3 you've considered or are funding any kind of research to
4 determine any kind of intervention or mitigation
5 strategies that you would think might be helpful as far
6 as you could have cleaner animals coming into the
7 slaughter plant?

8 DR. BELK: There was a presentation earlier in
9 the discussion about some of the harvest, as it were,
10 clearly sustaining quarterly stated in our slides that we
11 raise the bar -- and we're looking at all kinds of
12 matters that we can use the incidence of live animals
13 coming into our facility. You will know about it.

14 MS. SOSA: Is that coming from the coalition?
15 Or is that just generally --

16 DR. BELK: It would be members of the
17 coalition, and it's also the industry at large, too.

18 MS. SOSA: Okay.

19 SPEAKER: I have a question.

20 MR. BILLY: Yes, go ahead.

21 SPEAKER: In terms of the specific testing
22 methodology, I understand why you didn't use the rainbow
23 agar. You started before that was all announced. In
24 terms of the immunomagnetic separation, though, did you
25 use the FSIS method, but just without the rainbow agar?

26 DR. BELK: Yes.

27 SPEAKER: So it's exactly the same?

1 DR. BELK: We followed the main -- I should
2 qualify that. We followed the manufacturer's -- the
3 instructions to the plants, followed the manufacturer's
4 recommendations on how the test should be used. I have
5 looked at that protocol versus FSIS's, and it appears to
6 be similar.

7 MR. BILLY: Caroline?

8 MS. DeWAAL: Thank you. Caroline Smith DeWaal,
9 Center for Science in the Public Interest. Can you just
10 talk a little bit about the range of laboratories that
11 were used by the plants? Were some in-house laboratories
12 versus external?

13 DR. BELK: I have no specific knowledge if the
14 laboratory test was used. I do know the laboratory test
15 for the labs used by the individual plants. It's my
16 understanding some of those tests were conducted in-house
17 by laboratories company. A couple of others were done by
18 private laboratories that were chosen by the individual
19 plants.

20 MR. BILLY: Mark?

21 DR. POWELL: Thanks. Just one question for
22 clarification. I wanted to be sure that I understood
23 correctly the enrichment step that was used, that was
24 used in the same manner both for the high prevalence, as
25 well as the carcass prevalence. Was that consistent
26 across the hide in the carcass?

1 DR. BELK: The enrichment of the carcasses was
2 not clear until it got to the laboratory of the plant's
3 choosing. The enrichment on the hides during incubation
4 did not occur until it got to the Penn State Laboratory.
5 I will provide FSIS the directions in each one of the
6 plants certainly, specific analysis that I also have at
7 Penn State and medical procedures that they use on
8 evaluating -- general practices.

9 DR. POWELL: Thanks. And just as a final
10 follow-up, I wanted to thank you for supplying the state
11 of what will be an important, I think again, a reality
12 check on our risk assessment model.

13 Like, when we just at first glance taking into
14 account the sensitivity of the method that was used, it
15 seems that the carcass prevalence is pretty consistent
16 with -- that we're predicting is pretty consistent with
17 what you have found in terms of the reported prevalence
18 and the hide prevalence will be very valuable input. We
19 hadn't had access to this sort of data up until this
20 point, so thank you.

21 MR. BILLY: Okay. All right. Thank you very
22 much. I'd like to move on now to the next presentation,
23 which will be by Dr. Gary Weber. Gary?

24 DR. WEBER: Thanks, Tom. I'm fully willing to
25 talk over the noise if you want me to.

26 MR. BILLY: You want to talk over it?

27 DR. WEBER: Yes. Why not?

1 MR. BILLY: Let's go ahead.

2 DR. WEBER: Thank you very much. Thank you.

3 As Tom said, I'm Gary Weber. I'm the executive director
4 of Regulatory Affairs for the National Cattlemen's Beef
5 Association. Principally, I work in the regulatory area
6 around animal health issues in the Washington office in
7 meat inspection, food safety-related issues.

8 Dr. Reagan was going to be here today. And a
9 personal matter came up, and he was unable to attend.
10 But I thought it would be appropriate to share with you a
11 little about where we've been on this issue of food
12 safety. In 1989, we had policy on the books regarding
13 0157:H7 before the 1993 incident.

14 In '91, we began tests on organic acid rinses
15 and started investing research dollars at that particular
16 point in time. In 1994, an interesting thing happened
17 that really galvanized our emphasis on the direction that
18 we've taken over the last several years. And that was
19 the Pathogen Reduction Act of 1994. During that time
20 period -- I think he's going to shut it off. All right.
21 Thank you.

22 (Applause.)

23 DR. WEBER: And now we know it's not a way out.
24 Anyway, as I said, in 1994 some things started to happen
25 here in Washington, D.C., that really galvanized our
26 focus on this issue. And that event was the Pathogen

1 Reduction Act which would have quarantined farms and
2 ranches for E. coli 0157:H7.

3 But more importantly, there were a number of
4 individuals from the research community and others who
5 were on the Hill talking about the need for this
6 legislation and that it was, indeed, warranted because
7 soon there would be vaccines and probiotics (phonetic)
8 available on the market that take care of this.

9 Now, if that wasn't bad enough, because here we
10 are six years later and where are these developments?
11 And as Dr. Rexroad mentioned, the investments in the
12 preharvest side have been immensely problematic and it's
13 very, very complicated, long-term work.

14 But to make matters worse, the companies who
15 were beginning long-term investments in things that would
16 become steam-vacuum and, I would assume, steam-cabinet
17 pasteurization or organic acid-rinsing systems, a number
18 of the people responsible for the R&D in this area said
19 to us if this is true, if this is true, we don't want to
20 be investing in something that companies and the industry
21 aren't going to need.

22 And it became very clear to us, we better get
23 busy making sure that act didn't occur, that this
24 misrepresentation of research data that there was on-farm
25 solutions ready that could jeopardize everything we have
26 today that you've seen.

1 And Mike Taylor, and us, and many other people
2 in the industry came together to expedite the approval of
3 interventions that are now contributing real savings in
4 terms of food safety. One of the other things that we
5 were looking at in here was this choke point, if you want
6 to call it that, that we've got about a million people
7 that raise cattle and calves. And of course we've got
8 250 million consumers.

9 And so trying to change behaviors at both ends
10 of that spectrum in order to benefit food safety, yes, we
11 need to do that. But in the near term with limited
12 dollars, we wanted to hit this bug, this issue where we
13 could really make a difference. And so we began an
14 investment program led by the Blue Ribbon Task Force
15 Committee in a prioritized way to target where we could
16 make a difference.

17 In the back of the room, there's a report that
18 documents the time line and the commitments. And I want
19 to take this opportunity to have Dr. Belk come up and
20 talk a little bit about some of those interventions and
21 some of the things that have come. And then, I want to
22 tell you a little bit about the research we have planned
23 for the year and the years ahead that fit into this whole
24 continuum.

25 DR. BELK: Thank you, Dr. Weber. I'm probably
26 the only guy you get to listen to twice today. And I
27 think it's just because I was already here. Several of

1 these studies, researchers at Colorado State University
2 have been involved with, basically, since their inception
3 back in the very early 1990s.

4 And so it's kind of a privilege from our
5 perspective to have the opportunity to very generally go
6 through with you some of the research that we've
7 conducted on behalf of cattlemen to address this growing
8 food safety issue, E. coli 0157:H7.

9 The first studies -- and I'm going to be very
10 brief and general here, as I mentioned -- the first
11 studies that were instituted back in the early part of
12 the 1990s will be referred to as microbial mapping
13 studies. The first microbial mapping study we call
14 microbial mapping 1. It was initiated in 1994 and
15 completed in 1996.

16 Now, basically, the objective of the study was
17 to identify critical entry points for pathogens in the
18 slaughtering and harvesting process and use that
19 information to help extend and improve the process for
20 preventative maintenance of food safety. We felt at the
21 time that these data would be crucial in development of
22 HACCP regulations and HACCP plans within plants.

23 And we thought that this would help determine
24 how much contamination is introduced from outside of the
25 actual production chain. And so it was a series of
26 evaluations to determine exactly where in the process
27 flow we would have an opportunity to intervene or to

1 introduce process management techniques to improve the
2 safety of beef.

3 Microbial mapping two came along about a year
4 and a-half later. This was a similar sort of study. And
5 it was designed to provide an assessment of where
6 pathogens could enter the beef chain, following the
7 slaughtering and chilling processes all the way through
8 to retail.

9 In the case of this study and the previous
10 study combined, the opportunity then became available to
11 use -- as one example, to determine the prevalence of
12 pathogens in the different seasons, at different points
13 in the processing system where they might be introduced
14 or reoccur. We're currently in the process of conducting
15 the third in the series of studies called microbial
16 mapping three.

17 This particular study actually has been
18 designed to develop additional intervention systems that
19 could be used during the fabrication and grinding
20 processes to improve the safety of beef from the chilling
21 cooler on. And we think they will identify additional
22 methods to allow us to reduce the risk of pathogens being
23 transmitted to consumers and will ultimately address all
24 of our food safety objectives.

25 So as kind of an overview of all three of these
26 studies, microbial mapping one was designed to map
27 critical entry points for pathogens at the harvesting

1 step and within the cooler. Microbial mapping 2, then,
2 addressed whether you could control or exert process
3 control during fabrication and then distribution to food
4 service and retail. And then, microbial mapping 3 is an
5 ongoing project we're currently working on.

6 And when we finish with that, we would hope to
7 have some intervention systems that could then
8 additionally be applied during the fabrication and
9 grinding processes. Relative to the development of
10 intervention systems themselves, the first of these
11 studies, as Dr. Weber mentioned, was actually started in
12 1991 before the Pacific Northwest outbreak. It was a
13 four-year study.

14 It was determined -- it was designed to
15 determine whether the use of natural food acids could be
16 used to help decontaminate or remove pathogens from the
17 carcasses. And the beef industry worked very closely as
18 it conducted the study with USDA to develop and test
19 specific rinses that would be effective towards this
20 objective.

21 Second, a series of studies that was conducted
22 addressed washing versus trimming issues. Zero tolerance
23 had been implemented at that point in time. It was
24 extremely labor-intensive and costly to trim away visible
25 contamination on carcasses. It led to USDA approval.
26 These studies led to USDA approval and implementation of
27 the steam-vacuuming technologies.

1 And it also addressed the use of hot-water in
2 organic rinse interventions which are now recommended in
3 the FSIS regulations. Hot-water and steam-vacuuming
4 studies were conducted next. Actually, five different
5 universities were involved in the research that led to
6 the development of some of these systems.

7 Steam vacuuming has one of the offshoots of
8 that -- of those series of studies is now used in
9 virtually every major packing plant in the country and is
10 probably applied to more than 90 percent of the fed
11 cattle carcasses. Hot-water pasteurization came along
12 next. This kind of evolved at about the same time that
13 steam-pasteurization technologies evolved.

14 In this case, hot-water pasteurization was
15 developed to wash carcasses with water temperatures that
16 actually made contact with the carcass in excess of 160
17 degrees Fahrenheit. And that helped to serve as a kill
18 step in the elimination of pathogens on the surface of
19 carcasses.

20 This pasteurization system is often followed by
21 a rinsing system called final wash, and then subsequent
22 to that, usually some application of organic acid. And
23 it was imperative that these sorts of technologies be
24 researched, both for their effectiveness from the food
25 safety perspective, but also from the impact that they
26 would have on quality and color of the product that was
27 being generated.

1 Preevisceration washing came along during the
2 latter part of the '90s. And studies that we completed
3 in 1998 and 1999 preevisceration washing of carcasses is
4 an additional hurdle that pathogens have to jump over to
5 make it to the consumer. And so it made sense that you
6 would implement another hurdle in the process.

7 You could reduce the risk of a pathogen
8 reaching a consumer. The system helps eliminate
9 pathogens and particles that may remain on the carcass
10 immediately after hide removal and application of steam
11 vacuuming and also helps prevent attachment of bacteria
12 and formation of biofilm as the carcasses are
13 processed.

14 And that goes to what was discussed this
15 morning relative to some other studies that are currently
16 being conducted. From this research, kind of a new
17 terminology developed or evolved that we commonly call
18 today multiple hurdles. Multiple hurdles is essentially
19 the linkage sequentially of a whole bunch of
20 interventions within the processing system on harvesting
21 floor.

22 And starting in 1999, we decided that we needed
23 to go out and, essentially, conduct a study to see how
24 these interventions worked in aggregate when they are
25 implemented sequentially within the plant to determine
26 the value of that industry-funded process relative to the
27 safety of beef.

1 Very briefly, multiple-hurdle strategies create
2 barriers for pathogens and are highly effective in
3 reducing the risks that a pathogen would be transmitted
4 to consumers. In this particular study it's conducted in
5 eight commercial plants that were geographically
6 disbursed and included both fed beef and market cow and
7 bull plants.

8 They had standardized their multiple hurdle
9 system across the entirety of their harvesting operation
10 and included steam-vacuuming. It included application of
11 an evisceration wash unit, along with application of
12 organic acid at the preevisceration level. And then,
13 following evisceration, later down the stream, there was
14 hot-water pasteurization.

15 And, in this case, the hot water actually made
16 contact with the carcass surface at about 180 degrees,
17 followed by organic rinsing. The results of this study
18 across -- in total, the eight plants that were studied,
19 it resulted in a 99.75 percent reduction in total plate
20 counts or total aerobic plate counts, 99.79 percent
21 reduction in total coliform counts, and a 99.55 percent
22 reduction in generic E. coli counts.

23 NCBA has also funded several studies since, to
24 begin moving the process downstream towards the consumer
25 at the various points where we can now begin to identify
26 process control opportunities. One example of such
27 studies was a study conducted a couple of years ago

1 relating to the use of raw materials in ground beef
2 manufacturing systems.

3 In this study, basic general conclusions that
4 resulted from the experiment, raw material trimmings that
5 were greater than 30-percent fat content tended to have a
6 higher microbial count than other types of raw material
7 trimmings. Fed beef trimmings had higher plate counts
8 than trimmings from market cows and bulls, dairy cows or
9 imported frozen product that was boxed and in a different
10 state of refrigeration.

11 The same study of purged bacterial counts
12 tended to be higher than counts that were obtained using
13 poor sampling techniques and has led to some further
14 investigations that I think Dr. Weber will talk about
15 that are ongoing at the moment. The detectable bacteria
16 counts increased as product moved through the grinding
17 process, which wasn't a complete surprise to anybody.

18 The last study that we've just completed this
19 past fall -- and this is the only study that, out of the
20 series, that I've been through with you that is not
21 currently in peer-review press or in the acceptance
22 process -- has to do with raw materials that are used for
23 production of ground beef to be marketed at retail.

24 In this study, samples were collected from both
25 packing plants, processing plants, or further processing
26 plants, and retail stores that were pretty geographically
27 disbursed. A total of 1,158 samples in aggregate were

1 collected. Not one of those samples was found to have
2 positive E. coli 0157:H7. And this would have been using
3 the electromagnetic beads.

4 One combo bin sample did contain 0157
5 nonspecific H group that was considered to be
6 nonpathogenic and one ground beef patty sample that
7 contained an 0105:H8, which is a rare H-type group that
8 has not been linked with human beings as being a
9 pathogen. So I would turn it back over to Dr. Weber.
10 Thank you.

11 DR. WEBER: Thanks, Steve. I wish that Dr.
12 Reagan could be here, because really I'm sharing with you
13 the results of their current process of developing a set
14 of strategies for the next phase of investments in this
15 area. And these are the results of counsel from a number
16 of experts, scientists, government, industry leaders
17 sitting down and deciding where's the best way to focus
18 our limited resources.

19 Basically, there's a couple of key areas here.
20 One, there's a lot of investment going into engineering
21 and evaluating the dehairing process which is a chemical
22 dehairing that looks at basically cleaning the outside of
23 cattle to minimize that contamination, since that appears
24 that highest probability for carcass contamination is
25 hide-related, as opposed to intestinal contents, which is
26 a result of rupturing the gut during evisceration.

1 We are developing and continually monitoring
2 the preharvest side, watching for opportunities there.
3 As Dr. Rexroad mentioned, there's about \$27 million in
4 ARS alone this year. We're having a real serious problem
5 trying to monitor what goes on within the land grant
6 institutions which contains both federal dollars, state
7 dollars, and private industry dollars to find out what's
8 going on there.

9 And until we really have a sense of that and
10 we're really pursuing that, it's hard to really find out
11 where should you invest as a partner in trying to make
12 some of these things happen. But we are serious about
13 monitoring that and where there are opportunities, we
14 will invest there.

15 But there's a lot of activity there that's
16 really coalescing and hopefully will result in some
17 things that we can go into a validation mode on. We'll
18 continue to look at the post-cooler interventions to see
19 what we can do there.

20 The sampling systems for combos, I was
21 mentioning to Mark Mina at lunch that we appreciated as a
22 result of one of our meetings with Tom Billy and others
23 that we find one of these combos that's positive, we want
24 to be able to remove it from the plant and just take that
25 entire combo apart.

26 And I think, Mark, this relates to some of your
27 data on what this really looks like in terms of a

1 positive in a grinding lot in the context that it may
2 just be in one little part and maybe one piece. And how
3 does that really affect the risk or how we view how that
4 may contaminate the system? So we've got at least one of
5 those, and it's completely being disassembled into
6 integral pieces and tested.

7 With any work on the nonintact raw materials,
8 the blade-tenderized issues and others to look for E.
9 coli and salmonella and ways of looking at kill steps
10 there, after the listeria issues raise the potential for
11 aerosols and air purification needs, we're looking at
12 investments there, as well as equipment cleaning and
13 sanitation issues.

14 We continue to look at ways of helping to
15 ensure consumers can make an informed choice on
16 irradiated products. And there is some question about
17 dose levels, and we're continually monitoring that to
18 make sure that there is, sort of, this low-dose
19 relationship to help people out.

20 We've had a long-term relationship with the
21 American Digestive Health Foundation, looking at the
22 human side of it and seeing if there's ways we can
23 partner and encourage or help us access research dollars
24 on that side, too. This is an ongoing process. And as
25 in the past, I hope that we can focus in as these things
26 develop.

1 We'll be handling briefings with FSIS and with
2 consumer groups and others as we have developments here.
3 And again, I wish that Dr. Reagan was here. He could go
4 into more detail on this. And as Dr. Rexroad said, I'm
5 just the deliverer of that, not necessarily the
6 architect.

7 So if there's technical questions, Doctor, well
8 we'll just forgo that. I'll let you handle them. So
9 with that, thank you much and look forward to some bold
10 initiatives and new solutions as we further invest in
11 this area to improve food safety and improve consumer
12 confidence in our products and the regulatory agencies
13 that ensure that. So thanks a lot.

14 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. Are
15 there questions, first, from the panel? No. Okay.
16 Okay, Dr. Gill?

17 DR. GILL: Colin Gill, Agriculture Canada. Two
18 questions. The multihurdle data for carcasses, does that
19 relate to carcasses that are being inoculated? Or was
20 this describing their natural flora, because there is
21 often the great difference between the effects you get
22 with the two situations and the other thing on the work
23 on dehairing carcasses, the published data show there's
24 no microbiological effect of dehairing carcasses before
25 dressing. Have you any further data that would
26 contradict that?

1 DR. BELK: I can answer the first question.
2 Relative to the first question, multihurdle studies have
3 been conducted in eight plants and others have been
4 conducted in plants so there wouldn't have been any
5 inoculation. That was basically to monitor indicator
6 organisms as parts moved into the process. And that
7 publication is accepted and should be out there in the -
8 - on a table.

9 DR. GILL: Dehairing?

10 DR. BELK: Dehairing, I'm not the expert for
11 dehairing.

12 MR. BILLY: Anyone else that has any
13 information on that? Okay. We'll have to let that pass.
14 Other questions? Yes, Nancy?

15 MS. DONLEY: Nancy Donley from STOP, Safe
16 Tables Our Priority. And I think Gary Weber left the
17 room, because I really was going to direct -- well,
18 maybe, someone else here knows. I wanted to ask about --
19 I think multiple hurdles is a really important idea. And
20 it's a valuable one.

21 But I still didn't hear, he made some comments
22 about, you know, monitoring what was going on in ARS
23 research in the animals. But I didn't hear anything that
24 was specifically mentioned coming out of the National
25 Cattlemen's Beef Association on on-farm or preharvest
26 studies. And also, if maybe somebody knows, too, when

1 that White Paper is -- you mentioned a White Paper, but
2 when it might be released.

3 MS. KOSTY: I can try and answer that for you.
4 This is Lynn Kosty with the National Cattlemen's Beef
5 Association. The White Paper that we are working on
6 probably won't be released until sometime this fall.
7 That is an ongoing process.

8 As far as on-farm research that we are doing,
9 currently we don't have it in our agenda to do on-farm
10 research. We are lobbying very hard for those dollars
11 for agencies that are more capable to conduct those
12 long-term studies, like ARS, to conduct those.

13 But as far as what we have heard from
14 researchers and scientific experts, their feeling is that
15 our dollars are better spent elsewhere. And that is
16 where we can make the most impact on public health in the
17 near future.

18 MS. DONLEY: Elsewhere meaning postharvest?

19 MS. KOSTY: Exactly.

20 MS. DONLEY: And so is the White Paper also on
21 postharvest interventions or --

22 MS. KOSTY: I believe that it will target both.
23 I think that the greater problem that we have right now
24 is the fact that, as Dr. Rexroad said this morning, we
25 are seeing numerous studies that come out about on-farm
26 practices, such as the hay-feeding study. But then, a

1 few weeks later, we see something else that comes out
2 that points to the opposite conclusion.

3 And I'm going to repeat his words in saying,
4 basically, that we just don't know enough about the
5 ecology of the organism to get very far right now on
6 on-farm practices.

7 MS. DONLEY: Well, do you mind if I follow up
8 one more time? I guess if it's not the cattlemen who are
9 doing -- looking for it or figuring out how this is
10 happening, who else is there to look? Who else is there
11 to do the research?

12 MS. KOSTY: Well, I think we're counting on the
13 government to help us out in that area. I think, quite
14 honestly, if you look at the area of animal disease,
15 which is very similar, and the eradication of
16 tuberculosis which has also taken years and years -- it's
17 taken us 50 years to eradicate that disease.

18 And I think that you know you can't look at
19 that and expect us to solve this problem overnight. It's
20 not that we don't want to help. It's not that we're
21 unwilling to have government researchers on our farms. I
22 think if you speak to most of our members, they are more
23 than happy to help. And they are very interested, but we
24 just simply don't have the money to conduct a 50-year
25 survey.

26 MS. DONLEY: How much money are you spending
27 now on postharvest research.

1 MS. KOSTY: That, I couldn't tell you. You'd
2 have to speak with Bo Reagan.

3 MS. DONLEY: Okay. Okay.

4 MS. KOSTY: But I can tell you it's
5 significantly less than \$27 million.

6 MS. DONLEY: But it's more than zero, which is
7 what's being spent on preharvest?

8 MS. KOSTY: That's correct.

9 MS. DONLEY: Okay.

10 MS. GLAVIN: One of the things that I heard
11 Gary talk about was that detectable bacterial counts
12 increased as the material moved through the process. And
13 I wondered if, you know, when we look at the information
14 on interventions, they appear to be quite good, you know,
15 approaching maybe 100 percent good.

16 But obviously we continue to find 0157. Is
17 there any thought that after intervention, the incidence
18 is so low that we're not finding it, and then as the
19 product moves through commerce, it grows out and then
20 it's findable? Is that possible? Any comment on that?

21 DR. BELK: I think it's a matter of what
22 percentage of potentially contaminated surface area that
23 is being tested. All of the samples are being enriched,
24 so there it ought to be down.

25 MS. GLAVIN: Okay.

26 DR. PHEBUS: Randy Phebus, Kansas State
27 University. In relation to growing out there in

1 commerce, that's not going to happen with E. coli 0157:H7
2 based on its growth temperature characteristics. I think
3 one thing that we're forgetting relative to finding this
4 organism and, particularly in ground beef, is that a lot
5 of technologies have been directed at the carcass level.

6 And there's still a significant amount of
7 product that goes into ground beef that there's no
8 intervention at this point to take care of that.

9 DR. ALLEN: I'd speculate a little bit --

10 MR. BILLY: You need to say your name.

11 DR. ALLEN: Dell Allen. And it's a good
12 speculation, probably, that's appropriate here. I think
13 it's an opposite, Maggie. From what I've talked to the
14 RS researchers at Clay Center, 0157:H7, fortunately for
15 us, is not a real competitive organism and easily gets
16 overshadowed.

17 And I think, in fact, it's fairly fragile, in
18 particular a cold environment, at least it's my
19 impression in talking to the researchers there. So I
20 think when we have a problem, it's probably one where
21 there's been a fairly heavy contamination or
22 cross-contamination level is when it occurs, not in the
23 typical, probably, is not going to make it through, nor
24 is it going to grow afterwards.

25 And it also goes back to when James Jay, who's
26 -- I was in a meeting with him one time -- reminded me
27 that where our microbial counts were very, very low in

1 the ground beef, he says you're running in danger, then,
2 of any organism like 0157 if there is that contaminant
3 level where you get it. Then it doesn't have the
4 competitive exclusion thing to help you out.

5 And I think our counts industry wide are
6 considerably lower now than they were 10 years ago. So
7 we may be running on that fine line. And don't ask me
8 how you tell people not to be so clean. But I think we
9 are actually approaching some of those levels in some
10 cases.

11 MR. BILLY: Good. Dean?

12 MR. DANIELSON: Thank you, Tom. Dean
13 Danielson. I need to understand your question just a
14 little bit more. Could you repeat that?

15 MS. GLAVIN: Well, my question really was based
16 -- it was more of an observation that the data on
17 interventions looks so good, but we're still finding
18 0157. And I was looking for some speculation on, you
19 know, is that from -- you know, is this speculation that
20 it's from plants that aren't using interventions? You
21 know, what is the speculation?

22 DR. ALLEN: Okay. I guess I would offer
23 another thought on that. If you look at the carcass data
24 shown in the carcass study, .44 percent FSIS data, which
25 is done at various points throughout including retail,
26 you're looking at rates of .2, .3, .4 percent. The data
27 that we have on trimmings over the years puts us in that

1 .1 to .3 percent range, depending upon the year and
2 depending upon when various interventions come in place.

3 To me, exactly what you're saying, but then the
4 arrested growth, once we get temperature control on these
5 carcasses and arrest that growth, we show very -- you
6 know, quite similar levels at the carcass stage, at the
7 trimmings stage, and at the ground beef stage in the FSIS
8 testing.

9 So there is huge reductions occurring on the
10 slaughter floor, you know, very significant reductions.
11 And we're not, I don't believe, we're seeing whole-scale
12 temperature abuse. We're not seeing whole-scale growth
13 of this pathogen or this organism in the meat supply once
14 we get past the carcass stage. That would be my
15 observation to that question.

16 MS. GLAVIN: Okay.

17 MR. BILLY: Yes, Dr. Gill?

18 DR. GILL: Colin Gill, Agriculture Canada.

19 Just a comment on the temperature control. I've just
20 been involved in a rather large-scale study of the
21 temperature during distribution of beef in the Canadian
22 system. And it turns out that the degree of temperature
23 control is extremely good, particularly for ground beef,
24 for manufacturing beef, and ground meat products.

25 Throughout the system, it's generally cooled
26 very rapidly and maintained at temperatures below 6

1 degrees centigrade right to the retail level. Things do
2 tend to go wrong in the retail case, though.

3 We also have data that suggests that there is
4 no change in E. coli numbers throughout this distribution
5 system until you get to the retail case where you can get
6 temperatures up to 15 degrees centigrade for prolonged
7 periods which does allow bacterial growth.

8 MR. BROWN: Bill Brown. Maggie, a couple of
9 changes have been made, one, increasing sample size by
10 13-fold from 25 graphs to 325. That has a difference.
11 And then, the new method is four times as sensitive.

12 MS. GLAVIN: Oh, no, I understand. We're not
13 comparing. We're comparing two different things. Thank
14 you.

15 MR. BILLY: Okay. I think we'll move on.
16 Thank you very much. The next presentation is by Andrew
17 Benson, who is the Assistant Professor of Food
18 Microbiology at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln.
19 He's going to be speaking on research on 0157:H7 in feed
20 yards. Dr. Benson?

21 DR. BENSON: Thank you, Mr. Billy. I'm not
22 real sure where the title "0157 in Feed Yards" came from,
23 because that's not exactly what I want to tell you about.
24 But I do have a message today that I do want to
25 communicate that I think is important. So hopefully
26 you'll bear with me on that.

1 And if everybody will follow this, I'm a
2 geneticist trained as a geneticist, and so I look at this
3 problem from a slightly different standpoint than many of
4 you do in this room. And what I want to tell you about
5 today is a comparative genomic analysis that we've done
6 sort of to get at the question of the E. coli genetics
7 and the E. coli ecology of E. coli 0157:H7.

8 And hopefully, you'll understand as you walk
9 away from this that this is an approach that can be used,
10 in general, for other E. coli and other pathogens, as
11 well. Before we get started, though, we all have to have
12 a little bit of a course here in bacterial genetics and
13 population genetics, so that we all speak the same terms.

14 I always have to do this, and everybody laughs
15 at me. But it helps that we're all on the same page.
16 And first of all, the thing I need to get across is that
17 most bacterial populations -- I guess this isn't a
18 pointer. Here it is. Most bacterial populations are
19 clonal. And what that means is that they are comprised
20 of a founding cell and all of the daughters of that
21 particular cell.

22 Now, that's not to say that all of the
23 daughters will be genetically identical, because over
24 time subclones happen. Any number of types of
25 alterations can occur in that chromosome. And that will
26 mark that subclone from its peers here. And over time,
27 as a clone spreads geographically, it accumulates

1 alterations in the chromosome and also undergoes certain
2 types of selections in different niches, and therefore,
3 becomes adapted to particular niches.

4 Therefore, over time if one looks in different
5 niches, you'll find that although the bacteria are very,
6 very similar, there are distinct differences that you can
7 find amongst them to distinguish them one from another.
8 Okay. So that's enough of the little lesson here in
9 population genetics.

10 The reason I told you that is because there was
11 a bit of puzzling data with regard to 0157:H7. Back in
12 1993, Tom Widham (phonetic) at the Penn State University
13 had demonstrated by looking at E. coli 0157 isolates from
14 cattle and from humans all across the planet that, in
15 fact, 0157:H7 is a clone, that is, it arose from a single
16 founding cell that subsequently spread geographically.

17 However, wholesale genome electrophoresis, which
18 is a very standard typing scheme used by epidemiologists
19 demonstrated that, in fact, there's significant genome
20 diversity amongst the 0157:H7 strain.

21 So on the one hand, you have one method saying
22 that they are all very, very similar. On the other hand,
23 you have a different method saying that, in fact, there's
24 a tremendous amount of genetic diversity. And the
25 problem was that looking at the diversity with the
26 pulse-field data (phonetic) it was very difficult to

1 understand the relationships in the strains one to
2 another.

3 In fact, the only instance that we understood
4 the genetic relationships of the strains one to another
5 were those few instances in which we had isolates from
6 human cases of disease that had been linked
7 epidemiologically to contaminated food sources. Short of
8 that, we couldn't say much about the relationship of the
9 strains one to another.

10 Now, based on the fact that we have this
11 genetic diversity, this suggests that, in fact, there are
12 lots of subclones out there and also suggests that,
13 perhaps, some of those subclones could have unique
14 virulence or physiological properties.

15 This is what we needed at the time, is a very
16 high resolution method to identify subclones and to map
17 the role of genome alterations. That is, so to speak,
18 let Mother Nature do the genetic experiments for us.
19 We'll go find the alterations and walk backwards, finding
20 or determining what genes those alterations are in and
21 subsequently trying to understand the impact on the
22 physiology or virulence of the sub.

23 Well just very, very briefly, I don't want to
24 go into detail about our methodology, other than to say
25 it's called OBGS. It stands for Optimum-Based Genome
26 Scanning. And it relies on a phenomenon of skewed
27 oligomers (phonetic.) These are very short words. You

1 can think of them from the short words that occur in a
2 chromosome over and over and over again.

3 And not only are they overrepresented, they
4 also occur much more frequently on one strand than the
5 other. And we simply mix and match these different
6 sequences and use them as mileposts and use the former
7 H-chain reaction to look at the distances between it.
8 And so here's just a little short section of the
9 chromosome I've shown here. There's wats and strands
10 (phonetic) on top and a thick strand on the bottom.

11 And here, these little lines are just the
12 occurrence of these little specific segments we use. And
13 these little pieces here are the little pieces between
14 them that we can look at. So using this method, we can
15 look at thousands and thousands of pieces of the
16 chromosome from each different isolate and get a very,
17 very high-resolution fingerprint.

18 In fact, we can use whatever resolution we want
19 here to get a very high-resolution fingerprint of the
20 different isolates that we're looking at. So that's the
21 methodology. We, then, take those PCR products. We run
22 these in an automated DNA sequencer, so this is a very
23 automated process.

24 As you can see here, each of these tracts,
25 there's a different isolate, and here's an alteration
26 I've shown up here in only in some of the isolates, not
27 in the others. And here's some down here that occur only

1 on a couple of red guys occurring here. So we can
2 identify these different alterations.

3 Now, a little bit more on methodology. How do
4 we make that useful? Well, what we do with that is to
5 convert that image I just showed you over into a binary
6 file of 1s and 0s. One presents the presence of a band
7 or a segment of a chromosome. Zero represents absence.

8 And once you convert something over into a
9 binary file, you can essentially do anything you want
10 with it, computationally, which is really nice. So we do
11 cluster analysis on those. And the way the cluster
12 analyses are rendered is that they are rendered by
13 dendrograms (phonetic.) And, essentially, the closer
14 each sample is on the leaves on the dendrograms, the more
15 highly related they are genetically. Okay. So that's
16 the approach.

17 Now, here's what we do. We started off with a
18 set of isolates from Wisconsin, from a three-county
19 region in Wisconsin and were collected by Charlie Casper
20 and John Luchanski (phonetic) for a period of about three
21 or four years. Part of the isolates came from a
22 longitudinal cattle study of four different cattle herds
23 that occurred in that region.

24 The other isolates came from humans in that
25 same three-county region during that same time period.
26 We looked at 1,251 different markers from each of the
27 isolates. That's about 20-percent genome for a single

1 nucleotide resolution. So if there was a single-base
2 difference within these regions, we'd pick them out.

3 In contrast to what we expected, what we found
4 was that the bulk of the animal isolates clustered
5 together. And the bulk of the human isolates clustered
6 together with one single animal isolate up there. Now,
7 that kind of puzzled us, because we weren't expecting
8 that, because conventional wisdom said, at that point,
9 that ground beef was the primary source of transmission
10 and was the most effective source of transmission to
11 humans.

12 So we scratched our heads a bit and asked
13 ourselves what this might mean. There was two
14 explanations for the result that we had here. One
15 explanation was that what we were looking at was regional
16 bias. Those cattle herds were confined to that three or
17 four-county region during that three or four-year period
18 that Charlie and John were sampling then.

19 The humans, however, were not confined to those
20 regions, nor were their food sources. So what we could
21 be looking at here is a regional phenomenon. And this is
22 a region subclone of 0157, and the humans obtained their
23 clones -- I hate to put it that way -- but the humans
24 were infected with clones from outside this region.

25 The other explanation is that, rather than
26 regional formal phenomenon, we're looking at an
27 animal-specific clone here. And in fact this is a clone

1 that you very seldom see in humans. It's a subclone that
2 colonizes animals that is either less arivulent,
3 arivulent, or is ineffectively transmitted to humans.

4 So the way to test that hypothesis to
5 discriminate between those two is to collect samples from
6 all over the place. And we went out and did that. We
7 collected samples across the nation from 16 different
8 states' worth of cattle and, it seems to me, almost 20
9 different states' worth of humans. I forget the exact
10 numbers now.

11 The bottom line is when you do this experiment,
12 you get the same results. Again, right here is this
13 little cluster of isolates from Wisconsin, and you see
14 that the bulk of the animal isolates that we had, or that
15 we looked at, clustered with those animal isolates from
16 Wisconsin. In fact, there are no human isolates in this
17 clustering, till you get down to here.

18 Of course, there were some animal isolates did
19 cluster up with the humans, and we fully expected that.
20 In fact, I would have been shocked if we didn't see that.
21 And I really would have questioned whether a method was
22 working right or not. But the way we interpret this is
23 that, in fact, there are two very different subclones, or
24 at least two very different subclones, of this organism
25 out there.

26 One of them -- both of them can be isolated
27 from cattle. One of them you see in cattle, but you very

1 rarely see in humans. In fact, you may never even see it
2 in humans. The other clone you do see transmitted to
3 humans and the way we interpret that is that, in fact,
4 one of these subclones is less virulent or virulent where
5 it's just not efficiently transmitted from cattle to
6 human.

7 One example, it's easy to see if it was missing
8 virulence factors, if it had lost a virulence gene, why
9 it might be avirulent. On the physiological side, on the
10 transmission side, you might think of this subclone being
11 temperature-sensitive, let's say. So it doesn't survive
12 cooking as well as these guys do, and therefore, it's not
13 transmitted as efficiently. That's just an example.

14 That's -- I don't know that that's the case.
15 So anyway, that's two genetically distinct lineages of
16 0157 out there, at least two. We want to know what the
17 genetic differences are, and then we want to convert that
18 back to what the genetic differences are. That is to
19 say, how did the genetic differences correlate back to
20 the differences in the traits of this organism, the
21 character traits in virulence or in physiology? And how
22 do we go about doing that?

23 I don't have time to describe how we landed on
24 this, but just -- you'll have to trust me. Most of this
25 is published, by the way. So you can look at the details
26 in the publications. One of the things we do know that's
27 contributing to the diversions or the differences between

1 these subclones are little bacterial viruses called
2 bacteriophage.

3 Bacteria, just like we do, have viruses that
4 infect them. And sometimes those viruses choose, rather
5 than to blow the bacterium apart, to sit down in its
6 chromosome and become one with the bacterium for awhile.
7 We've pulled one of these viruses out of 0157:H7, and in
8 fact, it encodes one of the Shiga toxin genes. This
9 virus is called HB 4 down here.

10 Now, to make a long story short, what we've
11 noticed is that we've sequenced almost all of the genome
12 of this bacteriophage now, and what we've noticed is that
13 these green regions right here are regions that are at
14 least 95 percent identical to these other bacteriophages.
15 And the main takeaway message I want you to get here is
16 the fact that bacteriophage diversity contributes to a
17 lot of the genome diversity that you see in 0157:H7
18 isolates.

19 And bacteriophage, since they evolve very
20 rapidly by swapping segments of their chromosome, can
21 contribute to very rapid evolution in 0157:H7 and,
22 perhaps, in other bacteria. All right. So there's one
23 genetic difference that we know of and that we're
24 pursuing.

25 The other thing we're interested in doing now
26 is comparing the entire genome. The studies that we did
27 that I've just showed you were done at 20 percent genome

1 coverage. Now that we understand the genetic
2 relationship amongst those isolates, we want to cover the
3 entire genome. And the reason we want to do that is we
4 want to identify all of the lineage-specific
5 polymorphisms. That's a \$2-dollar word. What that
6 stands for, call it OSP.

7 A lineage-specific polymorphism is an
8 alteration that occurs in one subclone that's not in the
9 other and vice versa. Okay. We call those OSPs. We
10 want to identify all of them. And we want to do that for
11 a couple of reasons.

12 First of all, we want to design LSP tests, so
13 that we can test for the different subclones very, very
14 rapidly. Right now, it's sort of a difficulty for us to
15 distinguish between these subclones. It takes us a week
16 or so to do it. All right. So we want to develop a test
17 that'll greatly facilitate the epidemiological studies,
18 because we want to know something about the distribution
19 of these subclones.

20 What is the real prevalence of these subclones
21 in different populations? The other thing that it'll
22 allow us to do is if we cover the entire genome is to
23 learn something about the genetics and the physiology of
24 these sub-clones. So just to show you that we thought
25 about the problem and calculated how we're going to do
26 this, each primer combination that we do provides about
27 200 KB of coverage, on average.

1 It'll take us about 30 different OBGS
2 combinations to get 1-x coverage of the genome; 120
3 different combinations will give us 4-x coverage.
4 That'll allow us to account for any regions where these
5 priming sites are cold stops in the genome.

6 There's on an average, what we've seen so far,
7 that three of these lineage-specific polymorphisms for
8 any primer combinations -- so we're probably going to be
9 looking at anywhere around 360 different lineage-specific
10 polymorphisms. And at 4-x coverage, then that number 360
11 you could essentially divide it by four. That will be
12 the actual number, because many of them should be
13 overlapping.

14 This just sort of gives you an example of how
15 you can picture these lineage-specific polymorphisms.
16 The white here, the white lines, represent just different
17 isolates of E. coli 0157:H7. And that's the identical
18 part. That's the part that would be identical between
19 any isolate, any pair of isolates that you looked at out
20 there. Okay.

21 The 0157:H7-specific markers are shown in
22 yellow. Those would be the markers that discriminate
23 0157:H7 from other types of E. coli, other flavors of E.
24 coli you find out there. And then, these red and pink
25 markers would be the OSP's, the subclone-specific
26 markers, or lineage-specific polymorphisms that occur
27 only in subgroups of 0157:H7.

1 And then, we have even smaller groups that we
2 call Clade-specific (phonetic) markers. So those are the
3 different types of markers that you would come across.
4 Just to show you real quick how, in fact, we can find
5 these quite readily, here we've cheated a little bit.

6 And this is what we have to do to find these
7 things and that we've lined the organisms up, or the
8 samples up, and file a genetic order -- that is, in the
9 order of the genetic relationships on the automated
10 sequencer here. And here, you can see bands that are
11 present only in one lineage.

12 There's another one present only in another
13 lineage. Same thing here. Same thing here. Same thing
14 here. So you can find these examples of these things.
15 It's not terribly difficult for us to find. If we've
16 covered the genome, if we've done our job, each
17 lineage-specific polymorphism will be picked up on
18 different segments, different primer combinations by our
19 methods, so we'll have enough overlap here to be sure
20 that we've covered the entire genome.

21 And once we identify these things, then we have
22 specific specialized equipment that we can use to cut
23 those bands out. Here's an example of two of the bands.
24 Here's one band here. Here's another one here. We've
25 actually cut it out. We've used PCR to reamplify it.
26 It's purified now. We can go through some PCR chemistry
27 and some magic here and get the DNA sequence of this

1 particular product and know exactly where it is in the
2 chromosome and pinpoint it.

3 And this is just one example that I have where
4 we've done that. This happens to be a nine-base
5 duplication that occurs in the gene encoding
6 methenyltetrahydrofolate cyclohydrolase. It's a gene
7 that's -- that's really a \$2-dollar word. But that's a
8 gene involved in being a synthesis.

9 And in what we've referred to as the bovine
10 lineage, there was an eight or nine-base duplication that
11 occurred right in the lighter region of that gene and
12 actually looks like the footprint of a transposer jumped
13 out of there at some point in the evolution of this bug.

14 So anyway, what have I told you about? Well,
15 the bottom line is that there's at least two genetically
16 distinct subclones of 0157 that can be isolated from
17 cattle in the U.S. One of these subclones is rarely
18 isolated from patients with hemorrhagic colitis, at least
19 in the U.S. The subclone is, perhaps, less virulent or
20 not as readily transmittable.

21 That's our conclusion and reason -- genomics to
22 identify the specific alterations that distinguish these
23 subclones to begin to go back here and understand whether
24 this is a virulence of a transmission phenomenon. And
25 lastly, these are just the people who contributed to my
26 work and my collaborators in the funding. Thanks.

1 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. Are
2 there any questions from the panel? Yes, Bill?

3 DR. CRAY: Bill Cray, FSIS. Have you looked at
4 isolates from produce at all?

5 DR. BENSON: I'd love to. I would like to look
6 at them. We haven't yet. And if anybody in this room
7 would send them to me, we would be glad to look at them.

8 DR. CRAY: Also have you looked at isolates
9 from deer or sheep?

10 DR. BENSON: I do have isolates, a couple from
11 deer, one from a raccoon that I've looked at. And in
12 fact, they group in there with the cattle isolates so
13 far. But it's not a large enough sample to say that's
14 how they are all going to shake out.

15 DR. CRAY: You mentioned in the U.S. that the
16 human isolates are in the first group. Have you looked
17 at European isolates? And I think that you mentioned --

18 DR. BENSON: Yes, yes. So what we've done is
19 to get at this from an epidemiologic -- it's very
20 difficult to actually demonstrate whether a test --
21 whether or not one of these lineages are virulent or not,
22 because you can't do the real test. And I can't get
23 volunteers. That's not a real laughing matter in this
24 room, but it's the truth.

25 So what we've done is there's an
26 epidemiological approach we've taken. And there's a
27 phenomenon in Central Europe and also in Australia. It

1 turns out in those countries they have E. coli in their
2 cows, but not in their people. So they have 0157:H7 in
3 their cows at about the same prevalence that we have here
4 in the United States. However, it's very rarely isolated
5 from patients.

6 In fact, it's other serotypes of hemorrhagic E.
7 coli that cause problems over there. So this is very
8 preliminary evidence now, and I'm not finished with the
9 analysis, which is why I don't have the slide. But I'm
10 comfortable enough to tell you, we've looked at a set of
11 isolates from cattle and from humans, the few human
12 0157:H7 isolates that are from Australia.

13 And in fact, they all look like that lineage,
14 too. They look like the, what I've referred to, the
15 bovine lineage, a lineage, too, here in the United
16 States. So my interpretation of that is that, in fact,
17 that lineage is virulent, perhaps, less virulent.

18 And the other interpretation you would make you
19 would say it's less virulent, because it's in their
20 cattle. But very seldom does it ever cause disease in
21 their humans. If it's the primary clone in the cattle,
22 then you would expect it to be the one you'd isolate from
23 the humans, as well, or what few patients there were.

24 MR. BILLY: From your work, have you been able
25 to determine if there's -- I know you haven't done the
26 virulence study, but the known virulence markers
27 attaching and facing hemolysin and Shiga toxins --

1 DR. BENSON: They are all there.

2 MR. BILLY: They are all there.

3 DR. BENSON: They are all there.

4 MR. BILLY: Are they all there, maybe, two or
5 three in humans versus one in the cow?

6 DR. BENSON: Yes, that we haven't done. We
7 haven't quantified that. But all I know is, of the
8 isolates we've looked at, most of the isolates that all
9 of those tests have been run on, all of the known
10 virulence factors are present. I don't know anything
11 about whether the genes are expressed or not. It could
12 be that they are turned off in one lineage and not in the
13 other. But I know that they are at least present.

14 MR. BILLY: All right. Stan?

15 MR. EMERLING: Stan Emerling representing NET
16 (phonetic). Just a question. Are any of these
17 differences in the genetic makeup that you were talking
18 about, E. coli 0157:H7, are they peculiar to any specific
19 breed or breeds of cattle?

20 DR. BENSON: I don't have any data regarding
21 that right now. There could be. I think you'd have to
22 design a study to ask that very question.

23 MR. EMERLING: But it could be possible?

24 DR. BENSON: Oh, it's possible. I can tell you
25 this going back to the Australian isolates that we've
26 look at, I said they did look like the lineage, two
27 isolates. But nonetheless, they were distinct. I could

1 tell you that they were from another country. It was
2 clear that there is some geographic isolation to them.
3 So there could be in animals, as well.

4 MR. EMERLING: And that carries over into human
5 beings could be, perhaps, some trait also or not? I
6 mean, the fact it showed in some and not in others?

7 DR. BENSON: I don't know.

8 MR. EMERLING: I thought you showed a
9 difference in the genetic makeup.

10 DR. BENSON: Right. So the idea is that
11 there's several populations of 0157 out there, several of
12 these subclones out there. Okay. And you can isolate
13 these different subclones from animals, but not all of
14 those subclones the way you isolate from humans that
15 humans that have disease.

16 And so what that suggests is that, just because
17 you isolate 0157:H7 from an animal, it makes you
18 question, well, are all of them capable of causing
19 disease? Or can all of them do it with equal efficiency?
20 That's what I'm getting into.

21 MR. BILLY: Dean, then Sonja.

22 MR. DANIELSON: Thank you, Dr. Benson. That
23 was very interesting. It's a fairly new piece of
24 information that's come about. So I have two questions.
25 Has this theory or this discovery of yours been -- it's
26 very complex and it's way over my head. But has it been

1 duplicated or verified by a second independent source?
2 Or is this just emanating through your laboratory?

3 DR. BENSON: It's in the process of being
4 verified independently by another source. It has not
5 been reported in peer-review literature yet, that other
6 source. What I can tell you, though, is while it sounds
7 really striking that we find this phenomenon, if you take
8 a step back and think about it, if you're really looking
9 at the same sort of genetic drift and genetic shift that
10 you see with influenza or any infectious disease,
11 cholera, you name it, it's the same type of phenomenon
12 that you're seeing there.

13 MR. DANIELSON: Okay. It'll be very
14 interesting if and when that second source becomes
15 available. The second question, if you have an 0157:H7
16 test and a result, let's say, with a new standard method
17 or the new method and it says it's positive, do you know
18 if that's a virulent or a nonvirulent 0157, based upon
19 that result?

20 DR. BENSON: On the test that's currently being
21 done, no.

22 MR. DANIELSON: How about with PCR?

23 DR. BENSON: Not necessarily.

24 MR. DANIELSON: Thank you.

25 MR. BILLY: Kay?

26 MS. WACHSMUTH: Yes. I noticed Tom Widham is
27 one of your collaborators. Has Tom run this clone in the

1 multi -- because that would eliminate any of the
2 potential problems you see with this diversity in
3 bacteriophage and other, maybe, non -- I mean, since he
4 looks at core enzymes?

5 DR. BENSON: Right, right.

6 MS. WACHSMUTH: Has he done these?

7 DR. BENSON: In a lot of these -- I wouldn't
8 say all of them, but a lot of them he's run in the past.
9 And, again, the reason we developed our method was to get
10 around the limitations of his method. And the
11 limitations of his method is it's not sensitive enough to
12 discriminate subclones of 0157:H7.

13 MS. WACHSMUTH: But it does have a basis in
14 genetics, since he's looking at how the sequence of those
15 genes and code enzymes --

16 DR. BENSON: Yes. Now he's doing -- exactly.
17 Now he's doing it by sequence.

18 MS. WACHSMUTH: To me, it might be more
19 meaningful to have that link to potentially look at
20 repeat sequences that you don't really know what they
21 might code for. Or is something like that --

22 DR. BENSON: No, no, no. That's -- these
23 aren't repeat sequences like you normally --

24 MS. WACHSMUTH: Those are just to generate the
25 --

26 DR. BENSON: These are frequent words, but they
27 are very short. They are eight bases.

1 MS. WACHSMUTH: But you don't know the gene
2 products right?

3 DR. BENSON: Pardon?

4 MS. WACHSMUTH: You don't know the gene
5 products right?

6 DR. BENSON: No. They are too short to encode
7 gene products. There are frequent words, eight bases and
8 links that occur in a very nonrandom distribution on a
9 chromosome. And this phenomenon has been documented now
10 in almost every bacterial chromosome that's been
11 sequenced so far.

12 MS. WACHSMUTH: No. I wasn't taking any issue
13 with that.

14 DR. BENSON: Yes.

15 MS. WACHSMUTH: I just am saying in terms of
16 genetic relationships of strains, it seems that it might
17 be more meaningful to look at those enzymes that are
18 housekeeping --

19 DR. BENSON: But you can -- Tom and I argue
20 about this all the time. You can look at four low --

21 MS. WACHSMUTH: I worked with Tom. That's why
22 --

23 DR. BENSON: -- you can look at 451. To me,
24 I'd go with 1,250 data points over 4.

25 MS. WACHSMUTH: You know what the four really
26 are when you sequence the genes.

1 DR. BENSON: Right. But we can find out what
2 the alterations are. That's what I'm trying to get
3 across is we can go in and fish out the alterations that
4 are relevant and find out exactly what they are, which is
5 what we're doing right now.

6 MR. BILLY: Sonja?

7 DR. OLSEN: Sonja Olsen, CDC. I was just
8 curious about your human isolates you used, if you knew
9 if they were from sporadic infections or
10 outbreak-associated --

11 DR. BENSON: Funny you should ask. I have a
12 very difficult time getting isolates, particularly from
13 humans and particularly from CDC. (Laughter).

14 I'm sorry to bring that up, but it's a problem
15 I've had. The isolates that we did have from humans were
16 from both sporadic cases and from outbreaks.

17 DR. OLSEN: Okay. And did you see any specific
18 clustering --

19 DR. BENSON: We did tend to see clustering of
20 outbreak isolates. But I'd have to look at a whole bunch
21 more before I would really want to make that statement.

22 MR. BILLY: Go ahead.

23 MS. KOSTY: Dr. Benson, this is Lynn Kosty with
24 NCBA. Just one question for you. In light of your data,
25 what does this mean for things like Dr. Powell's risk
26 assessment where there is some concern now that maybe not
27 all E. coli strains are equal while looking in the feed

1 lot or on the incoming hides? What is your opinion
2 there?

3 DR. BENSON: My opinion there is that if you
4 really want to do a risk assessment, then one needs to
5 include a factor in there if you could come up with a
6 wobble factor for virulence. And again, I don't know how
7 to predict virulence.

8 I'm not necessarily sure that anybody knows how
9 to do that fairly well, particularly with 0157:H7. But
10 my suggestion would be to come up with some wobble factor
11 where you can account for the different subclones or quit
12 counting just E. coli 0157:H7 and start classifying them
13 as subclone A, subclone B, subclone C. That's my
14 suggestion. You're talking about an awful lot of work to
15 do that.

16 MR. BILLY: I concur. The person at that
17 microphone.

18 MR. BOLTON: Lance Bolton, Dupont Polycon.
19 Just a quick question. I think you've about answered
20 this, but before I get to that, I'd like to say very
21 impressive work.

22 DR. BENSON: Thank you.

23 MR. BOLTON: I really find it very fascinating.
24 But what I was wondering is if it would be possible to
25 develop a set of primers for PCR that would capture most,
26 if not all, of the human virulent subclones.

1 DR. BENSON: That's what we're doing, yes.
2 Yes.

3 MR. BOLTON: Would that ever be actually a
4 practical test, so that you could get the number down,
5 the number of --

6 DR. BENSON: It would be very practical,
7 because then you'd -- that's one of the reasons we're
8 covering the genomes, because we want to pull out all of
9 them. We'll take 20 of them -- 20 is a nice number -- to
10 make a very robust test for. That's the 20 most relevant
11 markers that can discriminate the two subclones one from
12 another. It's a multiplex test, so you can do it in one
13 shot.

14 MR. BOLTON: So about 20 would actually get --

15 DR. BENSON: Or we can do 50. We could do --
16 the problem is not everybody can afford automated DNA
17 sequencers like we have. So we have to try and design
18 it, so it'll fit different types of electrophoresis
19 formats.

20 MR. BOLTON: Thank you.

21 DR. BENSON: Yes.

22 MR. BILLY: Okay. Bill?

23 DR. CRAY: Bill Cray, FSIS. All of the cattle
24 isolates from the 1991 genomes survey were examined for
25 virulence attributes. And all of those were
26 toxin-positive, EAG-positive, and also EHEC-plasma
27 positive. Based on that, would you say that we should

1 still, at this point, consider all E. coli 0157 isolates
2 to be potential human pathogens?

3 DR. BENSON: If it were me, because I have
4 young children, I would say yes. At this point, until we
5 learn more about these subclones, we need to learn more
6 about their distribution. I think we need to map that
7 better, because what we did wasn't really a prevalence
8 study.

9 What we did was simply a genetic-relatedness
10 study. Somebody needs to go out and do a real prevalence
11 study. And, you know, that's something that I'd be
12 interested in hooking up with people to do once we've
13 generated these specific markers that make our lives a
14 lot easier in terms of data analysis.

15 I should say that those 1,251 markers should --
16 meat samples are scored manually, because there was no
17 software on the market that could deal with that. So
18 that's another issue that we have which, again, is
19 another driving force for us to generate this specific
20 test.

21 MR. BILLY: Mark?

22 DR. POWELL: Mark Powell, FSIS. That answered
23 the question that I was going to raise. And all kidding
24 aside, not only would it make a lot more work for the
25 risk assessment team, but also that doesn't give us a
26 handle yet on the relative prevalence occurring in the
27 wild population.

1 And, as well, because at least some of the
2 bovine isolates are found in human isolates match, there
3 may be some differential infectivity, but knowing that
4 and quantifying that are two very different things.

5 DR. BENSON: And I agree with that. But the
6 point I want to make is that we do need to change our
7 thinking in that not all 0157:H7 are identical. There
8 are some very, I think, quantifiable differences, both
9 genetically and probably physiologically, as well. And
10 we need to hammer away at that and identify what those
11 are to determine whether we need to worry at all on
12 0157:H7.

13 MR. BILLY: Okay. All right. It's now 3:30,
14 and I'd like to take a break for 15 minutes.

15 (Whereupon, a 15-minute break was taken.)

16 MR. BILLY: Okay. We're sort of on the home
17 stretch. And we don't want to short any of the remaining
18 speakers' time in terms of their contributions to what I
19 think is a very important meeting. So if you all take
20 your seats, the next speaker is Dr. Colin Gill.

21 He is a meat preservation and hygiene
22 microbiologist with Agriculture and Agrifood Canada. His
23 presentation will be on interventions for assuring the
24 microbiological safety of raw red meat. Dr. Gill?

25 DR. GILL: Thank you. Right. Thank you.
26 Sorry for the size of my paper, but I thought there was a
27 few bumps that had to be made. The first thing is that

1 intervention is to give surety of safe microbiological
2 conditions will only be effective if they are implemented
3 as part of our effective HACCP system.

4 To be effective, the HACCP system for raw meat
5 must be implemented on the basis of appropriate
6 microbiological data. That's not just any old
7 microbiological data, but appropriate data.
8 Consequently, current systems at meat plants are not
9 HACCP systems at all. They are quality management
10 systems for assuring the quality of compliance with
11 regulatory requirements. Whether or not those regulatory
12 requirements are effective can be questioned.

13 They are, after all, much the same sort of
14 requirements that have been enforced for 30 or 40 years.
15 And they haven't worked before, and changing the name to
16 HACCP isn't going to make them work now. Effective HACCP
17 systems can be based on the enumeration of appropriate
18 indicator organisms. There is very little point in
19 chasing after specific pathogens, because there are just
20 too few of them on which to base a system for process
21 control.

22 When using indicators to evaluate the
23 microbiological performance of a process, it is necessary
24 to look at their numbers on the product passing through
25 the process, not on the numbers as are hugely done,
26 because during a process, the variation in the

1 distributions can change. And if you don't take account
2 of that, you can get the wrong answer.

3 You can also look at individual operations with
4 a process, including decontaminating treatments. And
5 it's in decontaminating treatments often influence the
6 variance greatly if they don't take the change in
7 distribution into account. You will quite often get the
8 wrong impression as to what your intervention is doing.

9 Sequel indicator organisms are total --
10 coliforms, generic E. coli -- and we hope sometime in the
11 not-too-distant-future generic listeria. The more
12 indicators you look at, the better. The understanding of
13 your microbiological effects of your processor are going
14 to be -- because none of these indicators are
15 interchangeable.

16 Your reduced total aerobic count it doesn't
17 necessarily mean you've reduced numbers of E. coli and
18 vice versa. Interventions are four types. You have
19 those for preventing microbiological contamination, and
20 that's as much an intervention as any of the other ones;
21 those for decontaminating selected areas of product
22 surfaces, maybe on carcasses; those for decontaminating
23 all surfaces or the whole mass of the product, the
24 holistic approach; and those for dealing effectively with
25 misprocessed product.

26 In some processes, most of the microbiological
27 contamination will occur during only a few of many

1 operations. This is the classic situation where those
2 operations are your critical control points. If you
3 misidentify them, then you won't be in control of your
4 process.

5 I will give an example which is the skimming of
6 beef process carcass hindquarters which can cause -- does
7 cause more contamination in the meat at some plants and
8 not at others. Here's a set of results from three
9 plants. As you will see, the microbiological performance
10 of those operations on the carcasses at plant A are far
11 more deleterious to its microbiological condition than
12 the operations at the other two plants.

13 When some of the procedures used at plant B and
14 C were implemented at plant A, contamination on the
15 carcasses at plant A were reduced. Of course, that
16 reduction will only be effective in the final products.
17 And in this case, we were looking at the dressing
18 process, so we considered the carcasses leaving the
19 dressing operation or leaving the dressing floor.

20 And as you can see, the intervention
21 effectively reduced contamination with -- and E. coli by
22 something over one log unit, which is a nice handy little
23 number to have since it didn't cost anything, just a
24 little bit of effort. You will also notice that the
25 coliform numbers haven't changed at all, and that is
26 because the coliforms on these carcasses were being

1 deposited on the carcass mainly from improperly cleaned
2 equipment later on in the process.

3 So there's no shift in that, but it tells you
4 something that something else is going on further down
5 the process that is well worth looking at. In other
6 instances, there may be fundamental problems with the
7 procedures or the equipment used in processes. And these
8 would have to be addressed by radical changes before the
9 contamination of a product could be brought under
10 control.

11 For example, procedures for cleaning personal
12 and fixed equipment are inadequate at most meat packing
13 plants. Here's an example of the bacteria recovered from
14 equipment immediately before the start of work on a
15 number of days. As you will see, we recovered large
16 numbers of bacteria from all but one sample from gloves,
17 mesh gloves, and items of fixed equipment. And those
18 included, in some cases, substantial populations of
19 generic E. coli.

20 And you're going to run your meat through this.
21 Consequently, most of the bacteria on the meat dispatched
22 from many packing plants are deposited on the product
23 during the carcass-breaking process, not during the
24 carcass-dressing process where all -- on which all eyes
25 are fixed.

26 Here is the result from four plants before and
27 after the carcass-dressing process -- the carcass-

1 breaking process. This is carcasses entering and cuts
2 leaving. And as you will see, the numbers of E. coli out
3 of these products go up dramatically at plant A.

4 We have a 5-log increase in the numbers of E.
5 coli on the product. And we had 20 logs at plant B, one
6 log at plant C, and plant B looks as though it's got
7 everything under control. There is, however, one point
8 that we're looking at the moment. We know we recover by
9 swabbing or by incision similar numbers of bacteria from
10 carcasses. It doesn't matter which procedure you use,
11 you'll get much the same numbers.

12 Looking at manufacturing beef recently, we find
13 that swabbing will recover only about 1 percent of the
14 bacteria that are present on it. We're just looking at
15 cuts at the moment. But those increases in those numbers
16 could, in fact, be a hundredfold greater than those
17 earlier indicated. Not a pretty picture.

18 Such situations will be remedied if procedures
19 for assured effective cleaning of personal equipments are
20 adopted. And that is mainly a matter of management,
21 designs for cleanable meat plant equipment are developed,
22 and existing equipment is modified to be cleaned or it is
23 replaced.

24 The big problem here is that the equipment used
25 at meat plants has usually been designed without any
26 thought to its cleanability, whatsoever. It is just
27 assumed that it will be cleanable in due course and is

1 required. The consequence is that some of it is not
2 cleanable at all and, in fact, isn't cleaned. And
3 finally, with that, effective cleaning procedures for
4 meat plant equipment are implemented and are implemented
5 on a regular basis.

6 I don't believe -- I don't mean to imply that
7 everyone isn't trying very hard to clean this equipment,
8 but the fact of the matter is it is not being effectively
9 cleaned. It is essential that this aspect of hygiene
10 control is looked at urgently, because it could be the
11 major factor in compromising the safety of meat.

12 Treatments for decontamination in selected
13 areas, the old tradition of trimming, vacuum cleaning
14 which has been used on some parts of the carcass for many
15 years, and the now presently trendy vacuum-cleaning while
16 treating the surface with hot water or steam, all are
17 effective for using visible contamination which, after
18 all, is the prime purpose.

19 Cleaning for selected areas, therefore, are
20 usually guided by the presence of visible contamination.
21 You treat the carcass and you treat the carcass to get
22 rid of this more contamination. Used in this manner,
23 these treatments are largely ineffective. There's some
24 data, basically, as microbody and microbiological
25 treatments, they don't work.

26 But as for removing visible contamination,
27 which is not a bad idea after all, you can go with 31 of

1 them, and they will give you a similar result. Trimming
2 can be somewhat effective if it is supplied to an area
3 likely to be contaminated, irrespective of the
4 appearance. Here's a case where they get a live drop in
5 E. coli numbers as a result of trimming in an area that's
6 usually heavy contaminated.

7 They are not trimming it to reduce
8 microbiological contamination. They are trimming it to
9 remove fat. So for that reason, I wouldn't say any of
10 these interventions were necessarily ineffective, but I
11 want to indicate that they may or may not be ineffective
12 in your system, unless you find out from direct
13 microbiological data in each particular process you do
14 not know what it's doing.

15 And you cannot assume that it's doing
16 something. Vacuuming, hot-water vacuuming treatments are
17 likely to be ineffective however they are, for they are
18 applied vacuuming because all this is going to do is
19 remove visible contamination.

20 And hot-water vacuuming, because you're not
21 applying heating the carcass surface for long enough for
22 it to have any microbial effect, to be effective, you've
23 got to heat to a greater degree centigrade for about 10
24 seconds. Since you're applying these treatments to a
25 surface area of several hundred square centimeters
26 through a head that's only 50 square centimeters and
27 serve in an area, you simply cannot apply it for the

1 requisite time to heat the carcass surface to give you
2 antimicrobial effects.

3 Washing of carcasses is usually ineffective.
4 That's the usual result you get and really no effect at
5 all. You will notice there is an apparent increase in
6 the number of coliforms in E. coli. It's half a log, not
7 important. It isn't a real increase. The water isn't
8 heavily contaminated.

9 What's happening is you're getting
10 redistribution, and because you can undertake a limited
11 number of samples, you get the illusion of these -- that
12 the numbers have increased. However, washing of
13 carcasses can be performed to reduce bacterial
14 contamination and washing of at least some offals may
15 usually reduce bacterial contamination.

16 Here are some examples: There is a carcass
17 washing process where you're getting a good log reduction
18 in E. coli numbers by washing of tails and tongues.
19 Particularly, you get very large reductions as a result
20 of washing these things. I may, however, add that in
21 none of these cases did any of the people involved in
22 these washing processes know what the microbiological
23 effects of the washing processes were.

24 These things are not being washed to reduce
25 bacterial numbers. They are being washed to remove
26 visible contamination. The thing is if you know what
27 microbiological effects they are having, it should be

1 possible to adjust various operations of these types to
2 achieve consistent large reductions or useful reduction
3 in bacterial numbers.

4 If you don't know what the bacterial -- the
5 microbiological effects are, they are not -- they will be
6 useless. They probably will have no such effects at all.
7 Decontamination with antimicrobial solutions, they are
8 highly effective in laboratory circumstances. They are
9 probably largely ineffective in actual practice.

10 The reasons are that complete coverage of a
11 product, particularly carcasses, is difficult without
12 using uneconomically large amounts of solution. Bacteria
13 in the natural flora vary widely in their
14 susceptibilities to antimicrobials. It's quite usual to
15 see large differences in the numbers of bacteria
16 destroyed in the experimental circumstances with inocula
17 and with a natural population.

18 Many of the antimicrobials tend to act on the meat,
19 rather than the microbe. You've got very little microbe
20 and a great deal of meat. And they'll tend to react with
21 the meat itself.

22 And solutions and concentrations in
23 temperatures that are effective for destroying bacteria
24 tend to be damaging to the product, so there is a natural
25 tendency if you don't know what the microbiological
26 effects are to reduce the concentration to the

1 temperatures down to levels where they are ineffective
2 for bacterial decontamination anyway.

3 There are few very reports of the effects of
4 in-plant antimicrobial treatments. I presume that there
5 is possibly some more information out there in the
6 industry, but very little of it has been reported up till
7 now. What data there is does tend to confirm that, in
8 practice, these are ineffective.

9 This was a study of decontamination using
10 acetic acid at four plants. And there was found to be no
11 difference in the microbiological condition of the meat
12 from the four plants. The only thing I find puzzling
13 about that is the uniformity of the four plants. I've
14 never come across four plants that were all similar.
15 That is the reported data.

16 Pasteurizing toxins with steam or hot-water can
17 be effective. There's some data for each of them, a good
18 two- to three-log reduction in E. coli numbers,
19 considerably less with total aerobes. Pasteurizing the
20 carcasses with steam is rather more complicated. You
21 need clean, dry carcass surfaces to do this, or
22 otherwise, you're just heating the dirt on the surface or
23 the film or water on the surface, rather than dealing
24 with the bacteria.

25 You need a single treatment chamber to get the
26 uniform condensation of steam onto the object to be
27 pasteurized. And the effective treatment is a carcass

1 surface temperature of 103 centigrade for 6.5 seconds.
2 There isn't a report in the literature which describes
3 the treatment of, I think, 80 degrees centigrade for
4 about 5 seconds. And it is quite obvious from the
5 microbiological data that it's ineffective.

6 Pasteurizing carcasses with water is rather
7 easier and cruder which is nice for meat plants, carcass
8 surface temperatures of greater than 80 degrees
9 centigrade for 10 seconds, and carcasses don't need to be
10 clean or dry or anything because you have the mechanical
11 effect of dumping large quantities of water onto them.
12 Manufacturing beef, too, can be pasteurized with hot-
13 water.

14 The treatment times, however, are considerably
15 longer, over 30 seconds. In this case, we got effective
16 decontamination at 45 seconds, or at least we couldn't
17 find anything much after 45 seconds. But in other cases
18 there is so much variability between manufacturing beef
19 that even 45 seconds has little -- therefore we have to
20 go to a 60-second treatment which is considered to be
21 longer than you have to go with carcasses.

22 Carcass-cleaning processes, most probably, have
23 little effect on the microbiological quality of the
24 product. There's a couple of typical cases, air cooling
25 and spray chilling. Both of them, essentially, they
26 maintain the bacterial load just where it was when they
27 went into the chiller. But all carcass-cooling processes

1 can give large reduction in the number of E. coli and
2 other gram-negative bacteria.

3 And there's a couple of cases in air cooling
4 processes which is giving you a nice log reduction in E.
5 coli numbers and a spray chilling process, which is
6 giving a two-log reduction in E. coli numbers. I'm not
7 quite sure how that spray chilling process is doing it.
8 But I think it involves freezing of a film of,
9 essentially, pure water onto the carcass surface when
10 they drop the temperature to minus 5 degrees centigrade
11 at the end of the spraying process.

12 It's something that would be nice to have a
13 look at. Various other slow freezing processes may also
14 reduce bacterial numbers. However, few plants would know
15 the microbiological effects of their cooling processes.
16 And none at all likely operate their cooling processes to
17 assure reductions in the numbers of E. coli on product.

18 But as you see, you can get reductions that are
19 at good or better than some after interventions that are
20 being used with carcasses. Radiation treatments, you've
21 had a talk about that. I'm not very enthusiastic about
22 it. It does seem to be technological overkill, and it
23 doesn't seem to be -- it's not really necessary, there
24 are alternatives.

25 One shortcoming with meat plants is they do not
26 generally include specific procedures for reacting
27 immediately to misprocessing events as they occur online,

1 nor do they include procedures for treating misprocessed
2 product to assuredly return it to the microbiological
3 condition of properly processed product or to reject the
4 product from usual processing if its conditions cannot be
5 assured.

6 What usually happens is that misprocessed is
7 identified on the basis of visible contamination. It is
8 pulled off the line. The visible contamination is
9 removed, and it is returned to the line. There is no
10 surety whatsoever that its microbiological condition has
11 not been grossly compromised by the misprocessing. We
12 don't know what its microbiological condition is at all,
13 usually.

14 And varying procedures for dealing online and
15 effectively with misprocessed product are essential if
16 heavily contaminated product is not to sporadically enter
17 the process to compromise all the rest of the production.
18 So my conclusions, proper implementation of HACCP systems
19 at meat plants can give meat an assured microbiological
20 safety.

21 A proper HACCP system must include procedures
22 for minimizing microbiological contamination, procedures
23 for decontamination product, and procedures for dealing
24 with misprocessed product in timely and effective
25 manners. A system that lacks those elements is not an
26 effective HACCP system. Procedures currently advocated

1 in and employed for HACCP implementation do not give
2 effective HACCP systems.

3 And finally, an effective HACCP system should
4 give meat with total aerobes at less than 2 logs CFU per
5 square centimeter and E. coli at less than 0 logs CFU per
6 thousand square centimeters. These are levels
7 approaching the microbiological condition of potable
8 water. And if you can do that, there really is very
9 little point of going pathogen hunting. Thanks.

10 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you. Are there
11 questions from the panel? Dan?

12 DR. ENGELJOHN: Dan Engeljohn with USDA. I
13 have two questions. On the carcass-cooling information
14 you presented, is that related to cooling the carcass
15 once it's eviscerated down to a certain surface
16 temperature? Or do you know what those temperatures were
17 related to?

18 DR. GILL: All carcasses are cooled to a
19 nominal deep temperature. In theory, carcasses are not
20 moved from the chiller before they fall to 10 degrees
21 centigrade at their warmest point which is usually the
22 deep-pit temperature.

23 In practice, however, you'll find that a lot --
24 there's always a fraction of carcasses that are
25 substantially warmer than that when they are moved out of
26 the chiller, because in the backs of chillers, the air
27 distribution is uncertain. And some carcasses are always

1 shielded from effective cooling. What is done about
2 this, I'm not entirely sure. I think it varies
3 considerably between plant to plant.

4 But, no, there is no defined end point. You
5 will always get a range of end points in temperatures.
6 Surface temperature is not a consideration. Some of the
7 deep temperatures is a consideration. But, in fact, in
8 running these operations, the major consideration at most
9 plants is the avoidance of weight loss, shrinkage. And
10 that's the main operating parameter for the chilling
11 system.

12 DR. ENGELJOHN: I did have a follow-up. On
13 your very last slide there, an effective HACCP system
14 should give meat what the total aerobes in the numbers
15 you have there. Is that generally for carcasses,
16 processing meat?

17 DR. GILL: You can produce carcasses of that
18 level. In fact, I know of one or two plants who are
19 doing something very near to that at the moment. I mean,
20 just because I say, because they haven't got an effective
21 HACCP system -- it's simply that you haven't got a HACCP
22 system you can check up on. Some plants are doing an
23 extremely good job, and some plants are getting very near
24 to that.

25 There's no darn reason why you can't maintain
26 that condition right all the way through the rest of the

1 process. In fact, you should. The fact that many plants
2 don't is a real problem.

3 MR. BILLY: Okay. Randy?

4 DR. PHEBUS: Randy Phebus, Kansas State
5 University. Can I ask you how you put these data tables
6 together? You don't provide any references as to where
7 these figures come from. The second question is how
8 common or, as far as the numbers that are presented here,
9 were they obtained using the same type of sampling method
10 and analytical method?

11 DR. GILL: Well, they were all obtained using
12 the same method. Yes, what we do is --

13 DR. PHEBUS: All of them use incision sampling;
14 is that right?

15 DR. GILL: No, no, swab sampling.

16 DR. PHEBUS: Well, okay. All right. Go ahead.

17 DR. GILL: I have data that shows the swab --
18 not only I, but others, have data that shows on carcasses
19 swab sampling is as effective as incision sampling for
20 recovering bacteria. As I say, that's all obtained the
21 same way.

22 What we do is we take 25 random samples from
23 randomly selected carcasses moving through the process
24 and estimate from there the log mean numbers of bacteria
25 on the product. This is a process control system we're
26 trying to estimate what the process is doing.

1 DR. PHEBUS: So all these data figures are from
2 your personal research?

3 DR. GILL: Yes. I can send you all the papers
4 if you like. Most of it's been -- well, all of that's
5 been published.

6 MR. BILLY: Okay. Kim, and then Nancy.

7 MS. RICE: Dr. Gill, Kim Rice, the American
8 Meat Institute. I missed your first few slides and I
9 apologize. But did you say -- is all of this information
10 based on experience in Canada or the U.S.?

11 DR. GILL: It's from North American plants.

12 MS. RICE: How many plants are U.S.-federally
13 inspected plants involved in your findings?

14 DR. GILL: I'm sorry. I'm not prepared to
15 discuss my sources at all, except to tell you that these
16 are all commercial plants. I worked in New Zealand for a
17 long time, as well.

18 MS. RICE: So let me ask you this: Is this
19 your -- is this a culmination of just experience or --

20 DR. GILL: No. This is all published data.

21 MS. RICE: Okay.

22 MR. BILLY: Nancy?

23 MS. DONLEY: Nancy Donley from STOP. Dr. Gill,
24 you mentioned a couple of times today that the low
25 prevalence of E. coli 0157:H7 and that you said it's not
26 necessary to look specifically for it, because it is in
27 such very low prevalence.

1 But we've hearing today that it's quite the
2 controversy with these more sensitive testing methods
3 that, in particular, there appears to be a lot more of
4 it. Do you use the testing method that we heard about
5 this morning, the magnetic beads and the --

6 DR. GILL: I think, perhaps, you misheard me.
7 What I said was it was pointless to look for E. coli
8 0157:H7 in relationship to controlling the process. What
9 you're trying to do is control the process. So you need
10 to have numbers, appropriate microbiological data to
11 control that process. You simply cannot get useful
12 numbers of E. coli 0157:H7.

13 What you can do with this sort of process is
14 reduce your numbers of indicator organisms to such low
15 levels that your risk is contained. This is exactly
16 what's done with milk. It's exactly what's done with
17 water. And there's no reason why you can't do it with
18 meat. But chasing around after specific pathogens simply
19 does not solve your problem for you, because if you don't
20 find a pathogen, it doesn't tell you it's not there. It
21 just says you didn't find it that time.

22 MR. BILLY: Okay. Caroline?

23 MS. DeWAAL: Thank you. Caroline Smith DeWaal,
24 Center for Science in the Public Interest. And this
25 question follows up on Nancy's question. Are you aware
26 of data from some fast-food plants in the U.S. showing
27 that systems which combine both indicator organisms and

1 pathogen testing actually give you the best of both
2 worlds, because you get a good sense of what's going on
3 with the indicator organisms, but you also know what your
4 pathogen load is on products? And do you have any
5 objection to that kind of a broad-spectrum testing
6 approach?

7 DR. GILL: Well, the only thing is that testing
8 for pathogens distracts attention from controlling a
9 process in the first place.

10 MS. DeWAAL: Excuse me, though, if I could.
11 The process is supposed to control the pathogens. Isn't
12 the best measure of process control then control of the
13 pathogens? What else is the process control about?

14 DR. GILL: Well, unfortunately, no, it's not,
15 because all you get from -- if you're trying to control
16 your process, you've got to have some information to work
17 on. And all you get if you go chasing pathogens is a
18 string of zeros. You can't do anything with that,
19 because those zeros don't tell you that pathogen isn't
20 present. It only tells you you've got a string of zeros.

21 MR. BILLY: Let me follow up on that. As I
22 understand what you're saying, you're recommending to use
23 a certain species of bacteria to monitor process control.
24 And those are bacteria that are present in numbers that
25 you can detect differences from the various process
26 control procedures and antimicrobial treatments, or
27 whatever that you happen to be using.

1 How do you feel, then, about the periodic use
2 of tests for pathogens to verify that, in fact, the
3 results you're getting from indicator organisms are, in
4 fact, equating to effective controls? I understand your
5 point about zeros don't tell you anything. Is there some
6 way where you believe that some adequate number of tests
7 would be a good indication of the effectiveness of the
8 controls?

9 DR. GILL: Just as I stated, you don't use
10 microbiological data to control your process. You use it
11 for validation of your control procedures and for
12 verification of your maintaining control over your
13 procedures. You do not use it for online testing. You
14 can't do enough of it.

15 You can't do it frequently enough to use it for
16 online testing. That has to be done by your standard
17 operating procedures which you've set up for your
18 process. Having said that, the only reason I could see
19 for using -- testing for pathogens would be for
20 surveillance purposes to see what this actually means,
21 but then you'd have to set up your surveillance properly.

22 But, yes, I could see it would be useful for
23 regulatory agencies to sort of carry out surveillances of
24 that sort. But really, it has no part at all in relation
25 to a HACCP system if you're operating a HACCP system
26 properly. And if you're operating a HACCP system
27 properly, the whole point of it is you get progressive

1 improvement of your process to a level where you have a
2 very high degree of assured safety.

3 Testing for pathogens won't do anything for
4 you. You cannot test safety into a product. It's one of
5 those long-established things that seems to be forgotten
6 at the moment.

7 MR. BILLY: Okay. Rosemary?

8 MS. MUCKLOW: Rosemary Mucklow, National Meat
9 Association. I'm beginning to feel like I hang out with
10 Colin Gill, because we spent three days with each other
11 last week and a day this week. The three days we spent
12 together last week, Colin chaired a very distinguished
13 panel of microbiologists from both our country and
14 international companies.

15 And I wonder if you could, Colin -- better than
16 me anyway -- put into just a few -- couple of sentences
17 the conclusions that those microbiologists came together
18 under your leadership last week. The basic principles,
19 which are not different than you've enunciated here, but
20 maybe you could restate it as the views of, probably,
21 some of the best world microbiologists who look at this
22 system.

23 DR. GILL: Well, simply put I was gratified and
24 very relieved to find that all of the people present
25 ultimately agreed on almost every one of the -- they did
26 agree on all the major areas. Basically, the conclusions
27 were that the point of microbiological testing in

1 relationship to food safety should be for the
2 implementation of HACCP systems. There is no other
3 reason for doing it.

4 If you're going to use microbiological testing
5 in relation to HACCP systems, then you have to go for
6 indicator organisms, because pathogen counts -- counting
7 pathogens won't -- isn't any help in this respect. You
8 are using them in relation to HACCP systems for
9 validation and verification of your -- validation of your
10 control processes and verification that your processes
11 are under control.

12 That end-product testing is of no value and, in
13 fact, is completely contrary to the whole concept of
14 HACCP implementation. And finally, that if you're going
15 to use these procedures for -- you're going to use
16 microbiological data in relationship to HACCP systems,
17 then you have to go to variables, sampling plans rather
18 than to attribute sampling plans, because if you go to
19 attribute sampling plans, you use much of the information
20 you need for process improvement.

21 MR. BILLY: Yes, Caroline?

22 MS. DeWAAL: Caroline Smith DeWaal, Center for
23 Science in the Public Interest. I've heard these
24 arguments for so long. And they are so troubling. How
25 do you deal with a prevalence of, you know -- on some of
26 the plants that we saw today, we saw to 20 percent of the
27 cattle coming in with E. coli 0157:H7. Or in the poultry

1 industry, we've seen salmonella rates of 20 percent and
2 25 percent, actually, when the original rule was
3 published.

4 So the idea that you can't find pathogens
5 because, you know, they are just not going to show up
6 assumes very low levels of pathogens. How do you deal
7 with situations and how do you address the data that was
8 presented today showing that we have higher levels coming
9 into the processing plants and, in fact, testing of
10 carcasses for 0157:H7 documents process control?

11 I just -- you know, the language is stuff I've
12 heard a lot before, but it assumes a very low incidence
13 of pathogens which, in fact, has not been the case in
14 either our beef industry or our poultry industry.

15 DR. GILL: Well, I think we should -- you can't
16 equate poultry in this. I mean, as far as the poultry
17 industry is concerned, I quite agree you can use your
18 pathogens as indicator organisms. But these are red
19 meats. I mean, hey, that's all right. But the thing is
20 you looked at that data. All they were talking about was
21 prevalence, found it or didn't find it. The amount of
22 information you get out of that is very small.

23 They found it on animals. They found it on
24 animals wandering up to the place. Once it was into the
25 plant, it wasn't there. Where's all these organisms?
26 They are not there. You don't know what your processes
27 do. All you can say is we couldn't see any. But you

1 don't really know how hard you were looking, or it gives
2 you no information, except that you didn't find them.

3 You need information to be able to control the
4 process. That's why, I'm sorry; I didn't make this up.
5 Other people agree with me. I'll go over it with you, if
6 you'd like, bit by bit. But that is the situation.
7 Would I lie?

8 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. I
9 think we'll move on. The next presentation is going to
10 be a joint presentation by Dr. Randy Phebus, who is the
11 Professor of Food Microbiology at Kansas State
12 University; and his colleague, Dr. Jim Marsden, who is a
13 Regents Distinguished Professor from Kansas State
14 University. Their presentation will be regarding ongoing
15 studies at KSU to characterize pathogen risk in
16 non-intact beef and pork products.

17 DR. PHEBUS: Okay. I appreciate the
18 opportunity to be here today to present work that we have
19 been doing over the last year-and-a-half, I would say, on
20 risk assessment of non-intact meat products.

21 Specifically, what we're going to talk about
22 today, a little bit different than what the program
23 actually says, we're going to be looking at blade
24 tenderization of beef products. We're not going to
25 present work that we've done with pork and salmonella.
26 But we have completed a lot of that type of work. And
27 we're in the process of analyzing the data. But this is

1 specifically directed toward E. coli in blade-tenderized
2 products.

3 Back in 1997, the National Advisory Committee
4 made the statement, "Due to the low probability of
5 pathogenic organisms present in, or migrating from, the
6 external surface to the interior of beefsteaks, cuts of
7 intact muscle," which means steaks, should be safe if the
8 external surfaces are exposed to temperatures sufficient
9 to affect a cooked color change.

10 But they also said that there's a lack of
11 scientific data to address the hazards associated with
12 those processes that may cause translocation of the
13 pathogens to the interior of the meat products. So this
14 led to the initiation of our studies to try to generate
15 data to characterize what these processes do.

16 In case you're not familiar with blade
17 tenderization, it's a process that's used extensively in
18 the beef industry. This is a unit -- this is actually a
19 raw unit that is one of the most popular ways that beef
20 sub-primals are blade-tenderized.

21 And that particular unit has two of these heads
22 that have these long, slender blades that penetrate the
23 product from the top and go all the way through the sub-
24 primal as the sub-primal works its way down a conveyor
25 belt. So there will be two heads, kind of, stamping this
26 product and cutting the muscle fibers in order to
27 tenderize the product.

1 Just to kind of put this in a little context,
2 we have looked through the literature, and there's really
3 no foodborne illnesses that have been traced to blade-
4 tenderized product to date. There were two salmonella
5 outbreaks linked to beef roast that had been
6 needle-injected. And this is a different technology than
7 needle injection, but that was really related to
8 undercooking.

9 Federal law now requires these roasts to be
10 cooked to 145 degrees internally to assure their safety.
11 But since these outbreaks, E. coli 0157:H7 has emerged as
12 our problem in beef. The objectives of our study were,
13 first, we wanted to microscopically visualize these
14 organisms and how they are carried and to what extent
15 they are carried into this processed muscle. So I'll
16 show you how we did that very shortly.

17 But then, we wanted to determine the
18 effectiveness of cooking processes that are generally
19 used in the commercial scale from well -- from rare to
20 well-done temperatures, own controlling the amount of
21 contamination that might be carried into the center of
22 that sub-primal. Here, we looked at -- we took some
23 green fluorescent E. coli, and this would be the top
24 surface of the sub-primal that we inoculated at
25 approximately six to seven logs, depending on the rep.

26 And then, it was passed through the equipment,
27 and this would be a penetration point as you're looking

1 down on the top of that sub-primal. As you can see there
2 along that needle channel, there are probably 20 to 25
3 green fluorescent E. coli. That is right at the very
4 surface. This is at the very bottom of that sub-primal,
5 at the bottom of the needle channel.

6 As you can see, there's a lot more here than
7 here, but there's still three to four cells that were
8 carried down in that one channel to the very bottom of
9 the surface. We went a little further to actually
10 quantify how much E. coli is carried from the surface to
11 various levels in the sub-primal to see how it diluted
12 itself out.

13 Here, we inoculated E. coli by misting
14 approximately seven logs per square centimeter -- excuse
15 me -- six logs per square centimeter on the top surface.
16 And we also looked at a lower inoculum level of 10 to the
17 3 CFU's per square centimeter and passed those one time
18 through the blade tenderization unit.

19 And I might say that we have done a couple of
20 surveys since this work, and there's quite a bit of
21 variation in how blade tenderization is actually used in
22 the industry. Actually, there's probably a lot of the
23 people average about two passes through a unit, so it's
24 different, depending on the processor and how they are
25 using the technology.

26 But anyway, one pass leads to 32 blade
27 penetrations per square inch. We, then, took that sub-

1 primal that had been processed and we took cores,
2 aseptically took cores -- these dotted arrows represent
3 the path of the needle going in, the blades going in.
4 This would be the inoculated surface.

5 This is the non-inoculated surface, so we
6 actually cored from this direction from the lowest to the
7 highest concentration, and then pulled the core back out
8 the back end, so that we didn't artificially carry the
9 organisms further down into the core. We, then, looked
10 at various subsections of that core to enumerate the
11 amount of E. coli 0157:H7 there per gram.

12 And this is what we found, and this data has
13 been very consistent over several replications that we've
14 performed, both at high and low concentrations. As you
15 can see at the surface, which would be right there, we
16 had approximately six logs. And at the very bottom of
17 the core, we had approximately 2.8 logs when we started
18 with the high inoculum.

19 At three logs, initially, we had about a half a
20 log at the bottom. But the geometric center of that sub-
21 primal, which would be the geometric center of steaks cut
22 from that sub-primal, which theoretically would be the
23 slowest to heat during cook processes, would be
24 approximately at this point. And that corresponds to
25 about 3 to 4 percent of whatever was on the surface was
26 carried to the geometric center. Okay.

1 So a summary of this part of our work was that
2 E. coli 0157:H7 on the surface of meat were translated
3 throughout the entire volume of the sub-primals by the
4 penetrated blades and that the geometric center contained
5 about 3 or 4 percent of that surface contamination.

6 Now, if we look at a hypothetical example, say,
7 we're cutting steaks out of this particular sub-primal,
8 and we did have that three logs on the surface -- let's
9 say 3,000 CFU's per gram hypothetically, which that would
10 be an extremely contaminated piece of meat at the center
11 -- we would expect to get about 100 CFU's per gram.

12 So our conclusions are if pathogens are present
13 on the surface of the sub-primal, adequate cooking is the
14 key to providing safe blade-tenderized products. But
15 then what is an adequate cooking process? So this leads
16 us into the second part of the study, which we looked at
17 oven boiling in the data that I'm going to present to you
18 here, and how that affects control of E. coli 0157:H7 in
19 the product.

20 In this study, we looked at three sub-primals
21 that were tenderized and three that were left intact as
22 non-tenderized products. And we repeated this study four
23 times. We, then, hand-sliced aseptically into different
24 steaks' thicknesses, a half inch, three-quarters of an
25 inch, and 1.25 inch. And this really mimics what's
26 typically done in food service.

1 We trimmed those trimmings on the non-
2 inoculated side to 5, 8, and 12 ounces, respectively.
3 We, then, cooked these products, and we tried our best to
4 have an accurate cooking-temperature recording method.
5 And if you've ever done these types of studies, you know
6 it's very difficult to accurately measure internal
7 temperature, because it's a lot of that goes into that.
8 But we feel that we did the best job that we could with
9 this.

10 We did this in oven boiling. We looked at six
11 target internal temperatures, 120 to 170 degrees
12 Fahrenheit. I just checked with Marty, and the 140 would
13 be considered rare by NAP guidelines for cooking. So
14 this would be very rare. This would be very undercooked,
15 very rare, rare, medium; 145 would be medium rare. And
16 then, we also compared these to non-cooked inoculated
17 controls. Okay.

18 The steaks were cooked, again, at an ambient
19 air temperature of 300 degrees Fahrenheit. Okay. And
20 this is the data, and this is where I'm going to turn it
21 over to Dr. Marsden, not that I couldn't explain the
22 data.

23 DR. MARSDEN: Thank you, Randy. What we found
24 in terms of the results were that, in order to be assured
25 of a 5-log reduction across all the different treatments,
26 we had to cook to an internal temperature of 140 degrees.
27 At 130 degrees, which is really below any temperature

1 that would be likely to be seen in commercial practice,
2 we were -- the data was variable.

3 For the thicker steaks, the three-fourths inch
4 and inch-and-a-quarter, we did get a five-log reduction.
5 For the thinner steak which is cooked, of course, for a
6 less period of time in order to achieve that temperature,
7 there was quite of bit of variation. And it was
8 generally below five logs. But at 140 degrees, we were
9 able to get a consistent 5-log reduction. Again, 140
10 degrees is a rare- cooked steak.

11 One of the phenomenon that we noted was that
12 there is a continued rise in temperature after the steaks
13 are removed from the heat source. We tried to control
14 that by placing the steaks in an ice bath immediately
15 after coming off the heat source. And we still, you can
16 see from this slide, had a temperature rise in each case.
17 From 140, for example, crept up to 145 to 151 degrees;
18 130 crept up to 137 to 142.

19 And this is with a deliberate intent to
20 restrain that rise in temperature. In actual practice,
21 that rise in temperature occurs naturally. So there is,
22 if anything, what we're doing here is underestimating the
23 lethality of the process as it would exist in a
24 commercial practice. We concluded that blade
25 tenderization does not significantly affect the safety of
26 beefsteaks when they are cooked to temperatures of 140
27 degrees or above using this oven broiling method.

1 It was variation around that five-log
2 reduction. But, in general, we feel confident that we're
3 at that five-log reduction, similar to what we'd do with
4 ground beef if it were cooked to 160 degrees.
5 Significantly, though, there was no difference in risk
6 between the steaks that were tenderized and the steaks
7 that were not tenderized. Okay.

8 Some regulatory issues, if the objective is, in
9 fact, to achieve a five-log reduction, as we have with
10 ground beef, then internal temperatures slightly higher
11 than 140 degrees may be required, depending on the
12 cooking method and also the thickness of the steak.

13 If the objective, however, is to ensure the
14 safety of the blade-tenderized steaks, assure that it's
15 equal to non-tenderized product, then 140 was sufficient
16 for all cooking methods. We are looking at, as we've
17 been discussing all day, an integrated HACCP plan that
18 includes a lot of different elements.

19 One is a validated antimicrobial treatment as a
20 critical control point in the slaughter process, thermal
21 pasteurization or some validated critical control point.
22 Segregation of the slaughter process from the
23 post-slaughter process to prevent cross contamination is
24 important. Control of refrigeration temperatures and the
25 chilling of carcasses is important.

26 And then, also prerequisite programs to address
27 plant sanitation and personal hygiene issues all come

1 together to greatly reduce the likelihood of
2 contamination on sub-primals to start with. Now, we
3 looked at high inoculation levels, six logs and three
4 logs, in order to demonstrate this desired five-log
5 reduction.

6 In the context of this integrated HACCP system,
7 the risk of E. coli 0157:H7 contamination of sub-primals
8 that are destined to be blade-tenderized, obviously, is
9 significantly reduced. With these HACCP systems in place
10 and appropriately applied, the probability of having high
11 levels of contamination on the surface of a sub-primal
12 prior to being blade-tenderized is remote.

13 Now, in order to make a recommendation
14 regarding the level of reduction that's required to
15 assure the safety of non-intact steaks, we believe that a
16 scientific risk assessment should be conducted which
17 takes into account these upstream reductions, reductions
18 that are associated with each of the critical control
19 points in the overall HACCP system and production
20 process.

21 Another thing that the agency needs to take
22 into account -- and this is extremely important -- is
23 that non-intact is not a generic description that's
24 appropriate to all the meat products that are not intact
25 muscle. We looked here at blade-tenderization which
26 results in a fairly low level of translocation of

1 bacteria from the surface into the interior of the
2 muscle.

3 There are other technologies. For example, a
4 sectioned and formed product may actually resemble ground
5 beef in terms of the potential for translocating
6 bacteria. So just saying non-intact is not enough. The
7 actual process that's involved needs to be considered.
8 The risks are going to be different, depending on the
9 amount of translocation that occurs and translocation
10 that's associated with the various technologies.

11 So needle-injected or needle-tenderized may be
12 completely different in terms of its risk from sectioned
13 and formed. And finally, by combining an effective HACCP
14 plan with customary cooking practices -- and I noticed
15 that's a term that's used in the USDA regulation -- in
16 this case defined as cooking to a rare degree of
17 doneness, or 140 degrees, assures the safety of
18 blade-tenderized steaks.

19 Now, there is additional research that's
20 ongoing in this area. One is we're identifying methods
21 of reducing the variability associated with commonly used
22 cooking methods. That's similar to what happened in the
23 ground beef industry for cooking hamburger patties in
24 restaurants after the 1993 outbreak. We've made strides
25 in terms of improving the consistency that goes with the
26 cooking process.

1 We're also evaluating other technologies.
2 We're evaluating the fiber-mix technology, which involves
3 section and forming of the product. And we're conducting
4 inoculation studies to determine the risks associated
5 with those other types of technologies. Prime rib and
6 rare roast beef prepared from blade-tenderized sub-
7 primals are being evaluated.

8 There are reported cooking temperatures for
9 prime rib and rare roast beef that are well below the 140
10 degrees that we validated in the steak study. And we're
11 looking at those temperatures to determine whether or not
12 they are safe. And finally, we're doing a salmonella
13 risk assessment for -- we've already done one for
14 non-intact pork products. We are in the process right
15 now of doing one for non-intact beef products, as well.
16 So with that, I guess we can have questions.

17 MR. BILLY: Thank you very much. Questions
18 from the panel? Yes, Dan?

19 DR. ENGELJOHN: Jim, I had two questions. On
20 these non-intact steaks, did you look at the same quality
21 grade? Was the fat content, intramuscular fat, the same
22 in those steaks? Since we know that in hamburger
23 patties, fat content greatly affects the D-value, so I
24 was curious about the quality grade of the steaks.

25 DR. MARSDEN: Randy, did we look at all Choice?

1 DR. PHEBUS: Yes, everything was Choice. And
2 the controls and the tests of sub-primals came from the
3 same lot, the same box.

4 DR. ENGELJOHN: So you would expect them all to
5 be the same degree of intramuscular fat within the Choice
6 grade? They wouldn't be high, low, medium? You don't
7 know?

8 DR. PHEBUS: These were all exactly the same
9 sub-primals out of the same box. So they would have been
10 identical. We didn't specifically look at, say, high
11 Choice or Prime or anything like that, in selecting our
12 raw materials. But the ones that we did select were the
13 same between control and the test treatments.

14 DR. ENGELJOHN: Okay. And then the second
15 question, if I could, on those products with a
16 double-pass, do you expect the translocated organism to
17 be there in a double quantity, then?

18 DR. MARSDEN: I don't know if it'll be exactly
19 double. I think what happens is that the translocation
20 is proportional to the disruption of the surface and
21 carrying that surface into the center of the product. So
22 two passes would certainly result in the greater
23 translocation than one pass.

24 DR. PHEBUS: I might add on that that it would
25 still be probably 6 percent versus 3 percent. And you're
26 still on the same log cycle range.

27 DR. MARSDEN: Exactly.

1 DR. PHEBUS: So I would expect it to be fairly
2 minimal.

3 MR. BILLY: Bill?

4 DR. CRAY: Bill Cray, FSIS. How did you
5 enumerate the cells on your cook studies? And also, did
6 you have a resuscitation step in your --

7 DR. MARSDEN: I'll have Dr. Phebus answer that.

8 DR. PHEBUS: Okay. On the cook studies, we had
9 to directly plate so that we could enumerate to figure
10 our reductions. We actually played it on PRSA agar which
11 is much less selective and much more attuned to
12 recovering injured cells. So we've got several studies
13 that verify that as being the case. When we had truly
14 negative product, we did enrich and do a qualitative
15 assay to determine whether we could completely eliminate
16 it or not.

17 MR. BILLY: Other questions? Okay. Marty?

18 MR. HOLMES: I just wanted to make a statement
19 that, although a large number of our members do send
20 product through two times, two passes, the machine you
21 saw had two heads. Many of our members' machines only
22 have one head. So it may go through two times, but it's
23 going through a one-head machine, not a two-head machine.
24 So that's just something you might consider in the
25 future.

26 DR. MARSDEN: As Dr. Phebus pointed out, the
27 log level is going to be similar, whether it goes through

1 one pass or two passes. I wouldn't be too concerned
2 about that.

3 MR. BILLY: Okay. Nancy?

4 MS. DONLEY: Nancy Donley from STOP. Jim, did
5 you say that the risk assessment should be done based on
6 that list that you had of a good HACCP system which
7 included, for instance, a CCP in the slaughter phase?

8 DR. MARSDEN: Uh-huh, I did. That's exactly
9 what I mean is that I think that the risk assessment
10 should be conducted with the precondition that an
11 effective HACCP plan exists which, in my view, would
12 include a critical control point being a validated
13 antimicrobial step that would occur during the slaughter
14 process and the other conditions that I laid out, as
15 well, separation of the slaughter portion of the plant
16 from the post-slaughter portion of the plant, adequate
17 refrigeration, and so on.

18 MS. DONLEY: But right now, that's not the real
19 world.

20 DR. MARSDEN: Well, it's actually very often
21 the real world. You have the largest beef plants in the
22 United States all have a validated antimicrobial step in
23 their process. And increasingly, that's the case in
24 smaller plants, as well. So I don't know what the
25 percentage is, but the percentage is probably greater
26 than 90 percent of the beef slaughter plants in the
27 United States have validated intervention technologies in

1 place, and then whatever extent, to some extent, the
2 other things, as well.

3 That may be variable in terms of how they
4 separate the slaughter process from the post-slaughter
5 process and refrigeration capabilities and that type of
6 thing. But it's becoming, in my view, certainly in
7 larger plants the norm that these validated interventions
8 are, in fact, in place.

9 MS. DONLEY: But isn't it in some of these,
10 actually, in some of the smaller plants that a lot of
11 this processing is done? It's not done in --

12 DR. MARSDEN: Well, the processing is usually
13 done as further processing, so they are not -- it's not
14 like you have slaughter plants, generally, that are doing
15 this. They are buying their sub-primals or raw materials
16 from other plants.

17 So it's not 100 percent of validated
18 intervention is a pre-condition of bringing this into the
19 plant, and then maybe it should be, but it's generally
20 meat purveyors that are preparing steaks, and so on, for
21 restaurants that do this tenderization step, not
22 slaughter plants.

23 MR. BILLY: Okay. Marty, and then Mark.

24 MR. HOLMES: I was going to ask you a question,
25 Jim. You inoculated the surface with six logs. That is
26 a surface of a primal that, typically, would have been
27 trimmed more than once. I mean, you would have had a

1 carcass that would have been trimmed, a sub-primal
2 trimmed before it ever got to a blade-tenderizer.

3 DR. MARSDEN: That's right. That's another
4 thing that needs to be factored in the risk assessment is
5 that there's a lot of trimming that occurs from the
6 carcass level down to the sub-primal before it enters
7 this machine. And that needs to be factored in, as well.

8 MR. HOLMES: Can you give me some feel for what
9 would be a typical surface contamination of 0157 on a
10 carcass?

11 DR. MARSDEN: On a carcass?

12 MR. HOLMES: On a post-intervention carcass.

13 DR. MARSDEN: It would be approaching zero.

14 MR. HOLMES: And then, we're talking about
15 possibly trimming those even further before it goes
16 through a blade tenderizer, so I just want to make that
17 point.

18 DR. MARSDEN: With all of these provisions in
19 place, the probability of having any E. coli 0157:H7
20 would be remote, let alone three logs, six logs.

21 MR. BILLY: Yes, Mark?

22 DR. POWELL: In the current ground beef risk
23 assessment, rather than taking a worst-case scenario,
24 like you describe for the experimental study that
25 provides very useful information about the performance of
26 cooking, rather than taking worst-case scenario or the
27 alternative that you seem to be proposing which is a

1 best-case scenario, the agency's approach has been to try
2 and model the as-is scenario, the range of practices, the
3 range of concentrations that are the full range that are
4 existing, given the mix of practices that we see.

5 DR. MARSDEN: That's right. If you were to do
6 that and, and say for the sake of argument, that you
7 estimate a one-log contamination level, then you're going
8 to translate or translocate 3 percent of that into the
9 center. That's the kind of thing I'm talking about with
10 the risk assessment. And then you could do, like you
11 say, a moderate estimate risk assessment on what cooking
12 requirements would be necessary to assure the safety of
13 the product.

14 DR. POWELL: And to that end, it would be very
15 helpful to know about the range of practices in the
16 industry, as well as the relative frequency of those
17 practices in the industry.

18 DR. MARSDEN: Uh-huh, I agree.

19 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. We'll
20 move on now. The next presenter is Ms. Nancy Donley.
21 She is the president of Safe Tables Our Priority. And
22 she's going to provide a consumer's perspective in terms
23 of their expectations regarding this organism.

24 MS. DONLEY: I'd like to thank you for inviting
25 me here today to present STOP's comments on what we
26 consider a very critically important topic. We come from
27 an radically different perspective than, I dare say, just

1 about anybody else in this room. STOP's very origins are
2 a direct result from the problem, E. coli 0157:H7,
3 contaminated ground beef that we are discussing today.

4 Most of you are familiar with STOP, but for
5 those of you who may not be, let me give you a very brief
6 introduction of who we are. Safe Tables Our Priority was
7 founded in 1993 in the wake of the Jack-in-the-Box E.
8 coli 0157:H7 epidemic that sickened over 700 and killed a
9 documented four children in California and the Pacific
10 Northwest.

11 Grieving parents and concerned friends got
12 together to mourn, vent, and then to discuss ways on how
13 to prevent the horror that they experienced from
14 happening again. The channeling of personal grief and
15 the progressive efforts to effect reform makes STOP
16 unique for many activist organizations. We consider
17 ourself actionists. We are not willing to simply point
18 blame.

19 We want to work together with all food safety
20 stakeholders to produce the safest possible food to feed
21 our families. We want to see good-industry citizens
22 excel and the bad ones put out of business. We are
23 pleased that FSIS is moving forward in implementing the
24 adulteration policy announced over a year ago.

25 STOP has supported closing this food safety
26 loophole since 1998, and we appreciate the agency's
27 efforts to strengthen the random sampling program to

1 incorporate non-intact meat. The public strongly
2 supports testing for E. coli 0157. And I've got in this
3 bag several hundred petitions from consumers who just
4 want to weigh in with the agency their commitment to
5 0157. I'd be happier going back tonight; my suitcase
6 will be lighter.

7 The public really strongly supports, as I said,
8 testing for E. coli 0157. STOP knows from thousands of
9 phone calls that we've received on our hotline that the
10 public mistakenly believes that the government is
11 conducting now routine testing for E. coli 0157 in meat
12 plants.

13 They equate E. coli, generic E. coli, that they
14 read or hear about as the government's new scientific
15 inspection system, with the pathogenic strain. They
16 think they are one in the same. We are also pleased that
17 the agency wants to ensure that this policy is
18 implemented based on the best available information and
19 in a manner that will best protect public health.

20 We also wish to commend FSIS for expanding on
21 the questions listed in the White Paper to lead and lend
22 more balance to the discussion that we're having today.
23 Some of the points that have been clearly articulated
24 here and in the White Paper is that, number one, E. coli
25 0157:H7 is not as rare as previously thought in live
26 animals, up to 50 percent, and in ground beef, 40 percent
27 positive under the new sampling technique; that is,

1 Centers of Disease Control and Prevention has nearly
2 quadrupled the estimate of illnesses from E. coli 0157;
3 that the infectious doses for this organism is extremely
4 low, fewer than 10 organisms; and that E. coli can
5 produce severe and fatal consequences, particularly in
6 children and the elderly.

7 I'd like to share with you a few examples of
8 these consequences. This is Damian Piercing, and he
9 contracted E. coli 0157:H7 at a Boy Scout camping trip in
10 1992. He had over seven surgeries, four of them heart
11 surgeries. He no longer -- the lining of his heart had
12 to be removed. His kidneys failed, and his intestines
13 were punctured. He had to learn to stand, sit, and eat
14 again.

15 Seven years after his illness, his mother says
16 this disease is never over. Damian was hospitalized last
17 year three times with small bowel obstructions due to
18 abdominal scarring. At one point in Damian's illness,
19 they did have to remove his entire colon.

20 And I don't know if you can see. It's kind of
21 hard to see, but this red line here is where he was cut
22 open. And they had to remove -- and had to go over his
23 intestines inch-by-inch looking for punctures. And the
24 doctors cannot pack them back -- the intestines back in
25 the way God originally put them in our bodies. And he
26 suffers problems today.

1 Now, this is Brianne Kyner (phonetic). She was
2 one of the children hospitalized in the Jack-in-the-Box
3 outbreak in 1993. She spent two months in intensive care
4 and nearly six weeks in a coma. Her hospitalization
5 lasted nearly six months. She suffered from thousands of
6 seizures and three strokes. Every organ of her body
7 failed. She had swelled so much that they could not
8 close -- that's her abdomen -- they could not close her
9 up. She had to be left open while the swelling went
10 down, so that they could finally stitch her.

11 This is little Amy Ermo. This picture was
12 taken just two weeks before she became sick, just a
13 beautiful little girl, as you can see. Amy lives near
14 Sacramento, California. She got sick two weeks later and
15 was put in the hospital and in intensive care. She had
16 to receive two surgeries, and she was put on dialysis.

17 These pictures were taken when she was not at
18 the full height of her illness. Her parents were just
19 too concerned at that point that they couldn't even bear
20 to -- they didn't want to remember Amy this way if she
21 did die. Amy has survived, but they are very anxious
22 about, particularly AIDS test, coming back.

23 These are the lucky ones. What I just showed
24 you are the lucky ones. Their parents feel very lucky
25 and extremely blessed, because they still have their
26 children. Little Scotty Hinkley, he died, three years
27 old. Kevin Scott died in Seattle, Washington, a year

1 after Jack-in-the-Box when his parents thought it was
2 safe again to eat a hamburger.

3 All of these children, by the way, are
4 hamburger E. coli 0157:H7 accidents. This is Mrs. Metts.
5 She was 88 years old, very active, very fit until she ate
6 a hamburger with her daughter at home. This is Lauren
7 Rudolph. Lauren was the first to die in the
8 Jack-in-the-Box outbreak. And last of all, that's my
9 son. My son, Alex, didn't make it home either. So what
10 I have left are pictures like this and a death
11 certificate telling me he died of hemolytic uremic
12 syndrome.

13 At a time when we're seeing a higher prevalence
14 of 0157 and higher numbers of E. coli illnesses should be
15 recognized as a time for implementing more, not less,
16 aggressive plans in combatting the problem. It is a time
17 for government and the beef industry to acknowledge that
18 0157 is, in fact, a hazard reasonably likely to occur and
19 that HACCP plans from slaughter through processing must
20 address this hazard.

21 And I want to emphasize that each operation
22 must include 0157 as a hazard likely to occur. A single
23 accounting for it, either in the front or a back end of
24 the beef production process, won't suffice. It's simply
25 not enough to address E. coli 0157:H7 as a hazard
26 reasonably likely to occur only at a single point during
27 the slaughtering and processing of beef.

1 There are simply too many steps along the
2 continuum where cross-contamination can occur. It is
3 time for FSIS to broaden its pathogen reduction program
4 and include a comprehensive government testing program
5 for 0157 within its inspection program. The testing
6 program should be scientifically and statistically
7 designed to detect and prevent E. coli 0157-contaminated
8 beef from entering the marketplace.

9 Once a comprehensive testing program were
10 implemented at production, the need for the random
11 sampling program could be reviewed or modified, for
12 instance, to only test at the retail level. The current
13 random sampling program by FSIS was developed to
14 encourage voluntary testing by industry.

15 It had an added benefit of being able to detect
16 and prevent a limited number of adulterated product from
17 entering the marketplace, and it also had, again, a
18 limited effect on identifying contaminated product at the
19 retail level and effecting a recall. I use the term
20 limited, because the size of the sampling program is
21 minute when you compare it to the tonnage of ground beef
22 produced each year.

23 STOP has always encouraged voluntary testing by
24 industry, but the public needs to have
25 government-conducted inspection programs for pathogens.
26 Now, the industry's proposal of testing one out of every
27 300 carcasses to replace or reduce the need for FSIS's

1 random sampling program of non-intact beef does not
2 provide adequate protection to the public.

3 Testing results would not be available to the
4 public. And we certainly could not agree to a modified
5 Directive 10,010.1 to pass over or exempt production lots
6 all the way from slaughter through retail from FSIS's
7 Random Sampling Program simply because one out of 300
8 carcasses had been swiped by a plant employee. We will
9 not find that acceptable.

10 STOP has currently urged industry to develop
11 and implement additional testing programs of their own.
12 Supplemental approaches should always be considered as an
13 alternative, but they very rarely are. STOP has been
14 alarmed at the way industry wants government to horse
15 trade on food safety issues. This "I'll give you this if
16 you give me that" is not in the public's interest.

17 The objective should be not to maintain the
18 status quo, but rather to raise it. Let's see what the
19 outcome is with both programs. Industry, do your carcass
20 testing and, government, do the current random sampling.
21 And let's see what the results will be.

22 In the Federal Register notice, there were a
23 number of questions posed. And I'm just going to briefly
24 answer a couple of them. Question two asked a series of
25 questions regarding a redesign of the current program.
26 And as we stated earlier, we support 0157 testing as part

1 of government's HACCP-based inspection program within
2 each plant.

3 Until that time, FSIS should increase the
4 number of samples taken to allow for testing of
5 non-intact product, in addition to the current testing of
6 ground beef. What we're saying here is that the current
7 size of the sampling program need to be expanded to
8 account and adjust for non-intact, this new definition.
9 FSIS's current policy requiring 15 consecutive negative
10 samples, following a positive one, is a -- positive
11 result is a sound one.

12 So far, follow-up tests have yielded 11
13 positives. In Fiscal Year 1998, one plant tested
14 positive two consecutive times and another tested
15 positive three consecutive times. And in Fiscal Year
16 1999, one plant tested positive three times within two
17 months. Clearly, these plants were not operating as they
18 should. Consecutive 0157 testing identified that there
19 were systemic flaws which posed a serious threat to
20 public health.

21 There is no question that consecutive testing
22 provided an incentive for these plants to address their
23 food safety problems. STOP strongly encourages the
24 continuation of the consecutive testing policy. We are
25 interested in FSIS's plans to conduct some sampling to
26 assess the feasibility of identifying E. coli 0157:H7 on
27 carcasses and establishing a routine, and that an

1 agency-directed sampling program -- and then you had the
2 words "To supplement or replace FSIS's ongoing ground
3 beef testing."

4 We're pleased to see the term "supplement."
5 But we're distressed to see the term "replaced" at this
6 premature time. For the same reasons that we stated
7 earlier about the industry's carcass-testing proposal, we
8 urge FSIS to do comparative studies including either/or
9 and both scenarios before modifying or replacing its
10 ground beef testing.

11 Really, again, I commend the agency for looking
12 at both sides of the issue, looking at what if we do less
13 and what if we do more? And that's the way I think you
14 can make a really good decision on what type of policy
15 and how to implement it. Testing at all levels of the
16 production and distribution would have the most powerful
17 effect in encouraging the regulated industry to institute
18 pathogen reduction interventions, specifically for 0157.

19 In question three regarding the salmonella and
20 E. coli 0157 outcomes within plants, we are not aware of
21 any studies showing the correlation between the presence
22 of salmonella and E. coli 0157:H7. So we feel research
23 is needed before one can make any sort of definitive
24 comment on whether FSIS should target its sampling
25 program to plants with poor generic E. coli and
26 salmonella results.

1 STOP does support improved efforts to detect
2 0157 in food, and common sense suggests that these plants
3 would be a good place to target sampling efforts. We
4 still argue that the best strategy would be for FSIS to
5 test for 0157 as part of a HACCP-based inspection system.
6 And then, at question five is that STOP urges FSIS to
7 treat blade-tenderized beefsteaks and roasts the same as
8 other non-intact product.

9 Research presented in March and today by KSU
10 does show that 3 to 4 percent of surface contamination
11 was transferred into the interior of the muscle during a
12 blade-tenderization process. Because of the infectious
13 dosage of 0157 and the possibility of life-threatening
14 illness, we see no reason that these products should be
15 treated any differently than any other non-intact
16 products.

17 After determining in fall of 1999 that there is
18 insufficient information regarding the hygienic
19 processing of muscle systems to narrow the scope of
20 products affected by the E. coli 0157:H7 policy, FSIS
21 urged the industry to label their intact and non-intact
22 primal and sub-primal cuts with appropriate cooking
23 statements from the 1999 Food Code.

24 We, at STOP, would be interested in knowing to
25 what extent industry followed FSIS's advice. We are,
26 lastly, we are aware of the budgetary concerns on the
27 part of FSIS in implementing additional or supplemental

1 programs. You're having trouble meeting the current
2 program. But the public cannot and will not accept this
3 as an excuse for not doing everything possible to protect
4 them from harmful pathogens in their beef.

5 If this project cannot move forward because of
6 budgetary problems and/or inspection shortages, we want
7 FSIS to go back to the well. We also call on industry
8 here and those absent to lobby the administration,
9 Congress, and Secretary Glickman for additional funding
10 to fill inspector shortages. Consumers want
11 government-inspected meat and poultry. And we will
12 aggressively challenge any movement toward company
13 self-inspection.

14 Alternative inspection plans, even interim
15 inspection plans, are not acceptable. And we would
16 challenge the mark of inspection. STOP plans to submit
17 more extensive comments, written comments, by the April
18 deadline. But I would like to express, again, our
19 appreciate at being invited to present our views here
20 today. You saw just a few examples of the horrible toll
21 that E. coli 0157:H7 can take on its victims.

22 I don't have a little boy waiting for me
23 anymore at the end of my trip. For many people in this
24 room, it's about protecting a job, a company, or even a
25 whole industry. For us, at STOP, it's about protecting
26 lives. And we're here today on our own time and our own
27 dime to thank you at FSIS for working to strengthen

1 policies that will help prevent the tragedies you saw
2 today. We beg you to move swiftly. Thank you.

3 MR. BILLY: Thank you very much. Are there any
4 questions from the panel? Anyone else have any
5 questions? No? Okay. Thank you very much, Nancy.

6 MS. DONLEY: You're welcome.

7 MR. BILLY: The last presenter will be Ms.
8 Caroline Smith DeWaal. She's the director of Food Safety
9 for the Center for Science in the Public Interest. And
10 she's speaking this afternoon on behalf of the Safe Food
11 Coalition.

12 MS. DeWAAL: Can you hear me? Okay. Thank
13 you.

14 MR. BILLY: I can hear you fine.

15 MS. DeWAAL: Great. I just want to say thank
16 you. I think Nancy and I both appreciate that at the end
17 of this very long day where we've heard about five
18 government presentations, five industry and academic
19 presentations, one including numerous industry
20 representatives, and even an international presentation
21 that you saved a little room on your agenda to hear from
22 consumers. We do appreciate that.

23 Good evening. I guess we're entering evening
24 already. I'm speaking today on behalf of the Safe Food
25 Coalition. And we represent numerous consumer
26 organizations. Today, the Consumer Federation of
27 America, National Consumers League, and Government

1 Accountability Project, as well as CSPI and others are
2 endorsing this statement.

3 CSPI represents nearly 1 million consumers in
4 the U.S. and Canada on food safety and nutrition issues.
5 My remarks probably won't come as a surprise to most
6 people here. Pathogen testing is an essential weapon in
7 the government's arsenal against foodborne illness.
8 Testing at many levels is needed to maximize consumer and
9 public health protections.

10 Microbial testing at multiple levels was built
11 into the pathogen reduction and HACCP regulation which
12 utilizes both industry and government testing. USDA
13 requires all beef, pork, and poultry slaughter plants to
14 test their own products for generic E. coli. Government
15 tests these slaughter operations and some beef, pork, and
16 poultry processors for salmonella.

17 As this data shows, this program has had a
18 marked improvement on salmonella contamination levels
19 across the meat and poultry industry. And I'm giving you
20 just some example here given out recently by Secretary
21 Glickman at a meeting in Washington. But we see
22 reductions from one quarter to almost 50 percent of
23 salmonella in some meat and poultry -- portions of the
24 meat and poultry industry.

25 Unfortunately, the lessons of the last few
26 years have also shown us that control of this one hazard
27 does not result in control of all hazards. In fact,

1 recalls for other hazards in meat continued at a high
2 level last year. And this is just data for 1999.

3 We had Listeria-contaminated meat and poultry
4 products recalled 33 times and E. coli-contaminated meat
5 and poultry products were recalled 10 times. So, though
6 now we're seeing improvements in some areas, clearly more
7 work can be done.

8 The lesson of HACCP implementation -- in
9 addition, I just want to make this final note. I'm sure
10 we'll all remember the fact that 1998 and 1999 also gave
11 us one of the most deadly outbreaks of foodborne illness
12 when Listeria monocytogenes in a processed meat product
13 sickened 100 people and killed 21.

14 The lessons of HACCP implementation show
15 clearly that systemic pathogen testing of meat and
16 poultry products is an essential adjunct to HACCP
17 systems. Microbial testing provides both the food
18 industry and the government an objective measure for
19 evaluating HACCP's effectiveness. Recent improvements in
20 salmonella-contamination rates show that testing and
21 performance standards also provide incentive for meat and
22 poultry processors to improve.

23 It is time to expand this testing to cover more
24 products and more pathogens, especially those that
25 trigger adulteration standards. There is another model
26 for pathogen testing that differs from the model used in
27 the HACCP regulation. It is being used for two

1 pathogens, *Listeria monocytogenes* and *E. coli* 0157:H7.
2 And this model is marked by the fact that it utilizes
3 limited random government testing for the pathogen of
4 concern.

5 And when the pathogen is found in the food,
6 according to this government test, the products are
7 subject to a voluntary recall. This model has been used
8 by the government to address serious hazards in certain
9 food products which the industry hasn't been able to
10 adequately control.

11 The *E. coli* 0157:H7 Adulteration Policy and
12 Ground Beef Testing Program was announced in 1994, over
13 one year after a major outbreak -- actually, I'll go back
14 up -- after a major outbreak sickened over 700 consumers
15 and was linked to the deaths of four children. In
16 situations like this, the government must act promptly to
17 address serious safety concerns and to restore consumer
18 confidence.

19 However, many years later -- six years later,
20 actually, there are many criticisms that can be leveled
21 at this limited approach to testing. It is reactive,
22 instead of prevention-oriented. The number of tests
23 conducted each year is highly inadequate to address the
24 problem. It's like throwing darts at -- the program is
25 not systemic and provides inadequate coverage.

26 It's like throwing darts at a dart board.
27 Although the government hits the target occasionally,

1 it's clearly missing a lot of the problem. The same is
2 true for the government's Listeria testing program
3 currently in place for ready-to-eat meat and poultry
4 products. And CSPI recently petitioned USDA to change
5 this program.

6 And I believe that our analysis here is
7 applicable to both hazards. We support changing the E.
8 coli testing system to one that is more systematic, that
9 is more prevention-oriented, and that gives consumers
10 greater assurance that it is actually catching the
11 hazards in the food supply.

12 In 1994, Michael Taylor, the Administrator of
13 the Food Safety and the Inspection Service, announced the
14 E. coli policy that we have today. In his speech to the
15 American Meat Institute annual conference, Taylor said,
16 "In the case of the 0157:H7 in raw ground beef, the only
17 satisfactory public health goal is to eliminate
18 contamination.

19 "We must look for ways to reduce the likelihood
20 that contaminated animals will enter the stream of
21 commerce, the risk that any pathogenic bacteria present
22 in the intestinal tract will contaminate meat during the
23 slaughter process, and the potential for subsequent
24 growth of any organism that may be present.

25 In short, technological innovation and
26 production, slaughter, and processing must be harnessed

1 and applied aggressively if we're to move effectively
2 towards our public health goal."

3 Taylor's words provide an important reminder of
4 the challenges that continue to face the beef industry.
5 We strongly support FSIS in expanding the adulteration
6 policy to non-intact meat. This step is essential if all
7 segments of the beef industry are to share responsibility
8 for meeting these challenges.

9 Some things have changed, however, since the
10 original testing program for E. coli 0157:H7 was
11 announced. We now know that this hazard is much more
12 prevalent in live animal than was assumed in 1994. Also,
13 CDC's estimate of the annual burden of human illness has
14 greatly increased. Obviously, previous efforts to
15 control the pathogen have not worked.

16 It is time to bring this problem into the HACCP
17 area. First, E. coli 0157:H7 should be considered a
18 hazard reasonably likely to occur for beef slaughter and
19 processing operations. And the hazard should be included
20 in their HACCP plans. And they should institute
21 technological controls to address it.

22 If a company has evidence indicating that E.
23 coli is not a hazard for a particular type of cattle that
24 it slaughters, the burden should be on the company to
25 seek an exemption from the general policy and make
26 supporting data available to FSIS. Second, government

1 testing for E. coli 0157:H7 should be continued and
2 industry testing should be added.

3 When Mike Taylor announced the original policy
4 on E. coli, consumers believed that government testing
5 would provide greater incentives for the industry to test
6 their own products. We were wrong. Unfortunately, as
7 with Listeria, food lawyers advised the meat industry
8 that it is better not to know if their product contains a
9 deadly hazard.

10 The government must counter this
11 hide-your-head-in-the-sand approach to product testing,
12 product safety with the testing mandate. Microbial
13 testing for E. coli 0157:H7 should achieve the following
14 objectives: First and foremost, it should verify that
15 the plants' HACCP systems are effective in controlling E.
16 coli 0157:H7 and also identify problems so that
17 corrective actions can be taken.

18 Second, the testing should improve the
19 likelihood that contaminated products are detected and
20 either further processed to eliminate pathogens, recalled
21 if the product is already in commerce, or destroyed. It
22 can also provide incentives for companies to implement
23 effective interventions against E. coli both on the farm
24 and during the slaughter process and to conduct their own
25 thorough testing.

26 Finally, testing can fulfill the -- facilitate
27 the acquisition on data on such questions as the seasonal

1 and geographic prevalence of the pathogen, the
2 effectiveness of various intervention measures
3 implemented by the industry, and the relative utility of
4 carcass sampling versus bin sampling versus finished, raw
5 product sampling.

6 Neither government sampling nor industry
7 sampling alone would achieve these objectives. Instead,
8 FSIS should develop a comprehensive E. coli 0157:H7
9 strategy that includes both systematic microbial testing
10 by both the government and the industry.

11 USDA should consider the following element for
12 its sample program:

13 Mandatory industry testing of carcasses and
14 trimmings in slaughter houses and grinding operations.

15 Slaughter houses and grinding operations should
16 be required to test both carcasses and trimmings for the
17 presence of 0157:H7 at least until sufficient data exists
18 to demonstrate that thorough carcass sampling obviates
19 the need to test the trimmings. It may be appropriate to
20 allow plants that conduct more frequent carcass testing
21 to reduce the testing of trimmings.

22 As part of its rule-making, FSIS should consult
23 an independent expert body regarding how lot size for
24 carcass testing should be determined. The number one in
25 300 is a number that the industry came up with for
26 carcass sampling. But it really appears to have come out
27 of the air. And we need a better estimate of what the

1 appropriate sampling frequency should be and how the lot
2 size should be determined, given that sampling frequency.

3 Consumer protection must be maximized in
4 determining both lot size and the sampling frequency.
5 And actual carcasses that are sampled should be held
6 pending test results.

7 Any positive tests should trigger appropriate
8 corrective actions, including step-upped sampling in the
9 plant, and repeated positives should trigger revalidation
10 of interventions and possibly changes in the slaughter
11 processes.

12 All positives should be reported to FSIS
13 immediately, and the agency should take appropriate
14 action, including asking for product recalls.

15 Second, random FSIS testing based on risk:

16 FSIS should significantly increase the number
17 of E. coli 0157:H7 tests conducted annually and should
18 establish a protocol for conducting the tests in order to
19 evaluate a plant's process controls.

20 FSIS should target establishments that do not
21 conduct their own testing and/or do not employ validated
22 interventions initially. But once the entire industry is
23 required to perform its own testing, FSIS sampling should
24 be focused on those plants and raw meat products that
25 historically have posed the greatest risk.

26 Until sufficient 0157:H7 data are obtained from
27 the plants, the results from the salmonella and generic

1 E. coli testing can be useful in determining where to
2 sample. Once industry testing is fully implemented, all
3 plants should be subject to random government testing.
4 In a pooled system, similar to the one in use today, for
5 the salmonella testing program.

6 The trade-offs currently reflected in the FSIS
7 Directive 10,010.1 should be eliminated. As all beef
8 slaughter and most processing plants would be required to
9 conduct systemic testing. FSIS's program should be
10 dynamic, and not static. And the agency should alter its
11 testing program based on the data derived from both the
12 government and the industry testing.

13 The focus should be on identifying the riskiest
14 plants and products and taking the appropriate measures
15 to assure their safety. Now, in my talk, I also
16 addressed a bunch of other issues posed by USDA, but I'm
17 going to spare you all. And you can read it if you want
18 in my written text.

19 So in conclusion, I just want to say that USDA
20 should take responsibility to devise a new testing policy
21 for E. coli 0157:H7 that is more systemic, more
22 prevention-oriented, and one that gives the consumers
23 greater assurance that it is actually catching the
24 hazards in the food supply. In addition, the new policy
25 should utilize the lessons learned from HACCP
26 implementation, including the importance of testing at
27 several levels to maximize public health protections.

1 Combining both industry and government testing
2 for E. coli 0157:H7 would significantly improve consumer
3 protection from this deadly bacteria. It's important
4 that FSIS bring the E. coli policy into the HACCP era.
5 First, E. coli has to be considered a hazard reasonably
6 likely to occur. With the new data, especially on
7 prevalence in the live cattle, this is very important.

8 And it's also the trigger that will mandate --
9 that the industry's actually implement the interventions
10 that appear to be available to control it. And industry
11 testing should be mandated to verify that the controls
12 are working to eliminate the hazards. The data we saw
13 from the industry coalition today was quite striking in
14 providing evidence for how testing can be used to verify
15 process control.

16 Finally, as FSIS modernizes this policy, it
17 also should mandate pathogen testing in other areas such
18 as listeria in ready-to-eat meat and poultry products and
19 -- capturvacture (sp) in poultry products. These are the
20 next logical steps to incorporate the science of
21 microbiology in order to modernize FSIS's regulatory
22 program and to improve food safety.

23 These were the promises made to us in 1994.
24 And it is time to move forward on them. These steps are
25 essential if the government and the industry want to
26 continue the work that was begun in 1994 to improve

1 consumer confidence in meat and poultry products. Thank
2 you.

3 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you. Any questions
4 from the panel? Other questions. Yes, Kim?

5 MS. RICE: Kim Rice, American Meat Institute.
6 It's not a question. I just want to clarify for the
7 record that the one in 300 frequency that the industry
8 used -- the beef industry coalition used was based not
9 only on the USDA sampling frequency for generic E. coli
10 and salmonella or -- excuse me -- for generic E. coli, it
11 was also based on a outside recommendation from a testing
12 laboratory based on using already used combo sampling
13 programs through the fast-food customers that the
14 sampling at the rate of one in 300 was as -- the same,
15 basically, as the combo sampling that's used by the fast-
16 food customers. So it wasn't just pulled out of the air.

17 MR. BILLY: Other questions? Okay. Thank you
18 very much. Oh, yes, Jim?

19 DR. MARSDEN: Yes.

20 MR. BILLY: State your name, Jim.

21 DR. MARSDEN: Jim Marsden, American Meat
22 Institute. You're advocating many times more testing for
23 pathogen and it does still occur in the low incidence
24 rate in natural product. So obviously, your desire is to
25 improve public health, not just simply to test and reduce
26 the numbers in the product. But I think the ultimate
27 measure here is the public health hazard.

1 If you take an analogy and you look at the
2 numbers that you've gotten from Sec. Glickman, a 25
3 percent reduction on salmonella and 33 percent in ground
4 beef and a big percentage in -- and you compare that to
5 the CDC illness data, it leads me to at least question
6 whether more testing leads to a better health out lay.
7 I'd like to hear your opinion.

8 MS. DeWAAL: I'm a little confused. What exact
9 comparison are you making with the CDC figures?

10 DR. MARSDEN: Well, their estimates on illness,
11 in particularly.

12 MS. DeWAAL: Well, the estimates on illness
13 were revised recently. Are you interpreting that as an
14 increase? Are you using the FoodNet data? What data set
15 are we working from for CDC? The CDC figures for illness
16 are over 70,000 illnesses a year. I believe it's 73,000
17 from E. coli 0157:H7, the vast majority of which are from
18 beef products and the highest, clearly 55 percent, as I
19 saw, were from ground beef.

20 So this is a major contributor to a public
21 health problem that -- and testing of ground beef and
22 testing of beef carcasses would clearly help to maximize
23 consumer protections in this area. So I guess I'm
24 concerned -- I'm confused about which CDC data you were
25 trying to rely on in your question.

26 DR. MARSDEN: Maybe, I should ask for
27 clarification of some of the data. I can't even -- find

1 it -- when you look at the most recent estimates, those
2 estimates have --

3 MS. WACHSMUTH: No, they've gone down.

4 MR. BILLY: Identify yourself.

5 MS. WACHSMUTH: Kay Wachsmuth, FSIS. The last
6 report from FoodNet indicated a downward trend. That was
7 the '98 report; '99 hasn't come out yet. But I'm told if
8 you look at the original five sites, it might still be
9 that way for campobacteriosis (sp) and salmonellosis.

10 It's not dramatic, but I think Mark brought
11 attention to the fact in his presentation that, in
12 effect, some place in the chain may not have an exact
13 causal effect on the outcome. The 25 percent reduction
14 in the products may mean an increase in risk, but it
15 might not be a 25 percent risk. If Mark wants to --

16 DR. POWELL: That's right. And I just wanted
17 to try and clarify, I think, some of the confusion.
18 Since Dr. Olsen's not here, I'll pretend to speak for
19 CDC. Our numbers were very consistent with CDC's
20 estimates. And the increase in the reported estimate of
21 the number of illnesses nationwide, a large majority of
22 that increase is due to CDC capturing the 90 percent,
23 roughly, of cases that result in less severe health
24 outcomes, non-bloody diarrhea for which the patient does
25 not seek medical care.

26 And so if you look at their case control
27 studies, there's only been two, but the idealogic

1 fraction estimated from those two case control studies,
2 the proportion of illnesses attributable to ground beef
3 appears to be in decline from the initial case control
4 study to the second case control study, which has not yet
5 been firmly reported, but has been presented at various
6 scientific conferences.

7 So our best estimate, based on both the case
8 control study and the more recent outbreak data is that
9 currently somewhere between 16 and 40 percent of the
10 total can be attributed to ground beef, but our most
11 likely estimate was in that range which is consistent
12 with the most recent case control study is that it's on
13 the order of 20 percent.

14 MS. WACHSMUTH: The only data that you can
15 actually use to say something's gone up or down is data
16 that have been collected in the same way over a period of
17 time. The FoodNet data are the only data that can
18 address whether it's gone up or down. And they are
19 showing a slight downward trend. It think it's very
20 confusing, the new burden of disease document.

21 It makes it look like something's changed. But
22 what's changed is just the way that CDC's been able to
23 gather more data and different data and look at it in
24 that document, that study. But the FoodNet data, over
25 time, are the only trend data we have. And I think
26 Sonja's slide for 0157 specifically didn't show much of a
27 change one way or the other over the three years.

1 And HUS seemed to be about the same the last
2 two years. But the salmonella and camperia (sp) they
3 seem to be coming down.

4 MS. DeWAAL: I believe she did have a slide,
5 though, and it may have been the outbreak data where it
6 showed that the outbreak -- this 16 percent doesn't jive
7 with one of the slides she had, which showed that about
8 55 percent of the -- probably the illnesses linked to
9 outbreaks are from ground beef and another ten percent
10 from other beef products.

11 SPEAKER: And that's the percent of reported
12 outbreaks the likely vehicle identified for reported
13 outbreaks dating back to '83 or '82, I believe.

14 MS. DeWAAL: And I'll be certainly interested
15 to see your rationale for having that number at 16
16 percent in the risk assessment. But I'm sure that will
17 be interesting reading.

18 MR. BILLY: Are there other questions? Okay.
19 Thank you, Caroline.

20 MS. DeWAAL: Thank you, Tom.

21 MR. BILLY: We have the room till six o'clock,
22 and there are five people that have identified their
23 desire to make some comments. I want to ask all of them
24 to keep their comments as brief as possible. The first
25 person is Steven Grover, who is with the National
26 Restaurant Association. Hi, Steve.

1 MR. GROVER: Hi, Tom. I'll make my comments
2 brief. Can everybody hear? I'm pretty loud. I only
3 have a couple of points to make. The National Restaurant
4 Association represents about 40,000 independent
5 corporations which represent about 200,000 restaurants.
6 There are about one million restaurants in the country
7 today. We're a major consumer of ground beef and ground
8 beef products.

9 We encourage FSIS to work closely with the beef
10 industry and consumers such as ourselves to focus on a
11 science-based prevention of this pathogen. You need to
12 keep in mind bacteria are a normal part of most raw
13 foods, including ground beef.

14 No matter how much we wish for, simple
15 silver-bullet solutions, they are just not going to work
16 if they are not scientifically based or statistically
17 valid. No matter how many samples we take for low-level
18 pathogens, I don't think we're ever going to take enough
19 to give us the assurance of food safety that we would
20 like to see.

21 Quite frankly, I think we need to shift focus
22 to a more proactive approach where we implement pathogen
23 control programs and we use non-pathogenic organisms to
24 assure the statistical validity of the program. I think
25 the science is clear on that that low-level pathogens
26 and, quite frankly, I think you confuse the subject when

1 you start talking about salmonella, listeria, and E.
2 coli.

3 These are all unique pathogens. They have
4 unique problems. There's unique problems associated with
5 it. And when you talk about it together, you confuse the
6 entire topic. We're talking about E. coli here today.
7 We're talking about a low-level pathogen. It doesn't
8 happen. It's hard to find. No matter what you say, no
9 matter what the prevalence is, it's hard to find.

10 And I like the comment if you get zero, it
11 doesn't tell you anything. If you get consistent zeroes
12 and you get consistent zeroes on sampling, it's not
13 telling you anything. It's not telling you anything
14 about your process. It's not telling you anything about
15 your controls. And it's not telling you how good a job
16 you're doing, whether you're controlling it or not.

17 We need to find a better way to do it. It does
18 the restaurant industry no good. It does consumers no
19 good to simply find out that the ground beef we ate was
20 contaminated with E. coli after the fact. Sampling, it's
21 just not going to work. You can sample till the cows
22 come home at all levels.

23 While the question of scientific basis and
24 statistical justification for the current E. coli 0157:H7
25 policy is in debate, we strongly feel that FSIS should
26 set science-based standards for the production of ground
27 beef. But they must be scientifically-based and

1 statistically valid. I don't want there to be the same
2 chance of finding E. coli as there is for hitting the
3 lottery.

4 I mean, the bottom line is we need to make sure
5 that what we're doing is right and making a marked
6 improvement in the production of beef and the final end
7 product. To solve this problem, we need to consider
8 available science, quick fixes, and overly simplistic
9 schemes must be avoided, no matter how attractive they
10 may seem to be.

11 Again, pathogen testing of any low-level
12 pathogen in food is no assurance of food safety to the
13 restaurant industry. Finally, we encourage FSIS to
14 continue working with the industry, continue working with
15 consumers. And we dedicate our resources to helping
16 solve this problem. We would like to see an improvement
17 in the scientific understanding of this pathogen.

18 And we would like to work with FSIS and the
19 beef industry to implement meaningful, proactive controls
20 that prevent illnesses from happening, not just simply
21 sampling. Thank you.

22 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. The
23 next commenter is Richard Wood from FACT.

24 MR. WOOD: Thank you for this opportunity to
25 provide comments regarding FSIS policy on E. coli
26 0157:H7. I am Richard Wood, the Executive Director for
27 Food Animal Concerns Trust, or FACT. We're a non-profit,

1 not-for-profit organization that advocates for the use of
2 better farming practices to improve the safety of meat,
3 milk, and eggs.

4 Our response is focused on issues related to
5 the first and sixth questions that are before us.
6 Question one, should E. coli 0157 be addressed in animal
7 production HACCP plans? FACT supports the use of on-farm
8 HACCP pathogen controls for all producers raising cattle
9 for food consumption.

10 With the new data that the prevalence of 0157
11 is existing increasingly so in cattle, or at least it's
12 being identified there in increasing numbers, the FSIS
13 food safety system should be one that truly moves from
14 farm to table. FACT believes that the stakes are too
15 high to allow contaminated cattle to enter the slaughter
16 house door and then to trust that everyone else, in all
17 their technology, is vigilant from that point on to the
18 dinner table.

19 FACT wants the farm and the feed lot to be an
20 integral part of any FSIS pathogen control response. We
21 need to move forward with the science that we have in
22 hand now. A growing body of evidence exists in the
23 literature regarding on-farm mitigation steps and this
24 pathogen. These studies should form the basis of our
25 on-farm response with other steps being added or modified
26 as new studies warrant.

1 For example -- and I'll just mention a couple
2 here -- research has shown that a transmission point for
3 E. coli 0157 among cattle is the water troth where this
4 pathogen can survive for at least four months in its
5 sediments. Research has found that keeping water troths
6 clean and regularly changing the water for cattle appears
7 to be a most effective barrier to the disease.

8 Regarding feed, the NAMS (sp) cattle and feed
9 evaluation found that that cattle receiving barley were
10 two point seven five times more likely to have a positive
11 sample than cattle receiving barley. Another study found
12 significantly higher prevalence of 0157 in herds where
13 corn sodage was fed. The use of propionic and acidic
14 acids appear to inhibit growth of fecal E. coli. Adding
15 such acids to feed stored outside should be evaluated as
16 a mitigation step to protect cattle from 0157.

17 Regarding stress, research has demonstrated
18 that stress may cause calves and full-grown cattle to
19 become more susceptible to infection by 0157:H7 and that
20 management measures to prevent stress may reduce the
21 spread of infection. Continued research is needed,
22 focusing on such issues as stress-related decrowding,
23 transportation, and changes in diet. It's time for
24 on-farm controls.

25 Question six, how effective are voluntary
26 producer actions? FACT believes that while quality
27 assurance programs are good producer education tools,

1 they are no substitute for a nationwide HACCP need
2 required by the current situation with E. coli 0157:H7.
3 Reliance on voluntary programs will not provide consumers
4 with the confidence that the food is safe.

5 First, the voluntary programs are not
6 accountable to the public through the regulatory
7 agencies. There is no publicly available data as to the
8 actual number of producers participating in these
9 programs. And you meet with producer groups and talk and
10 you find they speak in the terms of high numbers, but the
11 NAMS (phonetic) cattle and feed evaluation said there was
12 only 18 percent of cattle producers that participated in
13 training programs.

14 And the numbers are probably higher now. But
15 there's no public accountability in terms of
16 participation. There's no public accountability as to
17 what program requires regarding pathogens and whether or
18 not the requirement are verified mitigating steps and
19 other commodity groups where individual state programs
20 exist has led to a patch work of diverse programs and
21 requirements.

22 This situation gives consumers little
23 confidence when faced with a production system where feed
24 lots in several states ship to processing plants in other
25 states. We can ill afford a patch work response to E.
26 coli 0157:H7. FACT calls for a federally regulated,
27 on-farm HACCP pathogen program.

1 This program would assure consumers that the
2 federal response to E. coli 0157 involves all producers,
3 that these producers are meeting the same standards of
4 pathogen controls and that these standards are the same
5 throughout the industry in the U.S. Thank you.

6 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. Is Joe
7 Maas here? Okay. The next speaker is Marty Holmes with
8 the National Food Processors Association.

9 MR. HOLMES: Dave Bernard would be glad to know
10 that they've added me to his staff.

11 MR. BILLY: Oh, sorry, Marty.

12 MR. HOLMES: That's all right. No problem.
13 Dave and I need to go fishing anyway.

14 MR. BILLY: I just read off the sheet.

15 MR. HOLMES: That's all right. North American
16 Meat Processors Association. I appreciate the time, and
17 I will make this very brief. A couple of things that, as
18 it relates to mechanical tenderizer -- blade-tenderized
19 products, a couple of facts I wanted to reiterate. They
20 were made previously, though.

21 The National Advisory Committee for
22 microbiological criteria for foods suggested that the
23 agency do a full risk assessment on these products before
24 making any regulatory action on those products. No cases
25 of 0157:H7 have been documented by CDC or anyone else
26 regarding mechanically tenderized products that we're
27 aware of. Caucuses are treated with a pathogen

1 intervention method they are further trimmed as primals
2 and sub-primals before entering a blade tenderizer.

3 And so if there was a gross contamination on
4 the surface, the odds of that ever reaching the blade
5 tenderizer is very very small. And the only study that's
6 been done so far is KSU's data which used a inoculated
7 surface that's far beyond anything that we see in nature.

8 And because of these points and in the wake of
9 that data, we respectfully request that the agency remove
10 the policy clarification on mechanically tenderized and
11 blade-tenderized products until they've done their own
12 full risk assessment based on these facts that have been
13 presented. Thank you.

14 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you, Marty. And
15 that's Marty from the North American Meat Processors
16 Association. The final speaker is Jimmie Keaton.

17 SPEAKER: Collis Powell is going to speak for
18 him.

19 MR. BILLY: Is he? Okay.

20 SPEAKER: He had to leave to get his plane.

21 MR. BILLY: Okay. Collis Powell with the
22 American Meat Science Association.

23 MR. POWELL: Yes, I'm executive director of
24 American Meat Science Association. Jimmie Keaton of
25 Texas A&M is our current past president. He had to catch
26 that last flight back to Dallas so that he could get back
27 to school to teach in the morning. What we wanted to

1 bring to you was, again, very similar to the testimony we
2 presented a year ago.

3 Back in January of 1999, the American Meat
4 Science Association, which consists of over 1,000 meat
5 researchers from around the world, pulled together 35 of
6 the best minds in statistics, microbiology, food
7 microbiology, and brought them together to answer the
8 questions of what can you do with microbial sampling in a
9 beef food safety program? We wanted them to evaluate the
10 concept of microbial sampling, say what you can, cannot
11 do.

12 And they also looked at evaluating approaches
13 to existing sample plans. And when you get 35 scientists
14 in one room to get them to agree on anything is sometimes
15 like pulling teeth. We managed to reach consensus on
16 eight points. The points are highlighted in the complete
17 report that we have, the scientific perspective on the
18 role of microbiological testing in beef food safety
19 programs.

20 I think it's appropriate that we end with this
21 today, a reminder of what the scientists say is possible
22 and is not possible with microbiological testing. Very
23 quickly, the eight points. Number one, the main purpose
24 of microbiological testing of foods is to validate and
25 verify process control measures in the context of a
26 properly implemented HACCP program.

1 Number two, effective microbiological testing
2 programs are based on sound food safety objectives with
3 defiable microbiological performance criteria. Number
4 three, pathogen testing at any stage will not assure food
5 safety. Number four, foodborne pathogens will not be
6 detected consistently when they are not randomly
7 distributed and/or they occur at a low incidence.

8 Number five, pathogens or other micro organisms
9 at a low incidence cannot be used to assess process
10 control. Number six, testing for appropriate
11 non-pathogenic organisms will allow validation and
12 verification of process control systems designed to
13 improve food safety. Number seven, declaration of a
14 foodborne pathogen as an adulterant in raw products
15 discourages testing for that pathogen.

16 It leads to a false sense of security among
17 consumers. It discourages evaluation of potential
18 control measures, and it encourages the inappropriate use
19 of microbiological testing. And finally, number eight,
20 microbiological testing of foods in production is
21 important, but is only a part of the overall strategy for
22 controlling food safety. And they suggested education
23 concerning proper handling and cooking is essential.

24 Thank you.

25 MR. BILLY: Okay. Thank you very much. I'd
26 like to thank all of you for your participation. I know
27 this has been a long and somewhat arguous process. On

1 the other hand, it's a very critical subject of
2 importance to everyone that's here. We very much
3 appreciate all the material that's been presented by the
4 various speakers.

5 We also appreciate the participation of those
6 of you in the audience. We will very carefully consider
7 all of this input and weigh it as we move forward to
8 develop a revised White Paper, which as I indicated in my
9 opening remarks, we plan to present to the National
10 Advisory Committee for Meat and Poultry Inspection -- I
11 believe, the meeting is in May.

12 So we look forward to that, and hopefully many
13 of you will participate as part of that process, as well.
14 So, again, thank you all very much.

15 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 6:00
16 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER, TRANSCRIBER AND PROOFREADER

Recent Developments Regarding Beef Products -
Contaminated With Escherichia Coli O157:H7
Name of Hearing or Event

N/A
Docket No.

Arlington, VA
Place of Hearing

February 29, 2000
Date of Hearing

We, the undersigned, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages, numbers 1 through 271, inclusive, constitute the true, accurate and complete transcript prepared from the tapes and notes prepared and reported by Jan M. Jablonsky, who was in attendance at the above identified hearing, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the current USDA contract, and have verified the accuracy of the transcript (1) by preparing the typewritten transcript from the reporting or recording accomplished at the hearing and (2) by comparing the final proofed typewritten transcript against the recording tapes and/or notes accomplished at the hearing.

2/29/00
Date
Terri Matthews
Name and Signature of Transcriber
Heritage Reporting Corporation

2/29/00
Date
George McGrath
Name and Signature of Proofreader
Heritage Reporting Corporation

2/29/00
Date
Jan M. Jablonsky
Name and Signature of Reporter

Heritage Reporting Corporation
(202) 628-4888

Heritage Reporting Corporation

Heritage Reporting Corporation
(202) 628-4888